The Story of the Philippines. Murat Halstead

It might be that the cathedral alone could be cleared without delay or prejudice with a pleasant effect, and if so why not? His grace was certainly diplomatic and persuasive in stating the case, and his attendants were animated with zeal that the Americans should have the credit of re-opening the cathedral for worship. It was true the Spanish garrison first occupied it, but if the necessity that its ample roof should protect soldiers from the torrential rains had existed perhaps it had ceased to be imperative. The matter was duly presented to the military authorities, and the objection found to immediate action that the Spanish prisoners of war should not for the time be located outside the walled city. They must be held where they could be handled.

      Coincident with the call of the Archbishop came Captain Coudert, of the distinguished family of that name in New York, and his grace was deeply interested in that young man and warmly expressed his gratification in meeting an American officer of his own faith. The Archbishop is a man of a high order of capacity, and his influence has been great. His position is a trying one, for it would be quite impossible for him to remain in Manila if the insurgents should become the masters of the situation. The claim of hostile natives that the Spanish priests have an influence in matters of state that make them a ruling class is one that they urge when expressing their resolve that the Friars must go. The Spanish policy, especially in the municipal governments, has been to magnify the office of the priests in political functions. The proceedings of a meeting of the people in order to receive attention or to have legal standing must be certified by a priest. It is the Spanish priest that is wanted in matters of moment, and the laws make his presence indispensable. The Spanish priests are, therefore, identified in the public mind with all the details of misgovernment. The civilized Filipinos profess christianity and faith in the native priests, carefully asserting the distinction. In his conversation with me, General Aguinaldo repeatedly referred to the necessity of consulting his advisers, and said he had to be careful not to offend many of his followers, who thought he had gone very far in his friendship for the United States. He gave emphasis to the assertion that they were "suspicious" of him on that account. It was my judgment at first that the General, in stopping short when a question was difficult and referring to the Council he had to consult, was showing a capacity for finesse, that he really had the power to do or to undo, though he has not a personal appearance of possible leadership. Now this, even, has been modified. His Council seems to be the real center of power. When I was talking with Aguinaldo there were two American priests waiting to propose the deportation of his prisoners who were priests, and he had to refer that question. The Council has decided to keep the priests in confinement, and it is remarked that the General desired to give up his prisoners and was false in saying he favored sending them to Spain. There are misapprehensions in this association. He has no doubt thought well of holding fast his most important hostages. If he personally desired to release the priests, he probably would not venture to do it. He is not so silly as to believe in his own inviolability by bullets, and digestion of poisons; and those who are such savages as to confide in these superstitions are not unlikely to try experiments just to strengthen their faith. The potentiality of Aguinaldo as a personage is not so great as has been imagined, and if he attempts a rally against the American flag he will be found full of weakness.

      The Archbishop, I was told, had much pleasure in meeting an American he was assured would attempt to be entirely just, and present him according to his own declarations to the people of the United States. He knew very well, unquestionably, the stories circulated in the American camps, that his voice had been loudest and last in urging hopeless war, in telling impossible tales of visionary Spanish reinforcements, and denouncing the Americans as "niggers" and "pigs." It is a fact that Spaniards have cultivated the notion among the rural Filipinos, that Americans are black men, and pigs is their favorite epithet for an American. The radical enemies of His Grace are, no doubt, responsible for unseemly stories about his animosities, for that he and those around him were sincere in their respect for, and gratitude toward the American army of occupation, for its admirable bearing and good conduct, was in itself too obviously true to be doubted.

CHAPTER VIII

       Table of Contents

      Why We Hold the Philippines.

      The Responsibility of Admiral Dewey—We Owe It to Ourselves to Hold

       the Philippines—Prosperity Assured by Our Permanent Possession—The

       Aguinaldo Question—Character Study of the Insurgent Leader—How

       Affairs Would Adjust Themselves for Us—Congress Must Be Trusted to

       Represent the People and Firmly Establish International Policy.

      If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no Philippine question on the other side of the world from Washington City. The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication, and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities curtly refused. Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a section removed, and both ends marked by buoys. Reflection caused the Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable, that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents. They mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late. The American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be, that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their available ships of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila. It is clear now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do. The Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain could have been in the Suez Canal, on the way to Manila when the movement was known to our navy department. Then Admiral Dewey would, of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat, that he should put to sea and take care of his men and ships. The result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to Spain. Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication with Madrid. It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated, that the Admiral cut the cable.

      The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at his mercy. If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his ships, he could bombard the city and burn it. He held the keys to the Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him then was the same before the country now. The question that incessantly presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town made good. We hold the keys of the Philippines. Shall we continue to do so? This question transcends in immediate importance—inevitable consequence—remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has raised. So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor decided with haste. It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings, and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will affect all the people for all time.

      What are the Philippines? They are the richest prize of soil and climate that has been at hazard in the world for many years—one that would be seized, if it could be done without war, by any of the great nations other than our own without hesitation. The only scruple we need entertain, the sole reason for deliberation, is because it is a duty of the government to be sure when there are imperial considerations to be weighed, that the people should be consulted. It was on this account distinctly, that the President knew the issue of the permanency of the possession of the Philippines was one of peculiar novelty and magnitude, that he permitted it to exist. Spain must have been as acquiescent in this as in yielding the independence of Cuba, and the concession to us without any intermediate formality of Porto Rico. It is not inconsistent with the policy of magnanimity that is generally anticipated after the victory of a great power over a lesser one, that we should hold the Philippines. We have only to keep the power we have in peace, and let it work as a wholesome medicine, and all the islands of the group of which Manila is the central point, will