Positive Psychology. Группа авторов

the extent that the human nurturant impulse relies on appraisal‐based other‐oriented emotions such as empathic concern, it should be relatively easy to generalize. And two specific factors may have facilitated the emergence of such generalization: (a) human cognitive capacity, including the capacity for symbolic thought and analogic reasoning; and (b) lack of evolutionary advantage for limiting empathic concern and parental nurturance to offspring in early human hunter‐gatherer bands. In these bands, not only were those in need often one’s children or close kin, but survival of one’s genes was tightly tied to the welfare even of those who weren’t close kin (Hrdy, 2009; Kelly, 1995; Sober & Wilson, 1998). In contemporary society, the prospect of generalization of parental nurturance appears more plausible when you think of the emotional sensitivity and tender care that can be provided by nannies, workers in day‐care centers, adoptive parents, and pet owners.

      If the roots of human altruism lie in generalized parental nurturance, then altruism is woven tightly into our nature and into the fabric of everyday life. Empathy‐induced altruism isn’t exceptional or unnatural, but a central feature of the human condition. Rather than looking for such altruism only in acts of extreme self‐sacrifice, it should be manifest in our everyday experience. The empathy‐altruism research provides evidence that it is.

      Practical implications

      Now that we have the “what” of the empathy‐altruism hypothesis before us, we can turn to why it’s important – the implications. Research shows that empathy‐induced altruism isn’t an unalloyed good. It offers important benefits but also has important liabilities, and we need to be aware of both. Let me highlight some of the key benefits and liabilities. (For more extensive discussion and review of relevant research, see Batson, 2011, 2018.)

      Benefits of empathy‐induced altruism

      More, more sensitive, and less fickle help. Perhaps the least surprising benefit is that feeling empathic concern leads us to help the target(s) of empathy more. Even before the empathy‐altruism hypothesis was tested, there was evidence that empathic concern can increase the likelihood of helping (e.g., Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Krebs, 1975). Now, knowing that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation, we have reason to believe it can improve the quality of help as well – producing help that is more sensitive to the needs of the person for whom empathy is felt.

Egoistic goals such as gaining rewards and avoiding punishments can often be reached even if our help doesn’t alleviate the needy individual’s suffering. For these goals, it’s the thought that counts. But for empathy‐induced altruism, the other’s welfare counts; our focus is on the other’s need and its relief. Experimental evidence supports this reasoning. Unlike those feeling little empathy, individuals induced to feel empathic concern tend to feel good after helping only if the other’s need is relieved (Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Weeks, 1996). And our concern for the other’s welfare includes sensitivity to future needs. Sibicky, Schroeder, and Dovidio (1995) provided experimental evidence that empathic concern reduced helping when the help, although meeting an immediate need, would be detrimental in the long term (e.g., think of parents who refuse to give their beloved child unhealthy treats).

      In addition to producing more sensitive help, empathy‐induced altruistic motivation is also likely to be less fickle than egoistic motives for helping. Research indicates that individuals experiencing relatively low empathy – and so a predominance of egoistic over altruistic motivation – are far less likely to help when either (a) they can easily escape exposure to the other’s need without helping or (b) they can easily justify to themselves and others a failure to help (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson et al., 1988; Toi & Batson, 1982). The practical implications of these findings are disturbing because easy escape and ready justification for not helping are common characteristics of many helping situations. Amid the blooming, buzzing confusion of everyday life, we can almost always find a way to direct attention elsewhere or to convince ourselves that inaction is justified. Given this, the practical potential of empathy‐induced altruistic motivation looks promising indeed. In the research just cited, individuals experiencing relatively high empathy showed no noticeable decrease in readiness to help under conditions of easy escape, high justification, or both.

      Less aggression. A second benefit is inhibition of aggression. To the degree that feeling empathic concern for a person in need produces altruistic motivation to maintain or increase their welfare, it should inhibit any inclination to aggress against or harm that person. This inhibitory effect was impressively demonstrated by Harmon‐Jones, Vaughn‐Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, and Harmon‐Jones (2004). They assessed the effect of empathy on anger‐related left‐frontal cortical electroencephalographic (EEG) activity following an insult. As predicted based on the empathy‐altruism hypothesis, relative left‐frontal cortical EEG activity, which is typically increased by insult and which promotes aggression – and which increased in a low‐empathy condition – was inhibited in their high‐empathy condition.

      Note that empathic feelings shouldn’t inhibit all aggressive impulses, only those directed toward the target of empathy. Indeed, it’s easy to imagine empathy‐induced anger and aggression, in which empathy for person A leads to increased anger and aggression toward person B if B is perceived to be a threat to A’s welfare (see Buffone & Poulin, 2014; Hoffman, 2000; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003).

More broadly, empathy may counteract a particularly subtle and insidious form of aggression – blaming the victims of injustice. In his classic work on the just‐world hypothesis, Melvin Lerner (1980) found that research participants were likely to derogate a person whom they perceived to be the innocent victim of suffering. This derogation presumably served to maintain participants’ belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. Protecting our belief in a just world in this way can lead to what William Ryan (1971) called blaming the victim. Ryan suggested that we’re likely to react to the victims of unjust discrimination and oppression in our society – racial minorities, the poor, immigrants – by unconsciously blaming them. If they have less, they must be less deserving.

      Derogation and blaming the victim are all‐too‐common alternatives to caring about the suffering of others. These processes can lead to smug acceptance of the plight of the disadvantaged as just and right. But empathy‐induced altruism may counteract this tendency. In an important follow‐up to Lerner’s classic experiments, Aderman, Brehm, and Katz (1974) found that perspective‐taking instructions designed to evoke empathy eliminated derogation of an innocent victim.

      Increased cooperation and care in conflict situations. There is also evidence that empathy‐induced altruistic motivation can increase cooperation and care in conflict situations. Paradigmatic of such situations is a one‐trial prisoner’s dilemma. In this two‐person dilemma, it’s always in each person’s material best interest to defect (i.e., compete) regardless of what the other person does. Theories that assume we humans are always and exclusively self‐interested – such as game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and the theory of rational choice (Downs, 1957; Sen, 1977; M. Taylor, 1976) – predict no cooperation in a one‐trial prisoner’s dilemma. In contrast, the empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts that if one person in such a dilemma is induced to feel empathy for the other, this person will experience two motives – self‐interest and empathy‐induced altruism. Although self‐interest is best satisfied by defecting, altruism is best satisfied by cooperating. So, the empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts that empathy should lead to increased cooperation in a one‐trial prisoner’s dilemma. Batson and Moran (1999) reported an experiment in which they found precisely these results (also see Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Rumble, Van Lange, & Parks, 2010).

      What about real‐world conflicts? Might the introduction of empathy‐induced altruism be worth pursuing there too? Stephan and Finlay (1999) pointed out that the induction of empathy is often an explicit component of techniques used in conflict‐resolution workshops designed to address long‐standing political conflicts, such as between Arabs and Israelis. Workshop participants are encouraged to express their feelings, their hopes and fears, and to actively adopt the perspective