Talmud. Various Authors

into a place of the same area, and such was not the case here. Said Rabba: Our Mishna is in accordance with R. Aqiba's opinion, who holds that as soon as the air of a place surrounds a thing it is equal to the thing being deposited in that place. But may it not be that depositing does not require four ells, for the reason stated above, but removing does? Said R. Joseph: The teaching of this paragraph agrees (not with the opinion of R. Aqiba), but with that of Rabbi, as we have learned in the following Boraitha:

      If one threw an object from one street into the other, and there was a private ground between them, Rabbi declared him culpable, and the sages freed him. Hereupon R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: Rabbi declared the man guilty of two offences: one for having removed the thing from its place, and one for having deposited it in another place. Hence in both, the four ells in question are not required.

      But with reference to this it was taught that both Rabh and Samuel said that Rabbi's declaration of culpability treated of a case where the private ground (that divided the two streets) was roofed, for the assumption is that a house must be regarded as a solid object that fills out all the space it occupies, but not when it was unroofed?

      Therefore said Rabha: (All these views can be dispensed with, as) the hand of a man (because of its value) is considered as a piece of ground four ells square. And so, also, was declared by Rabin, when he came from Palestine, in the name of R. Johanan.

      R. Abhin in the name of R. Ila'a, quoting R. Johanan, said: If one threw a thing and it rested in the hands of another man, he is culpable.

      Why the repetition--has not R. Johanan declared above, already, that the hand of a man is considered as a space of four ells square? Lest one say that this is only when he intended to put it into his hand (and the intention makes it valuable as the space in question), but not otherwise. Therefore the repetition.

      The same said again in the name of the same authority: If one remains standing in his place when he receives a thing, he is culpable; but if he was moving away from his place when he received it, he is free. And so also we have learned in a Boraitha in the name of the anonymous teachers.

      R. Johanan asked the following question: If one threw a thing and then moved from his place and caught it, is he culpable or not? How is this question to be understood? Said R. Ada bar Ah'bah: The difficulty is concerning the exercise of two forces by one man, and the question was thus: If two forces were exercised by one man (in committing a prohibited act), should both parts of the act be accounted to the same, so that he should be declared culpable, or should each part of the act be considered separately, as if there were two individuals concerned, and then he is free? This question is not decided.

      R. Abhin in the name of R. Johanan said: If one put his hand into the yard of his neighbor, got it full of rain water, and withdrew it, he is guilty. But to make one guilty of the act, it must consist of removing a thing from a place of four ells square, which is not the case here. Said R. Hyya b. R. Huna: It means that he took the water as it was running down a slanting wall, as Rabba taught elsewhere that removing a thing from a slanting wall made the man culpable. But (in speaking of removing an object from a slanting wall) Rabba treated on the question of removing a book, which is a stationary thing. Is it analogous to removing water that can never become stationary?

      Therefore said Rabha: Our case treats when he dipped the water out of a cavity (in the wall) in question. Is not this self-evident?

      Lest one say that water standing upon water is not considered stationary,, he comes to teach us that it is. And this is in accordance with his theory, as follows: Water standing upon water is considered stationary; a nut, however, lying upon the surface of water is not considered so.

      The same said again, in the name of the same authorities: One who was laden with eatables and beverages, entering and going out the whole day, he is not culpable until he rests. Said Abayi: And even then only if he stops for the purpose of resting; but not when he stops merely to adjust his burden on his shoulders. Whence is this deduced? From what the master said: "he stopped within the limit of four ells to rest he is free, but if he stopped to adjust the load on his shoulders he is culpable. Beyond four ells, if he stopped to rest he is culpable, but if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulder he is not culpable. What does this imply? It implies that one cannot be culpable unless his intention of removing was before he stopped.

      The rabbis taught: If one takes anything from his store into the market through the alley-way (where the benches of market-men are situated), he is culpable; it makes no difference whether he carries, throws, or pushes it with his arm. Ben Azai, however, said: If he carries it in or out he is not culpable, but if he throws or pushes it in or out he is culpable. The same we have learned in another Boraitha.

      The rabbis taught: There are four kinds of premises as regards the Sabbath--viz.: private ground, public ground, unclaimed ground, and ground that is under no jurisdiction. What is private ground? A ditch or hedge that is ten spans deep or high and four spans wide--such are absolutely private grounds. What is public ground? A country road or a wide street, or lanes open at both ends--such are absolutely public grounds. [So that in these two kinds of premises nothing must be carried from one to the other; and if such was done by one unintentionally, he is liable to a sin-offering; if, however, intentionally, then he is liable to be "cut off," or to suffer the extreme penalty (at the hands of human justice).]

A sea, a valley of fields, the front walk (before a row of stores), and unclaimed ground are neither like public nor like private ground. [Nothing should be carried about there to start with; but if one has done it, he is not culpable. Nor should anything be taken out of these grounds into public or private ground, or brought in from the latter into these grounds; but if one has done so, he is not culpable. In adjoining courtyards of many tenants and alleys that are open at both ends, where the tenants have made it communal property, 1 carrying things is allowed; however, it is not allowed when such is not done. A man standing on the door-step 2 may take things from or give things to the master of the house; so also may he take a thing from a mendicant in the street or give it to him; but he must not take things from the master of the house and hand them over to the mendicant in the street, nor take from the latter and transmit to the former. Still, if this was done, all the three men are not guilty. Anonymous teachers, however, say that the door-step serves as two separate grounds: when the door is open it belongs to the inside, and when the door is closed it belongs to the outside. But if the door-step is ten spans high and four spans wide, it is considered as a premises in itself.]

      The master said: "Such are absolutely private grounds." What does he intend to exclude (by this emphatic declaration)? To exclude that which R. Jehudah taught about Erubhin (p. 25).

      "These are absolutely public grounds." What does it mean to exclude? To exclude another instance of R. Jehudah's teaching, concerning the enclosure of wells. (Ibid., p. 40.)

      Why does not the Boraitha count the desert also, for have we not learned in a Boraitha: Public ground is constituted by public roads, wide streets, alleys that are open at both ends, and the desert? Said Abayi: It presents no difficulty. There the law was expounded as it existed when Israel dwelt in the desert; here, however, the law is taught as it prevails at the present time.

      The master said: "If one has brought in or taken out a thing unintentionally," etc. Is not this self-evident? He means to say that if the culprit did it intentionally, "he is liable to be cut off," etc. Also this is self-evident? He comes to teach, because of the following statement of Rabh, who said: "I found mysterious scrolls in the possession of my uncle, R. Hyya, which read: Aysy ben Jehudah says: There are forty less one principal acts of labor. A man, however, cannot be guilty of performing but one. And to the question, How is this to be understood? the answer was: It should be corrected and read: There is one of those acts of labor for which a man is not guilty. (In consequence, however, of the omission just what particular act of labor is excluded, all of the thirty-nine remained doubtful); and the Boraitha teaches that the labor mentioned is not one of the doubtful."

Again, the master said: "A sea, a valley of fields," etc. Is that so? Have we not