The Koran (Al-Qur'an). Anonymous

power of man on his action, and that this power is what is called Acquisition.2 But the point will be still clearer if we hear a third author, who rehearses the various opinions, or explications of the opinion of this sect, in the following words, viz.: Abu'l Hasan al Ashári asserts all the actions of men to be subject to the power of GOD, being created by him, and that the power of man hath no influence at all on that which he is empowered to do; but that both the power, and what is subject thereto, fall under the power of GOD:

      1 Idem, apud eund. p. 228, &c. 2 Vide Poc. ibid.

       3 Al Shahrest. apud eund. p. 245, &c.

       4 Idem, ibid. p. 246. 5 Al Shahrest. apud Poc. p. 245, &c.

       1 Auctor Sharh al Mawâkef, apud eund. p. 247.

       2 Al Shahrest. ibid. p. 248.

      al Kâdi Abu Becr says that the essence or substance of the action is the effect of the power of GOD, but its being either an action of obedience, as prayer, or an action of disobedience, as fornication, are qualities of the action, which proceed from the power of man: Abd'almalec, known by the title of Imâm al Haramein, Abu'l Hosein of Basra, and other learned men, held that the actions of men are effected by the power which GOD hath created in man, and that GOD causeth to exist in man both power and will, and that this power and will do necessarily produce that which man is empowered to do: and Abu Ishâk al Isfarâyeni taught that that which maketh impression, or hath influence on an action, is a compound of the power of GOD and the power of man.3 The same author observes that their ancestors, perceiving a manifest difference between those things which are the effects of the election of man and those things which are the necessary effects of inanimate agents, destitute both of knowledge and choice, and being at the same time pressed by the arguments which prove that GOD is the Creator of all things, and consequently of those things which are done by men, to conciliate the matter, chose the middle way, asserting actions to proceed from the power of GOD, and the acquisition of man; GOD'S way of dealing with his servants being, that when man intendeth obedience, GOD createth in him an action of obedience, and when he intendeth disobedience, he createth in him an action of disobedience; so that man seemeth to be the effective producer of his action, though he really be not.1 But this, proceeds the same writer, is again pressed with its difficulties, because the very intention of the mind is the work of GOD, so that no oman hath any share in the production of his own actions; for which reason the ancients disapproved of too nice an inquiry into this point, the end of the dispute concerning the same being, for the most part, either the taking away of all precepts positive as well as negative, or else the associating of a companion with GOD, by introducing some other independent agent besides him. Those, therefore, who would speak more accurately, use this form: there is neither compulsion nor free liberty, but the way lies between the two; the power and will in man being both created by GOD, though the merit or guilt be imputed unto man. Yet, after all, it is judged the safest way to follow the steps of the primitive Moslems, and, avoiding subtle disputations and too curious inquiries, to leave the knowledge of this matter wholly unto GOD.2 3. As to mortal sin, the Ashárians

      3 Auctor Sharh al Tawâlea, apud eund. ibid. p. 248, &c. 1 Idem, ibid. p. 249, 250. 2 Idem, ibid. p. 250, 251. I trust the reader will not be offended if, as a farther illustration of what has been said on this subject (in producing of which I have purposely kept to the original Mohammedan expressions) I transcribe a passage or two from a postscript subjoined to the epistle I have quoted above (§4, p. 85), in which the point of free will is treated ex professo. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite opinions of the Kadarians, who allow free will, and the Jabarians, who make man a necessary agent (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to approach nearest to that of the greater part of Christians and of the Jews), declares the true opinion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath power and will to choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be rewarded if he do well, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and willeth, if GOD willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly to refute the two extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, though it be agreeable to GOD'S justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom and power: "Sapientia enim Dei," says he, "comprehendit quicquid fuit et futurum est ab æternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab æterno omnia opera creaturarum, sive bona, sive mala, quæ fuerint creata cum potentia Dei, et ejus libera et determinate voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique novit eum qui futurus

