Positive Psychology. Группа авторов

the two definitions refers to means–end relations in the psychological present, not to a metaphysical first or final cause, and not to biological function. An ultimate goal is an end in itself. In contrast, an instrumental goal is a stepping stone on the way to some other goal. Both instrumental and ultimate goals should be distinguished from unintended consequences – results of an action that aren’t a goal.)

      Each of a person’s ultimate goals defines a distinct goal‐directed motive. Hence, altruism and egoism, which have different ultimate goals, are distinct motives even though they can co‐occur. Moreover, they are motivational states, not personal dispositions or traits. The disagreement in the egoism–altruism debate is over the nature of our motives – egoism versus altruism – not over the kind of people we are – egoists versus altruists.

      Self‐benefits as ultimate goals (egoism) or unintended consequences (altruism)

      Many forms of self‐benefit can be derived from helping. Some are obvious, as when we get material rewards or thanks, or when we avoid censure. But even when we benefit others in the absence of external rewards, we can still benefit. Seeing a person or animal in need may cause us to feel distress, and we may relieve the other’s distress in order to remove our own. Or we can benefit by feeling good about ourselves for being kind. Or by escaping guilt and shame for failing to do what we think we should. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis doesn’t deny that altruistically motivated helping brings self‐benefits like these. But it claims that, insofar as our motivation for helping stems from empathic concern, any self‐benefits that result are unintended consequences rather than the ultimate goal.

      Two non‐claims of empathy‐altruism hypothesis

      Let me also mention two things that the empathy‐altruism hypothesis does not claim. First, it doesn’t claim that a person feeling empathic concern must experience only – or even primarily – altruistic motivation. Such a person can also experience motives, including motives to help, that are produced by thoughts and feelings other than empathic concern. Second, the hypothesis doesn’t claim that empathic concern is the only source of altruistic motivation. There may be other sources, such as certain personality characteristics or personal values. To date, however, no other source has been carefully tested.

      Why worry about our motivation for benefiting others?

      As long as a person in need receives help, why worry about whether the underlying motivation is altruistic or egoistic? The answer to this question depends on your interest. If you’re only interested in getting help in this situation for this person (you perhaps?), the nature of the motivation may not matter. But if you’re interested in knowing more generally when and where help can be expected – and how effective it is likely to be (perhaps with an eye to creating a more caring society) – then to understand the underlying motivation is essential. If, for example, I am motivated to help in order to impress you, then if you won’t know whether I help or not, this motivation and my help will disappear.

      As argued by Kurt Lewin (1951), explanatory stability for human action is found in the link of a given motive to its ultimate goal, not found in behavior or in behavioral consequences. Behavior is highly variable. Occurrence of a given behavior, including helping, depends on the strength of the motive or motives that might evoke this behavior, as well as on (a) the strength of competing motives in the situation, (b) how the behavior relates to each of these motives, and (c) other behavioral options available at the time. It also depends on whether the behavior promotes an instrumental or an ultimate goal. The more directly a certain behavior promotes an ultimate goal, and the more uniquely it does so among the behavioral options available, the more likely the behavior is to occur. Behavior that promotes an instrumental goal can change if either (a) the causal association between the instrumental and ultimate goal changes or (b) better behavioral pathways to the ultimate goal appear that bypass the instrumental goal.

      Yet, complicating matters, we infer motivation from behavior, although not from a single instance of behavior. Instead, we infer motivation from the pattern of behavior across situations that vary in the best way to reach different possible ultimate goals. Inference from such a pattern has allowed us to identify the ultimate goal of empathy‐induced motivation to help.

      Current status of the empathy‐altruism hypothesis

      Across the past four decades, more than 35 experiments have been conducted to test the empathy‐altruism hypothesis against a range of egoistic alternative hypotheses – hypotheses claiming that the motivation produced by empathic concern is directed toward the ultimate goal of obtaining one or another self‐benefit. As just suggested, the research strategy has been to experimentally vary situations so that we can use the pattern of behavior to make a meaningful inference about the ultimate goal of empathy‐induced motivation. (See Batson, 2011 and 2018, for a comprehensive review of the experiments.)

With remarkable consistency, results of these experiments have supported the empathy‐altruism hypothesis. The few results that initially seemed to contradict the hypothesis haven’t stood up to further examination. To the best of my knowledge, we now have no plausible egoistic explanation for the cumulative results. This experimental evidence has led me to conclude – tentatively – that the empathy‐altruism hypothesis is true: Other‐oriented feeling for a person in need (empathic concern) produces motivation with the ultimate goal of removing the empathy‐inducing need (altruistic motivation). The evidence has also led me to conclude that this motivation can be surprisingly powerful. And it has led me to wonder how this empathy‐induced altruistic motivation is possible. What evolutionary function could it serve?

      Evolutionary function of empathy‐induced altruism

      Rather than inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), the most plausible answer seems to be that empathy‐induced altruistic motivation evolved as part of the parental instinct among higher mammals, especially humans (Batson, 2010, 2011, 2018; Bell, 2001; De Waal, 1996; Hoffman, 1981; McDougall, 1908; Zahn‐Waxler & Radke‐Yarrow, 1990). If mammalian parents were not intensely interested in the welfare of their very vulnerable progeny, these species would quickly die out.

      We humans have no doubt inherited key aspects of our parental instinct from ancestors we share with other mammalian species (Preston, 2013). But in humans this instinct seems less automatic and more flexible. Human parental nurturance goes well beyond nursing, providing other kinds of food, protecting, and keeping the young close – activities that characterize parental care in most mammalian species. It includes inferences about and anticipation of the desires and feelings of the child (“Is that a hungry cry or a wet cry?” “She won’t like the fireworks; they’ll be too loud.”). It also includes goal‐directed motives and appraisal‐based emotions (Scherer, 1984). Crucially, it seems to include (a) other‐oriented feelings of empathic concern for the child and (b) empathy‐induced altruistic motivation to protect and increase the child’s welfare.

      Parental care based on empathic concern didn’t supplant the more primitive cue‐based responses of our ancient ancestors. Instead, it supplemented these responses by increasing the flexibility with which they are employed (see Bell, 2001; Damasio, 2002; MacLean, 1990; Sober, 1991; Sober & Wilson, 1998; S. E. Taylor, 2002; Zahn‐Waxler & Radke‐Yarrow, 1990). This flexibility permits anticipation and prevention of needs – even evolutionarily quite novel ones such as the need to avoid sticking a pin in an electrical outlet.

Importantly, the empathy‐altruism research shows that we humans don’t experience empathy‐induced altruistic motivation only in response to the needs of our own children. As long as there’s no preexisting antipathy, we can feel empathy for a wide range of others in need, including nonhumans (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Shelton & Rogers, 1981). Speculating, let me suggest that this breadth of human empathy‐induced altruism may reflect cognitive generalization whereby we “adopt” cared‐for others