Complete Works. Hamilton Alexander

the influence of government to the doors of the people. The Union is dependent on the will of the State governments for its Chief Magistrate, and for its Senate. The blow aimed at the members must give a fatal wound to the head, and the destruction of the States must be at once a political suicide. Can the National Government be guilty of this madness? What inducements, what temptations, can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station; will they increase the national strength; will they multiply the national resources; will they make themselves more respectable, in the view of foreign nations, or of their fellow-citizens, by robbing the States of their constitutional privileges? But imagine for a moment, that a political frenzy should seize the government. Suppose they should make the attempt. Certainly it would be for ever impracticable. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by reason and experience. It has been proved, that the members of republics have been, and ever will be, stronger than the head. Let us attend to one general historical example. In the ancient feudal governments of Europe there was in the first place a monarch; subordinate to him a body of nobles; and subject to these, the vassals or the whole body of the people. The authority of the kings was limited, and that of the barons considerably independent. A great part of the early wars in Europe were contests between the king and his nobility. In these contests, the latter possessed many advantages, derived from their influence, and the immediate command they had over the people, and they generally prevailed. The history of the feudal wars exhibits little more than a series of successful encroachments on the prerogatives of monarchy. Here is one great proof of the superiority which the members in limited governments possess over their head. As long as the barons enjoyed the confidence and attachment of the people, they had the strength of the country on their side, and were irresistible. I may be told that in some instances the barons were overcome. But how did this happen? They took advantage of the depression of the royal authority and the establishment of their own power, to oppress and tyrannize over their vassals. As commerce enlarged, and as wealth and civilization increased, the people began to feel their own weight and consequence; they grew tired of their oppressions; united their strength with that of the prince; and threw off the yoke of aristocracy. These very instances prove what I contend for. They prove that in whatever direction the popular weight leans, the current of power will flow. Wherever the popular attachments be, there will rest the political superiority. Sir, can it be supposed that the State governments will become the oppressors of the people? Will they forget their affections? Will they combine to destroy the liberties and happiness of their fellow-citizens, for the sole purpose of involving themselves in ruin? God forbid! The idea is shocking! It outrages every feeling of humanity, and every dictate of common-sense!

      There are certain social principles in human nature, from which we may draw the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of individuals and of communities. We love our families more than our neighbors; we love our neighbors more than our countrymen in general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they depart from the centre; and become languid in proportion to the expansion of the circle on which they act. On these principles, the attachment of the individual will be first and for ever secured by the State governments. They will be a mutual protection and support. Another source of influence which has already been pointed out, is the various official connections in the States. Gentlemen endeavor to evade the force of this, by saying that these offices will be insignificant. This is by no means true. The State officers will ever be important, because they are necessary and useful. Their powers are such as are extremely interesting to the people, such as affect their property, their liberty, and life. What is more important than the administration of justice, and the execution of the civil and criminal laws? Can the State governments become insignificant, while they have the power of raising money independently and without control? If they are really useful,—if they are calculated to promote the essential interests of the people, they must have their confidence and support. The States can never lose their powers till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties. These must go together; they must support each other, or meet one common fate. On the gentleman's principles we may safely trust the State governments, though we have no means of resisting them, but we cannot confide in the National Government, though we have an effectual constitutional guard against every encroachment. This is the essence of their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond conception.

      With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I shall certainly admit that the Constitution ought not to be so formed as to prevent the States providing for their own existence; and I maintain that it is so formed that their power of providing for themselves is sufficiently established. This is conceded by one gentleman, and in the next breath the concession is retracted. He says Congress have but one exclusive right in taxation, that of duties on imports. Certainly, then, their other powers are only concurrent. But, to take off the force of this obvious conclusion, he immediately says that if the laws of the United States are supreme, those of the States must be subordinate, because there cannot be two supremes. This is curious sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together is false. They are inconsistent only when they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme as to all their proper constitutional objects. The laws of the States are supreme in the same way. These supreme laws may act on different objects without clashing, or they may operate on different parts of the same common object with perfect harmony. Suppose both governments should lay a tax of a penny on a certain article. Has not each an independent and uncontrollable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the axiom, that there cannot be two supremes, is simply this: two powers cannot be supreme over each other. This meaning is entirely perverted by the gentlemen. But, it is said, disputes between collectors are to be referred to the federal courts. This is again wandering in the field of conjecture. But suppose the fact certain. Is it not to be presumed that they will express the true meaning of the Constitution and the laws? Will they not be bound to consider the concurrent jurisdiction; to declare that both the taxes shall have equal operation; that both the powers, in that respect, are sovereign and coextensive? If they transgress their duty we are to hope that they will be punished. Sir, we cannot reason from probabilities alone. When we leave common-sense, and give ourselves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty, no security in our reasonings.

      I imagine I have stated to the committee abundant reasons to prove the entire safety of the State governments and of the people. I would go into a more minute consideration of the nature of the concurrent jurisdiction, and of the operation of the laws in relation to revenue; but at present I feel too much indisposed to proceed. I shall, with the leave of the committee, improve another opportunity of expressing to them more fully my ideas on this point. I wish the committee to remember, that the Constitution under examination is framed upon truly republican principles, and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for the common protection and the general welfare of the United States, it must be utterly repugnant to this Constitution to subvert the State governments or oppress the people.

      June 28, 1788.—Mr. Hamilton: Mr. Chairman, in the course of these debates it has been suggested that the State of New York has sustained peculiar misfortune from the mode of raising revenue by requisitions. I believe we shall now be able to prove that this State, in the course of the late Revolution, suffered the extremes of distress on account of this delusive system. To establish these facts, I shall beg leave to introduce a series of official papers and resolutions of this State as evidence of the sentiments of the people during the most melancholy periods of war. I shall request the secretary to read these papers, in the order in which I point them out.—Elliot's Debates, ii.

      June 28, 1788.—Mr. Hamilton [In reply to Mr. Smith, who had claimed the right to explain the papers produced, which involved Clinton in certain inconsistencies]: We shall make the same reservation. By the indisputable construction of these resolutions, we shall prove that this State was once on the verge of destruction, for want of an energetic government. To this point we shall confine ourselves.—Elliot's Debates, ii.

      June 28, 1788.—Mr. Hamilton: The honorable gentleman from Ulster has given a turn to the introduction of those papers which was never in our contemplation. He seems to insinuate that they were brought forward with a view of showing an inconsistency in the conduct of some gentlemen; perhaps of himself. Sir, the exhibition of them had a very different object. It was to prove that this State once experienced hardships and distresses to an astonishing degree for want of the assistance of the other