      taught, that if a believer guilty of such sin die without repentance, his sentence is to be left with GOD, whether he pardon him out of mercy, or whether the prophet intercede for him (according to that saying recorded of him, "My intercession shall be employed for those among my people who shall have been guilty of grievous crimes"), or whether he punish him in proportion to his demerit, and afterwards, through his mercy, admit him into paradise: but that it is not to be supposed he will remain for ever in hell with the infidels, seeing it is declared that whoever shall have faith in his heart but of the weight of an ant, shall be delivered from hell fire.1 And this is generally received for the orthodox doctrine in this point, and is diametrically opposite to that of the Mótazalites. These were the more rational Sefâtians, but the ignorant part of them, not knowing how otherwise to explain the expressions of the Korân relating to the declarative attributes, fell into most gross and

      erat malus, et tamen creavit: neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset, potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cùm Deo soli sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita enim Salomon in suis proverbiis dixit. Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum, divitias et paupertatem, esse et venire à Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S. Paulum dixisse in suis epistolis; Dicet etiam lutum figulo, quare facis unum vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? Cum igitur miser homo fuerit creatus à voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud potest tribui ipsi quàm ipse sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male faciat. Quæ unica causa (id est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloriæ vel ponæ causa: per talem enim sensum novit quid boni vel mali adversus Dei præcepta fecerit." The opinion of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary to man's consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with GOD'S justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing of which he was annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to explain the third opinion in the following words: "Tertia opinio Zunis (i.e., Sonnitarum) quæ vera est, affirmat homini potesttatem esse, sed limitatem à sua causa, id est, dependentem à Dei potentia et voluntate, et proper illam cognitionem qua deliberat benè vel malè facere, esse dignum pona vel præmio. Manifestum est in æternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam præter Dei nostri omnipotentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, quæ poterant esse, cum ab ipso fuerint creata. Sapientia verò Dei novit etiam quæ non sunt futura; et potentia ejus, etsi non creaverit ea, potuit tamen, si ita Deo placuisset. Ita novit sapientia Dei quæ erant impossibilia, id est, quæ non poterant esse; quæ tamen nullo pacto pendent ab ejus potentia: ab ejus enim potentia mulla pendent nisi possibilia.-Dicimus enim à Dei potentia non pendere creare Deum alium ipsi similem, nec creare aliquid quod moveatur et quiescat simul eodem tempore, cùm hæc sint ex impossibilibus: comprehendit tamen suâ sapientiâ tale aliquid non pendere ab ejus potentiâ.-A potentiâ igitur Dei pendet solùm quod potest esse, et possibile est esse; quæ semper parata est dare esse possibilibus. Et si hoc penitus cognoscamus,cognoscemus pariter omne quod est, seu futurum est, sive sint opera nostra, sive quidvis aliud, pendere à sola potentia Dei. Et hoc non privatim intelligitur, sed in genere de omni eo quod est et movetur, sive in colis sive in terrâ; et nec aliquâ potentiâ potest impediri Dei potentia, cùm nulla alia potentia absoluta sit, præter Dei; potentia verò nostra non est à se, nisi à Dei potentia: et cum potentia nostra dicitur esse a causa sua, ideo dicimus potentiam nostram esse straminis comparatam cum potentia Dei: eo enim modo quo stramen movetur à motu maris, ita nostra potentia et voluntas à Dei potentia. Itaque Dei potentia semper est parata etiam ad occidendum aliquem; ut si quis hominem occidat, non dicimus potentiâ hominis id factum, sed æterna potentia Dei: error enim est id tribuere potentiæ hominis. Potentia enim Dei, cùm semper sit parata, et ante ipsum hominem, ad occidendum; si solâ hominis potentiâ id factum esse diceremus, et moreretur, potentia sanè Dei (quæ antè erat) jam ibi esset frustra: quia post mortem non potest potentia Dei