War and the Arme Blanche. Erskine Childers

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       Erskine Childers

      War and the Arme Blanche

      Published by Good Press, 2019

       [email protected]

      EAN 4064066199906

Table of Contents

       INTRODUCTION

       CHAPTER I THE ISSUE AND ITS IMPORTANCE

       CHAPTER II THE THREEFOLD PROBLEM

       I.— The Physical Problem.

       II.— The Psychological Problem.

       III.— The Problem of Training.

       CHAPTER III BRITISH AND BOER MOUNTED TROOPS

       CHAPTER IV ELANDSLAAGTE

       CHAPTER V FROM ELANDSLAAGTE TO THE BLACK WEEK

       CHAPTER VI COLESBERG AND KIMBERLEY

       CHAPTER VII PAARDEBERG AND POPLAR GROVE

       I.— Kimberley to Paardeberg.

       II.— Poplar Grove.

       III.— The Final Advance to Bloemfontein.

       CHAPTER VIII THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH

       CHAPTER IX BLOEMFONTEIN TO KOMATI POORT

       I.— The Transition.

       II.— The Halt at Bloemfontein.

       III.— The Advance to Pretoria.

       IV.— The Advance to Komati Poort.

       CHAPTER X THE GUERILLA WAR

       CHAPTER XI MOUNTED CHARGES IN SOUTH AFRICA

       CHAPTER XII A PECULIAR WAR?

       CHAPTER XIII BERNHARDI AND “CAVALRY TRAINING”

       CHAPTER XIV THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

       CHAPTER XV REFORM

       I.— Study.

       II.— Nomenclature.

       III.— Armament of Cavalry.

       IV.— Mounted Infantry.

       V.— Yeomanry.

       VI.— Imperial Mounted Troops.

       VII.— Conclusion.

       INDEX

INTRODUCTION

       Table of Contents

      BY

      FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G.

      I have read with the greatest interest Mr. Childers’s illuminating book “War and the Arme Blanche.” My opinion of the subject with which it deals is already so well known throughout the army that I need not labour to say how entirely I agree with the author’s main thesis; indeed, anyone who will take the trouble to read “Cavalry Training” (1904), will see that I anticipated the arguments which he has so ably developed. This being so, it is not surprising that I should view the regulations laid down in “Cavalry Training” (1907), with some concern.

      Let us consider briefly what the history of this question—the comparative value of steel weapons and firearms for Cavalry in war—is. Until within the last few years our Lancer regiments depended entirely on the lance and sword, while other Cavalry regiments depended almost entirely on the sword.^[1] This was inevitable because of the inaccuracy and short range of the smooth-bore carbine. Tentative changes were made when rifled arms were adopted, but it is only within the last thirty years that Lancer regiments have had any firearm given to them save a pistol.^[2] With such an equipment and such traditions it was perhaps but natural that the training of Cavalry should have been almost exclusively devoted to shock tactics and the use of the arme blanche.

      But why now, with a different equipment, should Cavalry still be trained on the old tradition, and their rifles reside in buckets attached to the horse, only to be used on certain exceptional occasions to “supplement the sword or lance”? (“Cavalry Training,” sec. 142.)

      The late Colonel Henderson, in his essay on the tactical employment of Cavalry, “Science of War,” chapter iii., page 51, pointed out that, notwithstanding the introduction of gunpowder, the Cavalry was the arm that had undergone the least change. He went on to say that “shock-tactics, the charge, and the hand-to-hand encounter are still the one ideal of Cavalry action; and the power of manœuvring in great masses, maintaining an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and moving at the highest speed with accurately dressed ranks, is the criterion of excellence.” He added: “to such an extent has this teaching been carried out, that the efficiency of the individual, especially in those duties which are performed by single men or small parties, cannot fairly be said to have received due attention.”

      After