Название | Galen on Apodictics |
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Автор произведения | Dmitry A. Balalykin |
Жанр | Журналы |
Серия | |
Издательство | Журналы |
Год выпуска | 0 |
isbn | 9783838274065 |
A crucial attribute of Galen’s medical theory, which could be called “natural philosophy of medicine” has to be emphasised. In it, disease was not associated with anatomical location and a special etiological factor. In other words, in order to understand Galen, we have to ditch the modern conception of disease (or go beyond its bounds). Nonetheless, similar to how T. Kuhn compares the physics of Aristotle, I. Newton and A. Einstein, doctors, while recognising the difference between the medicine of Galen, S.P. Botkin and E.M. Tareev, have to keep in mind the various types of scientific rationality, which are typical of different historical phases of the development of science.
Galen explains the phenomena of medical practice in the language of philosophy. For example, when analysing his treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato19, it should be remembered that in the debate on the “soul”, we are dealing not with the modern language of philosophy and theology, but with the specific language of science of that time, wherein this concept had meanings different from those familiar to us. The same applies to the strictly medical language of the Galenic clinician. This is the very same question of the “commensurability” or “incommensurability” of scientific knowledge from different eras. Galen also explains physiological processes occurring in the human body using the category of “soul”. For instance, digestion and haemopoiesis occur with the direct involvement of the “inferior parts of the soul”, which are located in the liver: for food to be properly absorbed into the body, and for primary elements to properly replenish anatomical structures of various parts of the body, there is need for the active presence of the “vegetative spirit”, a type of endogenouss pneuma, which is a derived from the inferior, “desiring” part of the soul. The liver is particularly the organ which forms blood and saturates the blood with nutrients. The process of digestion and absorption ends in the liver, and functions of venous blood begin from it. The same applies to the other two types of endogenous pneuma which, according to Galen, are derived from the activity of the superior (rational) and middle (violent) parts of the soul. They particularly explain the realisation of the functions of the brain, heart and arterial blood. Therefore, according to Galen, diseases of the soul should be approached from the same standpoint as diseases of the body.20
Discussing the matter of commensurability, I also suggest to use the Stepin’s classification: classical, nonclassical, post-nonclassical paradigms of cognition.
The potential of Galen’s system is defined by the principle of teleology, which is the basis of his views on the human being. In this case, the term “teleology” is used in the classical sense as a “practical function”. It is about the view on the structure of animals and human as being practical in relation to the function they perform. However, this principle has another side. It determines the potential use of the system of investigation (the ability to allow the governing paradigm to take in and absorb new facts). A teleological view of the anatomy of the human being provides a deep conviction of the extreme importance of every detail, both known and unknown. It constantly stimulates the explorer to new observations and research. On the one hand, the human organism is knowable; on the other hand, doctors are never satisfied with the amount of knowledge they have and try to expand it.
This is why Galen focuses on the views expressed by Plato, particularly the concept of the psychosomatic unity of the human. It should be clear to any historian of medicine that without the appropriate evaluation of the soul, the body and their interactions, there could be no integrated approach to the diagnosis of illness and its treatment.
Great danger lurks in wait for the scientist when historical and philosophical inquiry is focused solely on specific details of the professional work itself and sets out to answer only the questions: “who discovered?”, “how did they discover it?” The question why a particular scientist at a certain time and place made their discovery is not even considered. And it is not considered because the medical historian lacks the necessary package of general philosophical and general historical knowledge.
Speaking of the history of any given scientific discovery or the establishment of general theoretical ideas in medicine (or physics, for example), I am certainly trying to understand the “anatomy” of the mind of the inquirer, to find out how any given idea came about, the path of the scientific search by a particular scientist. Of course, these questions cannot be answered without the description of the figure of the inquirer himself. Reconstruction of the biography of the scientist, details about his education, information about his family and social surrounding are always the focus of attention of historians of science. Simply put, I am trying to answer for myself the question: “How did he come up with the idea of his discovery?” Thereafter, the following question immediately arises: “Why specifically him (and not someone else) and why at that place and at that time (and not some other time)?”
V.S. Stepin also proposed the term the “world view of the scientist”21, which considers not only theoretical ideas of any given investigator on the subject of inquiry, but also the need for comprehensive understanding of science as part of the social environment and framework factors which shaped the personality of the scientist.
In the historical development of science, one can identify eras that are characterised by changes in the type of scientific rationality. These types may be associated with above-mentioned three types of the paradigm—classical, nonclassical and post-nonclassical. The criteria of their differentiation are: 1) the peculiarities of the system organisation of objects mastered by science (simple systems, complex self-regulating systems, complex spontaneously developing systems, each of which involves special interpretation of the categorical grid, which facilitates comprehension and study—special meanings of the categories of part and whole, thing and process, causality, space and time); 2) the system of ideals and norms of inquiry inherent to each type of rationality (explanation, description, justification, structure and construction of knowledge); 3) the peculiarity of philosophical and methodological reflection over cognitive activity, which enables to include scientific knowledge in the culture of the corresponding historical era.22
The Galenic system is a unique phenomenon in the history of natural science. It emerged in the early 3rd century and assumed a dominant position surprisingly quickly. I would like to make a critical methodological observation: the expressions “scientific theory”, “scientific knowledge” do not sound quite appropriate with respect to this time—I am certainly referring to the pre-scientific period of the development of natural science, protoscience. Taking into account this adjustment, which introduces the necessary semantic and notional boundaries, for the sake of convenience, I will employ the concepts of “scientific-practical system” and “theory of rational knowledge” with respect to Galenism.
The triumph of Galenism is a truly unprecedented fact in the history of science. G. Ferngren argues that the Galenic system dominates as early as the mid 3rd century, wittily describing the remaining opponents of Galen as a “post-Galenic sect”.23 V. Nutton takes a more cautious position, pointing to a longer period during which Galenism becomes the universally recognised foundation