The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal. Blaise Pascal

stray from her paths; as passengers in a ship think that those move who stand upon the shore. Both sides say the same thing. There must be a fixed point to enable us to judge. The harbour decides the question for those who are in the vessel, but where can we find the harbour in morals?

      When all moves equally, nothing seems to move, as in a ship. When all tend to vice, none appears to do so. Whoever stops draws attention to the onward movement of others, as does a fixed point.

      

      Justice is what is established, and thus all our established laws are necessarily held to be just without being examined, because they are established.

      Justice.—As fashion makes what is agreeable, so it makes what is just.

      Our natural principles are but principles of custom. In children natural principles are those which they have received from the habits of their fathers, as hunting in animals.

      A different custom will produce different natural principles. This experience testifies, and if there are some natural principles ineradicable by custom, so are there some customs opposed to nature ineradicable by nature, or by a second custom. This depends on constitution.

      Fathers fear that the natural love of their children may be effaced. Now what sort of thing is that nature which is liable to be effaced. Custom is a second nature which destroys the former. But what is nature, for is not custom natural? I am greatly afraid that nature itself may be only our first custom, as custom is second nature.

      Montaigne was wrong: custom should only be followed because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just; but most men follow it for the simple reason that they think it just. Otherwise they would not follow it though it were the custom, for our only desire is to be subjected to reason or to justice. Without this, custom would pass for tyranny, but the empire of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of choice. These are principles natural to man.

      It is then good to obey laws and customs because they are laws, but we ought to know that there is neither truth nor justice to introduce into them, that we know nothing about these, and can therefore only follow what is recognised, and thus we should never transgress them. But most men cannot receive this doctrine, and since they believe that truth can be found, and that it resides in law and custom, they believe these laws, and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not merely of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey the laws, but are liable to revolt when these are shown to be of no value; and this may be proved of all of them, looked at from a certain point of view.

      Injustice.—The authority of the judge is not given him for his sake, but for that of the judged. It is dangerous to say this to the people, but the people have too much faith in you; that will not harm them, and may serve you. You must then say it openly. Pasce oves meas, not tuas. You owe me pasturage.

      Injustice.—It is dangerous to say to the people that the laws are not just, for men obey them only because they think them just. Therefore it is necessary to say at the same time that they must be obeyed because they are laws, as superiors must be obeyed, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. All sedition is averted, if this principle be established and it be understood what is rightly the definition of justice.

      If God gave us masters direct from himself, how heartily ought we to obey them! Circumstances and necessity are infallible masters.

      Custom is our nature. Whoever is accustomed to the faith believes in it, can no longer even fear hell, and believes in nothing else. Whoever accustoms himself to believe that the king is terrible … etc. Who doubts then that our soul, being accustomed to see number, space, and motion, believes that and nothing else?

      Veri juris; we have it no longer; had we it, we should not take the manners of our country as our rule of justice.

      Here, not finding justice, we fall back on force, etc.

      It is a ridiculous thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have yet made laws for themselves which they exactly obey, as, for instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, thieves, heretics, etc., and thus logicians. …

      It seems as though their licence must be without limit or barrier, since they have broken down so many that are just and holy.

      

      Weakness.—The whole employment of men is to gain wealth; yet they have no title to show that they justly possess it but human caprice, nor have they power to hold it securely. It is the same with knowledge, of which disease deprives us. We are incapable both of truth and of goodness.

      The Swiss are offended if they are called noble, and bring proof of their plebeian race that they may be judged worthy of office.

      When the question is of judging whether we ought to make war and kill so many men, condemning so many Spaniards to death, there is only one man who is the judge, and he an interested party; there ought to be a third, and he disinterested.

      "Why do you kill me?—What! Do not you live on the other side of the stream, my friend? If you lived on this side I should be an assassin, and it were unjust to kill you in this fashion, but since you live on the other side, I am a brave soldier, and it is just."

      Justice, Power.—It is just that what is just should be obeyed, it is of necessity that what is strongest should be obeyed.

      Justice without power is unavailing, power without justice is tyrannical. Justice without power is gainsaid, because the wicked always exist, power without justice is condemned. We must therefore combine justice and power, making what is just strong, and what is strong just.

      Justice is subject to dispute, power is easily recognised and cannot be disputed. Thus we cannot give power to justice, because power has arraigned justice, saying that justice is unjust, and she herself truly just; so since we are unable to bring about that what is just should be strong, we have made the strong just.

      The sole universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs, and the law of the majority in others. And this comes from the power which is in them.

      

      Thus it comes that kings, whose power is of another kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.

      No doubt equality of goods is just, but since they are unable to bring about that power should obey justice, people have judged it right to obey power; not being able to add power to justice they have justified power, so that justice and power should coalesce, and peace, the sovereign good, result.

      Do we follow the majority because they have more reason? No; but because they have more power.

      Do we follow ancient laws and opinions because they are more sound? No; but because they stand alone and take from us the root of diversity.

      Summum jus, summa injuria.

      The way of the majority is the best way, because it is plain, and has power to make itself obeyed; yet it is the opinion of the least able.

      If men could have done so, they would have placed power in the hands of justice, since we cannot deal with power as we please, because it is a tangible quality, while justice is a spiritual quality of which we dispose as we please, they have placed justice in the hands of power, and thus that is called just which we are forced to obey.

      Thence arises the right of the sword, for the sword gives a true right.

      Otherwise we should see violence on one side and justice on the other. The end of the twelfth Provincial.

      Thence the injustice of the Fronde, which raises its so-called justice against power.

      It is not the same in the Church, for there is true justice and no violence.

      Injustice.—That presumption should be joined to insignificance is extreme injustice.