Promoting Democracy. Manal A. Jamal

as the Western democracy promotion establishment). This oversight has profound implications for the impact of their work. Although the extant literature has acknowledged how political bargaining influences the institutions that emerge35—and in turn, how institutional engineering influences electoral outcomes,36 conflict resolution goals,37 and the emergent state38—these works tell us little about the broader contexts that spawn political bargaining dynamics, the institutions that emerge, and the role of Western donors.

      A growing body of literature has sought to assess the impact of Western democracy promotion assistance on democratic outcomes. A number of these works, often quantitative in approach, have examined the relationship between foreign aid, including democracy assistance, and democratic outcomes. Scholars, however, do not agree on the nature of this relationship. Some have found positive relationships39 or negative relationships,40 while others have found no direct relationship at all.41 Although the quantitative research overwhelmingly establishes a positive relationship between foreign aid (including democracy assistance) and civil society and democratic outcomes, I do not fundamentally disagree with this approach. For the most part, however, as my analysis illustrates, in-depth case study examination illuminates the limitations of this approach since multiple dimensions and dynamics of these relationships simply cannot be captured by quantitative macro correlations. The amount of assistance per country is one factor, but the type and approaches of assistance are as important, if not more important. Fewer works have elaborated more explicit causal mechanisms. Pertaining to Western donor assistance and civil society development in particular, some scholars have focused on institutional professionalization, political and cultural constraints,42 or on preexisting ethnic and religious cleavages that may inhibit civil society development.43 Institutional professionalization, as I have explained, is not an adequate explanation to account for divergent outcomes. And although preexisting cleavages are important to consider, the political settlement remains pivotal to institutionalizing these divisions, or in harnessing ethnic, political, and social divisions. Moreover, in post-Communist regimes, although Western donors are inclined to support nonleftist groups that support liberal democracy, it is fair to say that the political settlements (even if informally) are noninclusive in these societies, but to a lesser degree than in conflict to peace transitions where a settlement is formally defined. Other scholars have focused on the importance of civil society’s legacy in a given context, or its embrace of “universally embraced” norms.44 Societies with a strong legacy of grassroots organization will persist in that tradition,45 regardless of the type and quantity of Western donor assistance they receive. There are many cases, however, that may have had a strong legacy of civil society organizing that experience a decline regardless of the historical precedent or prevalent norms.

      A number of works have focused on Western donors’ lack of understanding of the contexts in which they operate and their reluctance to address the key challenges at hand while prioritizing their geostrategic interests.46 Jason Brownley, for example, forcefully argued that the United States has often worked to ensure that democracy does not take root, as in the case of Egypt, prioritizing its own geostrategic interests over political reform.47 Benoit Challand provided a cogent explanation of how donors can play a role in promoting and excluding certain NGOs.48 These explanations, however, fail to fully account for how political contexts lead to divergent outcomes, and, more specifically, how noninclusive arrangements exacerbate these negative outcomes. Foreign donors are not operating in vacuums. Some may counter that the variation in democracy assistance may account for the difference in outcomes, but it is important to note that democracy programs do not vary extensively depending on the donor. The difference lies in the types of programs and projects that are prioritized in certain countries or contexts and the amounts of funding.49

      This book addresses these omissions head on. It focuses on how political settlements shape the institutional engineering process and the unfolding relations between different civil society and political groups in these contexts, as well as how Western donor assistance mediates these processes. Western donors mediate these outcomes by encouraging certain patterns of engagement between different civil society and political groups, as well as with state institutions. Western donors also influence the degree of impact by the amount of funding they provide.

      The inclusivity of the political settlement (in a given context), my key explanatory factor, shapes the impact of donor assistance on civil society and democratic development in three fundamental ways: who is included and who is not; degree of foreign donor involvement and program priority; and levels of institutionalization.

      Inclusivity and Who Is Included and Who Is Not?

      First, political settlements affect who receives funding and who does not and thus the strategies adopted by different actors. As a result, these settlements shape the degree of horizontal and vertical polarization between individuals, groups, and organizations that receive funding (and hence can professionalize) and those that do not receive funding. In turn, the settlements affect the degree of vertical hierarchy between those organizations that receive Western donor funding and those that do not. Funded organizations are required to professionalize their operations and often become service providers to the unfunded organizations. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, in the post-Oslo era, the mass-based women’s organizations in the Palestinian territories that were affiliated with the Oslo opposition were often not able to access Western donor funding. In the new reconstituted women’s sector, these mass-based organizations became the recipients of services and training from those organizations that were not as vocally opposed to the Oslo Accords. In this way, Western donors mediated relations between those who were included and those who were shunned by the settlement. These findings are not limited to the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, but extend to other cases. In noninclusive contexts such as Iraq, Western donors, and especially United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID), allocated all its assistance to anti-Ba’ath groups. In inclusive contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, Western donor assistance was far less political and did not work to promote and exclude different political and civil society groups.

      Inclusivity and Degree of Foreign Donor Involvement and Program Priority

      Second, the political settlements determine the amounts of funding and types of programs donors are more likely to promote. Donors, especially state-sponsored donors, will likely be more involved and commit higher amounts of funding where settlements are more fragile and their geostrategic interests figure more prominently. Geostrategic considerations may influence which programs are implemented, and donors may not prioritize a stronger civil society or democratic development. Where donors become more involved and commit higher amounts of funding, their impact is greater. Higher amounts of funding also often require more stringent professionalization criteria. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 4, foreign donors prioritized aid to civil society development in the Palestinian territories in contrast to El Salvador, where they were more likely to prioritize economic development programs in the post-accord period. Along these same lines, the United States was more heavily involved supporting right-wing groups in El Salvador during the Cold War. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it had appeared that liberal market-democracy had nearly triumphed in Latin America in contrast to the Middle East. All Latin American countries had adopted neo-liberal economic reform policies.50

      Inclusivity and Institutionalization—Articulated versus Disarticulated Spaces

      Third, in addition to determining suffrage and equal opportunity to formulate preferences and have preferences equally considered by the state,51 the political settlement will impact political institutionalization at the local and national levels of government in a given context,52 as well as electoral institutional design, and, in turn, shape citizen participation. These two levels of government are of particular relevance to this study because they facilitate relations between the state and civil society, and hence shape citizen participation. Through electoral laws and the frequency of elections, dominant groups influence the ability of opposition groups to participate in elections and prevail at certain levels of government. In turn, electoral outcomes influence how much and what type of access opposition groups (and affiliated NGOs) will have to council or assembly representatives in local government and the national legislative bodies.53 As I will elaborate