1 Recce. Alexander Strachan

raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda on 4 July 1976, a number of operators from 1 Recce were sent to Israel to do a course in urban warfare. The Recces subsequently designed their own courses that were applicable to the conditions under which they worked.

      In the same way that the operators used the bush to their advantage, they now exploited the built-up area’s shadows, noises, dress codes and traffic to blend in with the urban environment.

      They wore civilian clothes in enemy cities, with firearms concealed under their jackets. They would walk in loose groups, those who were able to would converse with the people in the local language, and they would avoid suspicious movements as well as any military formation. Depending on the operation, the Recce operator might pass himself off as a tourist in search of pubs or nightclubs.

      The target in the city was studied in detail beforehand to acquaint the team with the layout, traffic patterns and hiding places. Sometimes tramps and their habits were studied, and the Recces would then dress and act like them without attracting attention.

      As the cities were always deep inside enemy territory, the enemy had a false sense of confidence that they were secure and out of reach of action against them. When the first shots rang out and the stun grenades went off, it invariably came as a total surprise.

      The objective of the operations was to raid enemy headquarters and hiding places and collect documentation and other sources of information. Thereafter demolition charges were laid in the target to destroy it completely. After the raid the Recces would immediately disappear again in the city among the buildings, dens and streets to make their way to a predetermined point to be extracted.

      Successful execution of such an operation depended on a proper prior urban recce. The close-in recce was usually carried out by one man (sometimes two), who would walk or drive past the target once or twice. In the process, an abundance of information would be gathered: what do the doors look like, and in which direction do they open; is there burglar proofing, and how strong is it; are there pipes indicating the presence of gas in the kitchen; and what do the locks on the doors look like?

      All these details and many more were thoroughly memorised in passing, and photos were taken with hidden cameras. If vehicles were used, EMLC1 (highly qualified engineers at the Special Forces headquarters) would equip the vehicle with all-round invisible cameras that could be controlled from the inside.

      These operations were extremely specialised and operators were sometimes transported to the target by sea, or otherwise inserted by helicopter at a particular point from where they continued on foot. Sometimes Puma helicopters would fly them in with motorcycles on board and drop them about 50 km, depending on the situation, outside the city. The teams would then approach the target on their powerful 500 cc Honda off-road motorcycles. While the operators raided the target, their comrades would keep the motorcycles running.

      On completion of the operation, they would pick up the attackers and drive to a predetermined landing zone to be extracted. A typical raid on a target would sometimes last only a minute or two. The attack was always a total surprise, and the team would already be out of the area before the enemy was able to react.

      1 Recce was very well trained in urban warfare; in fact, it was one of their major fields of specialisation. Sometimes agents were used to supply vehicles in the target city. In such cases the teams were launched from the sea and met the agents on the beach. They would then drive to the target and return in the same vehicles to the beach to be extracted.

      With urban operations, the team used urban noises to their advantage. Heavy traffic or a plane passing overhead would mask the shots of especially silenced MP-5s and AK-47s (submachine guns equipped with silencers). At times the operators would wear specially designed jackets in which weapons and equipment could be concealed. The jackets blended in with the clothing worn by the local population, but had Kevlar reinforcement that protected them against shrapnel and small-arms fire.

      Like phantoms, 1 Recce sneaked around in enemy cities in the midnight hours, slipping from one dark patch to another. In emergencies, they would vanish without trace in the underground city structure. Just as they used the African bush to render themselves invisible, the city and all its structures were now employed for the same purpose.

      Sea and river operations were also conducted during dark-moon and half- and quarter-moon periods. The operators would approach ports and coastal targets unobtrusively in special boats with low profiles and muffled engines, and infiltrate them. The many dark places in the harbour area were ideal hiding places.

      River banks, too, had patches of shadow in which the target could be approached unnoticed. The team would pull camouflage nets over the kayaks and disappear with the silent-rowing technique – with the water as their most valuable anti-tracking ally.

      They chose their landing sites very carefully to avoid leaving suspicious tracks on the bank, and wore shoes that were equipped with the enemy’s sole pattern. At times they would wear ‘olifantvoete’ (elephant feet) – a kind of sock made out of canvas – over their boots to hide their tracks. The sole part of the elephant feet contained sponge that left a fuzzy, indistinct oval-shaped track. Some of the men would use their elephant feet as pillows at night. At times the operators would get out of the boats with bare feet, especially if there were many fishermen in the area. Once they reached a safe and suitable spot, they would again put on the boots with the sole pattern of the enemy.

      Cooperation between the different Recce units was paramount for them to be operationally effective. Equally vital was the role of the support personnel. Without the right equipment, transport, medical assistance, logistical support and financial peace of mind, the Recce could not focus properly on his mission.

      It was also important that his household would keep functioning smoothly in his absence. In this regard, the role of the wives should never be underestimated. They made sure that school attendance, the upbringing of the children and daily maintenance continued, so that the operator could eventually return to a safe and orderly haven. In the success of 1 Recce, the role of the support component was just as integral as that of the operational component.

      1

      First action

      The thinking behind the formation of 1 RC can be traced back to the 1960s. It was in these early days of the Bush War that the first South African attack in Ovamboland was carried out on Swapo’s Ongulumbashe base on 26 August 1966.

      At that stage only the South African Police (SAP) were used to combat Swapo insurgents in South West Africa (SWA). Therefore Capt. Jan Breytenbach’s team of eight paratroopers first had to be sworn in as ‘special police’ so that they could attack the base from helicopters alongside the police force. Apart from Breytenbach himself, his team consisted of Kaas van der Waals, Wouter Hugo, W Burgess, Yogi Potgieter, J Snyman, Tilly Smit and Johnny Kruger.

      The SAP’s Maj. ‘Rooi Rus’ (Red Russian) Swanepoel was in command of the combined attack that was known as Operation Blouwildebees.2 The command structure was on the ground instead of in a helicopter to orchestrate the attack from the air. Hence the operation had limited success – two Swapo fighters were killed and nine captured, while a considerable number escaped.

      During the debriefing in Pretoria it was realised that the SAP were no longer able to keep the Swapo insurgents in SWA in check on their own. This led to the entry of the SADF into the Border War.

      Breytenbach was in the British Royal Navy before he returned to South Africa. Cmdt. WP Louw persuaded him to join 1 Parachute Battalion. This was before Operation Blouwildebees, and by then Breytenbach had already had extensive military exposure.

      In the Royal Navy he had specialised in night navigation and was the top achiever in his group. He was a navigator in the elite Night Fighter Squadron of the Fleet Air Arm.

      Apart from navigation, he learnt much about flying and maritime topics. A highlight of his navy career was his service period in the Far East. The different ports they called at and the variety of positions in which he was employed had broadened his vision within a short space of time. Breytenbach was a keen reader, and from early on in his life he had developed personal ideas and views about