The Governments of Europe. Frederic Austin Ogg

in all cases of treason or felony by the upper chamber itself, under the presidency of a Lord High Steward appointed by the crown. The Lords are exempt from arrest in civil causes, not merely during and immediately preceding and succeeding sessions, but at all times, and they enjoy all the rights, privileges, and distinctions which, through law or custom, have become inherent in their several dignities.

      134. Payment of Members of the Commons.—Until recently the fact that there was no salary attached to service in Parliament operated to debar from election to the Commons men who were not of independent means. Through some years the Labor Party was accustomed to provide funds wherewith its representatives were enabled to maintain themselves at the capital,[184] but this arrangement affected only a small group of members and was of an entirely private and casual nature. Public and systematic payment of members, to the end that poor but capable men might not be kept out of the Commons, was demanded by the Chartists three-quarters of a century ago, and from time to time after 1870 there was agitation in behalf of such a policy. In 1893, and again in 1895, a resolution in favor of the payment of members was adopted in the Commons, and March 7, 1906, a resolution was carried to the effect that every member should be paid a salary of £300 annually. But it was not until 1911 that a measure of the kind could be got through the upper chamber. Fresh impetus was afforded by the Osborne Judgment, in which, on an appeal from the lower courts, the House of Lords ruled in December, 1909, that the payment of parliamentary members as such from the dues collected by labor organizations was contrary to law. The announcement of the Judgment was followed by persistent agitation for legislation to reverse the ruling. In connection with the budget presented to the Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer May 16, 1911, the proposition was made, not to take action one way or the other upon the Lords' decision, but to provide for the payment to all non-official members of the House of Commons of a yearly salary of £400; and with little delay and no great amount of opposition the proposal was enacted into law. The amount of the salary provided is not large, but it is ample to render candidacy for seats possible for numbers of men who formerly could not under any circumstances have contemplated a public career.[185]

      V. The Functions of Parliament

      When the king summons the two chambers he does so, "being desirous and resolved as soon as may be to meet his people, and to have their advice in Parliament." No mention is made of legislative or financial business, and, technically, Parliament is still essentially what originally it was exclusively, i.e., a purely deliberative assemblage. Practically, however, the mere discussion of public questions and the giving of advice to the crown has become but one of several distinctive parliamentary functions. The newer functions which, with the passing of time, have acquired ever increasing importance are, in effect, three. The first is that of criticism, involving the habitual scrutiny and control of the measures of the executive and administrative organs. The second is the exercise, under limitations to be described, of the power of judicature. The third, and much the most important, is the function of public and private legislation and of fiscal control.

      135. Criticism: Ministerial Responsibility.—Parliament does not govern and is not intended to govern. Never save when the Long Parliament undertook the administration of public affairs through committees of its members has Parliament asserted a disposition to gather immediately into its own hands those powers of state which are executive in character. At the same time, the growth of parliamentary government has meant the establishment of a connection between the executive and the parliamentary chambers (principally the Commons) as close as may be so long as separateness of organization is still maintained. The officials who comprise the working executive are invariably members of Parliament. They initiate public measures, introduce them, advocate and defend them, and, in general, guide and control the conduct of public business both inside and outside the chambers. But for every act they are responsible directly to the House of Commons. They may continue in power only so long as they are supported by a majority in that chamber. And their conduct is subject continually to review and criticism, through the instrumentality of questions, formal inquiries, and, if need be, judicial procedure.

      It is within the competence of any member to address a question to any minister of the crown who is also a member, to obtain information. Except in special cases, notice of questions must be given at least one day in advance, and a period of approximately three-quarters of an hour is set apart at four sittings every week for the asking and answering of such questions. A minister may answer or decline to answer, but unless a declination can be shown to arise from legitimate considerations of public interest its effect politically may be embarrassing. In any event, there is no debate, and in this respect the English practice differs from the French "interpellation."[186] The asking of questions is liable to abuse but, as is pointed out by Ilbert, "there is no more valuable safeguard against maladministration, no more effective method of bringing the searchlight of criticism to bear on the action or inaction of the executive government and its subordinates. A minister has to be constantly asking himself, not merely whether his proceedings and the proceedings of those for whom he is responsible are legally or technically defensible, but what kind of answer he can give if questioned about them in the House, and how that answer will be received."[187] Any member is privileged to bring forward a motion censuring the Government or any member or department thereof, and a motion of this sort, when emanating from the leader of the Opposition, constitutes a vote of confidence upon whose result may depend the continued tenure of the ministry. By a call upon the Government or a given department for information, by the constitution of parliamentary committees, departmental committees, or royal commissions, and, in particular by taking advantage of the numberless opportunities afforded by the enactment of appropriation bills, the House of Commons may further impose upon the executive the most thoroughgoing responsibility and control. "A strong executive government, tempered and controlled by constant, vigilant, and representative criticism," is the ideal at which the parliamentary institutions of Great Britain are aimed.[188]

      136. Judicial Powers: Impeachment and Attainder.—The functions of a judicial character which, in the capacity of the High Court of Parliament, the two chambers fulfill are of secondary importance and do not call for extended discussion. So far as the law of the subject goes, they comprise (1) the powers possessed by each of the houses to deal with the constitution and conduct of its own membership; (2) the power of the Lords to try their own members when charged with treason or felony; (3) the jurisdiction of the Lords in the capacity of a final court of appeal for the United Kingdom; (4) the power of the two houses, acting jointly, to carry through impeachments of public officers and to enact bills of attainder; and (5) the effecting of the removal of certain kinds of public officers through the agency of an address from both houses to the crown. In days when the king and the ministers were disposed to defy the law and to evade responsibility the power of impeachment by the Commons at the bar of the Lords, originated as early as the reign of Edward III., was of the utmost importance. When, however, the House of Commons progressed in competence to the point where it was able to review and control the conduct of ministers with such thoroughness and continuity as to make it impossible for them to conduct business without a parliamentary majority, impeachment lost its value and fell into disuse. The last occasion upon which impeachment proceedings were instituted was in 1805.[189] Procedure by bill of attainder, arising from the legislative omnipotence of Parliament and following the ordinary course of legislation, is also obsolete.

      137. The House of Lords as a Court.—Most important among surviving parliamentary functions of a judicial character is the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the House of Lords. The judicial authority of the Lords is an anomaly, although as it is actually exercised it does not seriously contravene the principle which forbids the bringing together of judicial and legislative powers in the same hands. Historically, it arose from a confusion of the functions of two groups of men which were long largely identical in personnel, i.e., the Great Council, on the one hand, and the Lords of Parliament, on the other. In the reign of Henry IV. the Commons asked specifically to be relieved from judicial business, and the parliamentary jurisdiction which survived was recognized thereafter to be vested in the House of Lords alone. From an early date this jurisdiction was, as it is to-day, both original and appellate. As a court of first instance the chamber acquired the right to try peers charged with treason and felony and, on the accusation of the House of Commons,