A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. John Stuart Mill

Chapter VII.

       Of Classification, As Subsidiary To Induction.

       Chapter VIII.

       Of Classification By Series.

       Book V.

       On Fallacies.

       Chapter I.

       Of Fallacies In General.

       Chapter II.

       Classification Of Fallacies.

       Chapter III.

       Fallacies Of Simple Inspection; Or A. Priori Fallacies.

       Chapter IV.

       Fallacies Of Observation.

       Chapter V.

       Fallacies Of Generalization.

       Chapter VI.

       Fallacies Of Ratiocination.

       Chapter VII.

       Fallacies Of Confusion.

       Book VI.

       On The Logic Of The Moral Sciences.

       Chapter I.

       Introductory Remarks.

       Chapter II.

       Of Liberty And Necessity.

       Chapter III.

       That There Is, Or May Be, A Science Of Human Nature.

       Chapter IV.

       Of The Laws Of Mind.

       Chapter V.

       Of Ethology, Or The Science Of The Formation Of Character.

       Chapter VI.

       General Considerations On The Social Science.

       Chapter VII.

       Of The Chemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.

       Chapter VIII.

       Of The Geometrical, Or Abstract, Method.

       Chapter IX.

       Of The Physical, Or Concrete Deductive, Method.

       Chapter X.

       Of The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical, Method.

       Chapter XI.

       Additional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.

       Chapter XII.

       Of The Logic Of Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.

      "

      [pg 003]

Preface To The First Edition.

       Table of Contents

      This book makes no pretense of giving to the world a new theory of the intellectual operations. Its claim to attention, if it possess any, is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt, not to supersede, but to embody and systematize, the best ideas which have been either promulgated on its subject by speculative writers, or conformed to by accurate thinkers in their scientific inquiries.

      To cement together the detached fragments of a subject, never yet treated as a whole; to harmonize the true portions of discordant theories, by supplying the links of thought necessary to connect them, and by disentangling them from the errors with which they are always more or less interwoven, must necessarily require a considerable amount of original speculation. To other originality than this, the present work lays no claim. In the existing state of the cultivation of the sciences, there would be a very strong presumption against any one who should imagine that he had effected a revolution in the theory of the investigation of truth, or added any fundamentally new process to the practice of it. The improvement which remains to be effected in the methods of philosophizing (and the author believes that they have much need of improvement) can only consist in performing more systematically and accurately operations with which, at least in their elementary form, the human intellect, in some one or other of its employments, is already familiar.

      In the portion of the work