Promoting Democracy. Manal A. Jamal

of certain mass-based organizations. NGO professionalization in El Salvador, however, did not result in the same extent of demobilization of previously active sectors. Rather, civil society development encouraged the incorporation of grassroots constituencies and facilitated citizens’ ability to engage the state. The development of civil society entailed the institutionalization of productive patterns of engagement with local government (see figure 1.1). Moreover, competition and a smooth turnover became defining features of El Salvador’s presidential, legislative, and local elections. After two decades of Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, ARENA), presidential victories, the FMLN won both the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections. Indeed, the degree of political competition and the smooth turnover of power from ARENA, El Salvador’s right-wing party, to the FMLN in presidential and legislative elections reflected the vigor of political life in the country.

      Similar to the PLO, the political-military organizations of what became the FMLN embarked on mass-movement mobilization in the mid-1970s and established their own mass-based structures in the controlled zones17 that included rural workers, teachers, students, women, and repopulated and war-displaced persons.18 In the preaccord period, these associations shared similarities in terms of grassroots character, functions, and relationship to the political organizations. As in the Palestinian case, such organizations played central roles in resistance, consciousness-raising, provision of community services, and organization of cooperative economic enterprises.

      Similar to the Palestinian case, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political-military organizations succeeded in recruiting women in large numbers, and in genuinely involving them in the struggle through mass-based organizations.19 Each political-military organization established its own mass-based women’s organizations (see table 5.3, which shows the year that each political-military organizations established its affiliated mass-based women’s organization). The level of organization during this period, especially among the leftist opposition, laid the groundwork for what could become an effective civil society that could represent large segments of the population who would not otherwise be represented. In both contexts, the programs and projects of the women’s sector addressed women’s practical needs such as health, sustenance, childcare, literacy, and small-scale vocational training.

      Following the election of Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte in 1984, political openings in El Salvador increased; because US engagement required the appearance of democracy, blatant repression was less tolerated. Consequently, many of the political-military organizations of the FMLN and the Christian base communities were able to operate more openly and established their own women’s mass-based organizations between 1985 and 1988, many of them in San Salvador and not in the controlled zones20 (see table 5.3).

      After the signing of the Salvadoran peace accords in 1992, there also was an influx of donor assistance. Even after professionalizing their operations, however, these women’s organizations, as with many other mass-based organizations, retained their mass character. In fact, donors often required these organizations to maintain regular engagement with their mass constituencies. The Palestinian case, however, and specifically the formerly active mass-based organizations, pointed to how unequal access to resources as well as institutions to engage the state became a defining feature of post-Oslo political life. This unequal access and the polarization that transpired were not simply an outcome of foreign donors requiring institutions to professionalize their operations. Even in the absence of the massive influx of Western donor assistance and requirements for institutional professionalization, Palestinian civil society and democratic developments would have remained constrained because, ultimately, the Oslo Accords were not meant to deliver and promote democracy. The massive influx of foreign aid that followed, including assistance to develop civil society and democracy, was intended to buttress the Oslo Accords and to promote those groups and constituencies that did not oppose the Oslo Accords.

      Figure 1.1. Political settlements, donor assistance, and civil society outcomes. This figure was slightly modified from the original that first appeared in Manal A. Jamal, “Democracy Promotion, Civil Society Building, and the Primacy of Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 1 (January 2012): 3–31. Reprinted by permission of SAGE.

      The Centrality of Political Settlements

      In this book, I depart from predominant explanations of civil society and democracy outcomes that solely focus on foreign donor assistance and related professionalization dynamics.21 My analysis takes the argument a step back and concentrates on those factors that shape the emergent political context. I argue that political settlements, broadly understood as the formal and informal political agreements that define political relations in certain contexts, shape the impact of democracy promotion assistance. The “inclusivity” of political settlements (assessed by the extent of participation of major political groups and the degree of societal support) shapes the relative effectiveness of democracy promotion efforts and the impact of Western donor assistance on civil society and democratic development more generally. Democracy promotion efforts are bound to fail in contexts where the political settlement enjoys limited societal support and key political constituencies are excluded—despite the backing of dominant political groups and Western state-sponsored donors. In these contexts, Western donor assistance will minimize cooperation, exacerbate political polarization, and weaken civil society by promoting favored groups over others. This is especially true if the interests of dominant political groups and Western foreign donors coalesce to marginalize important political sectors. Conversely, in inclusive contexts, Western donor assistance will play a more positive role, helping civil society and democratic development.

      Political settlements frame political relations and outcomes, determine key players, and shape societal conflict management systems.22 In conflict-to-peace transitions, political settlements specifically refer to peace agreements. According to Stephan Haggard and Robert Kauffman, the settlement terms refer to both “formal constitutional rules and the informal understandings that govern political contestation in the new democratic system.… Terms include military prerogatives, rights of participation in political life, design of representation and decision making institutions.”23 In many ways, they are most similar to pacted transitions,24 or what Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter define as

      an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those entering into it.25

      Transition theorists generally concur that “pacted transitions” lead to the most stable and successful transitions to democracy.26 These transitions ensure that the rules of democratic politics are acceptable to the largest proportion of the elite population.27 Although stability may characterize these transitions, scholars agree that noninclusive arrangements may ultimately marginalize certain groups and sectors of the population, thus affecting the quality of the emergent democracies.28 Similarly, during conflict-to-peace transitions, political settlements play a pivotal role in defining the most and least relevant actors. External actors also often play key roles in negotiating political settlements in these transitions, as opposed to in ordinary democratic transitions, which tend to be more of an internal, domestic affair. Ultimately, noninclusive political settlements undermine the conflict-to-peace transition, as well as the quality of the emergent democracy.

      During conflict to peace transitions, political liberalization and democratization processes may inherently exacerbate polarization and conflict,29 especially where preexisting religious and ethnic schisms may exist.30 Furthermore, the prospects for peace and democratization are bleak when there are unsatisfactory political pacts,31 and especially when the settlements are noninclusive.32 The more prescriptive peace-building33 and conflict-resolution literatures concur that the broader inclusion of different actors and constituencies enhances the longer-term prospects for the cessation of violence, peace-building, and democratic development.34 However, this fundamental understanding does not appear to figure prominently in the programming of Western donors who work in the promotion of democracy (what