Organon. Aristotle

so many; but how we shall take them, and by what we shall be well provided with them, we must declare hereafter.

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Chapter 10

       Table of Contents

      In the first place then, let us define what is a dialectic proposition, and what a dialectic problem, for we must not suppose every proposition nor every problem as dialectic, since no one in his senses would propose that which is assented to by no one, nor would he advance as a question what was palpable to all, or to most men, for the latter does not admit of a doubt, but the former no one would admit. Indeed a dialectic proposition is an interrogation, probable either to all, or to the most, or to the wise; and to these, either to all or most, or to the most celebrated, it is not paradoxical, as any one may admit what is assented to by the wise, if it be not contrary to the opinions of the multitude. Dialectic propositions however are both those which resemble the probable and which are contrary to those which appear probable, being proposed through contradiction, and whatever opinions are according to the discovered arts. For if it be probable that there is the same science of contraries, it would also appear probable that the sense of contraries is the same, and if the grammatical art be one in number, that there is one art also of playing on the pipe, but if there are many grammatical arts, there will also be many piping arts, for all these things seem to be similar and akin. So also those things which are contrary to probabilities, being proposed according to contradiction, will appear probable, for if it is probable that we ought to benefit friends, it is also probable that we ought not to injure them. Nevertheless, that we ought to injure friends is contrary, but that we ought not to injure them is contradictory; so also if we ought to benefit friends, we ought not to benefit enemies; but this also is according to the contradiction of contraries, since the contrary is that we ought to benefit enemies, and in like ​manner in the case of other things. Still the probable will appear in comparison to be the contrary about the contrary, as, if we ought to benefit friends, we ought also to injure enemies. To benefit friends however may appear contrary to injuring enemies, yet whether it is truly so or not, will be shown in what we say about contraries. Notwithstanding, it is apparent that whatever opinions also are according to the arts, are dialectic propositions; since any one would admit those things, which are assented to by persons conversant with such subjects, as in matters of medicine, that the physician (is to be assented to), the geometrician in geometrical concerns, and similarly of others.

Chapter 11

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      The dialectic problem is a theorem tending either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either per se or as co-operative with something else of this kind, about which the multitude either hold an opinion in neither way, or in a way contrary to the wise, or the wise to the multitude, or each of these to themselves. Now some problems it is useful to know, for the purpose of choice or avoidance, as whether pleasure is eligible or not, but others for knowledge only, as whether the world is everlasting or not, some again by themselves, for neither of these purposes, yet do they co-operate to something or this kind, since there are many things which we do not desire to know for themselves, but for the sake of others, in order that through these we may know ​something else. Moreover, those are problems also, of which there are contrary syllogisms (for they admit a doubt, whether they are so and so, because of there being credible arguments in both respects). And those about which we have no argument from their being vast, conceiving it difficult to assign their cause, e. g. whether the world is everlasting or not, for any one may investigate such things as these.

      Let then problems and propositions be distinguished as we have said: a thesis, on the other hand, is a paradoxical judgment of some one celebrated in philosophy, as that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said, or that all things are moved, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus asserted, for to notice any casual person setting forth contrarieties to (common) opinions is silly. Or (a thesis is an opinion) of things concerning which we have a reason contrary to opinions, as that not every thing which is, is either generated or perpetual, as the sophists declare, since (they say) that a musician is a grammarian, though he is neither generated nor eternal, for this, even if it be not admitted by any one, may appear to be from possessing a reason.

      A thesis then is also a problem, yet not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are of such a kind, as that we form an opinion about them in neither way; but that a thesis is also a problem ​is evident, as it is neoesary from what we have said, either that the multitude ahould be at variance with the wise about the thesis, or one or other of these with themselves, since a thesis is a certain paradoxical judgment. Now almost all dialectical problems arc called theses, let it, however, make no difference how they are called, as we have not thus divided them from a desire to fabricate names, but that we may not be ignorant what are their real differences.

      Still we need not consider every problem nor every thesis, but that which any one may be in doubt about, who is in want of argument and not of punishment or sense, for those who doubt whether we ought to worship the gods and to love our parents or not, require punishment, but those (who doubt) whether snow is white or not, (need) sense. Nor (need we discuss those things) of which the demonstration is at hand, nor those of which it is very remote, for the one do not admit of doubt, but the other, of greater (doubt) than accords to (dialectic) exercise.

Chapter 12

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      These things then being determined, we must distinguish how many species of dialectic arguments there are. Now one is induction, but the other syllogism, and what indeed syllogism is, has been declared before, but induction is a progression from singulars to umversals, as if the pilot skilled in his art is the best, so also is the charioteer, and generally the skilful is the most excellent about each thing. Nevertheless, induction is more calculated to persuade, is clearer, and according to sense more known, and common to many things; but syllogism is more cogent, and efficacious against opponents in disputation.

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Chapter 13

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      Let then the genera about which, and from which, arguments subsist be defined, as we have stated before, but the instruments by which we shall be well provided with syllogisms are four; one to assume propositions, the second to be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is predicated, the third to discover differences, and the fourth the consideration of the similar. In a certain way indeed there are three propositions of these, since it is possible to make a proposition as to each of them, as that the beautiful, or the sweet, or the profitable is eligible, and that sense differs from science, in that he who loses the latter may regain it; but this is impossible with the other, and that the wholesome has the same relation to health as what produces good constitutional habit, to a good habit of constitution. Now the first proposition is derived from that which is predicated in many ways, but the second from differences, and the third from similars.

Chapter 14

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      Propositions then must be selected in as many ways as there has been definition about proposition, either choosing the opinions of all, or those of most, or those of the wise, and of these either of all, or of most, or of the most celebrated, or opinions contrary to the apparent, and whatever are according to arts. Yet it is necessary to propose according to contradiction those which are contrary to the apparently