Congo Diary. Ernesto Che Guevara

that eventually there was a “Congolization” of the Cubans. “Congolization” refers to habits and attitudes toward the revolution that were typical of the Congolese soldiers at that time. This does not reflect a derogatory opinion of the Congolese people, but it does reflect such a view of the soldiers of those days. We will try to explain why those combatants displayed such negative traits in the course of this narrative.

      As a general norm, one that I have always followed, nothing but the truth will be told in these pages, or at least in my interpretation of the events, although it may be challenged by other subjective evaluations or corrections, should any errors have crept into my account.

      At some points, where it would be indiscreet or inadvisable to tell the truth, some specific references been omitted because there are certain things the enemy should not know. Moreover, what we consider here are issues that may assist friends in the reorganization of the struggle in the Congo (or in the launching of the struggle elsewhere in Africa or other continents that face similar challenges). Among the matters that have been omitted are the ways and means by which we reached Tanzania, our springboard into the setting of this story.¹

      The names of the Congolese mentioned here are their real ones, but nearly all combatants of the Cuban contingent are referred to by the Swahili names we gave them on their arrival in the Congo. The real names of the compañeros who participated will be included in an appendix, should the editors decide that this would be useful.

      Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that we have highlighted various cases of weakness on the part of individuals or groups, as well as the general demoralization that eventually overcame us, in strict adherence to the truth, recognizing the importance these incidents may have for future liberation movements. But this in no way detracts from the heroic character of the effort. The heroic character of this participation flows from the general position of our government and the Cuban people. Our country, the sole socialist bastion on the doorstep of Yankee imperialism, sends its soldiers to fight and die in a foreign land, on a distant continent, and publicly assumes full responsibility for its actions. In this challenge, in this clear position on the great modern-day issue of waging a relentless struggle against Yankee imperialism, lies the heroic significance of our participation in the struggle of the Congo.

      It is there we see the readiness of a people and its leadership not only to defend themselves but to attack, because when it comes to Yankee imperialism, it is not enough to be resolute in defense. It has to be attacked in its bases of support in the colonies and neocolonies that are the foundation of its system of world domination.²

      1. Che left Cuba for the Congo on April 1, 1965, after a process of disguising himself in order to assume the identity of Ramón Benítez. He was accompanied by José María Martínez Tamayo and Víctor Dreke. The night before they left, Fidel visited them to say good-bye. They traveled from Cuba to Prague and Cairo and arrived in Tanzania April 5-6. Other members of the column left Cuba in the following weeks, in groups of three or six, and took various different routes, arriving in Tanzania after Che, Martínez Tamayo and Dreke.

      2. It is from this perspective that Che analyzes imperialist domination as a world system—how it functions to protect its interests, guarantee exploitation and challenge any attempt at resistance or liberation as well as its various forms of colonialism and neocolonialism. Che’s actions were completely consistent with his ideas. He practiced internationalism in an attempt to coordinate and unify the anti-imperialist struggle.

FIRST ACT

      In this kind of story, it is difficult to establish the first act. For the sake of narrative, I will begin with a trip I made to Africa that gave me the chance to rub shoulders with many leaders of the various liberation movements.¹ Particularly instructive was my visit to Dar es-Salaam, where a considerable number of Freedom Fighters² had taken up residence. Most of them lived comfortably in hotels and had made a career out of their situation, sometimes lucrative and almost always congenial. This was the setting for a series of interviews in which they generally asked for military training in Cuba and financial assistance. It was the leitmotif of nearly all of them.

      I also met the Congolese combatants. From our first meeting with them, we could clearly see the extraordinary number of diverse tendencies and opinions that gave a distinct character to this group of revolutionary leaders. I made contact with Kabila and his General Staff, and he made an excellent impression on me. He said he had come from the interior of the country, but apparently he had only come from Kigoma, a small Tanzanian town on Lake Tanganyika and one of the main settings of this story. It was the point of departure for the Congo and a comfortable place for revolutionaries to take refuge when they had their fill of the hazardous life in the mountains across the water.

      Kabila’s presentation was clear, detailed and resolute; he allowed his opposition to Gbenyé and Kanza to show, as well as how much he disagreed with Soumialot. He argued there could be no talk of a Congolese government because Mulele, the initiator of the struggle, had not been consulted, and so the president could only claim the title of head of the government of northeastern Congo. This also meant that Kabila’s own zone in the southeast, which he led as vice-chairman of the party,³ lay outside Gbenyé’s sphere of influence.

      Kabila realized perfectly well that the main enemy was US imperialism, and he declared his readiness to carry the fight against it through to the end. As I said, his statements and his confidence made a very good impression on me.

      On another day, we spoke with Soumialot. He is a different kind of man, much less politically mature and much older. He lacked the basic instinct to keep quiet or to speak very little, using vague phrases, so that he seemed to express great subtlety of thought but, however much he tried, he was unable to give the impression of a real popular leader. He explained what he has since made public: his involvement as defense minister in the Gbenyé government, how Gbenyé’s action took them by surprise, etc. He also clearly stated his opposition to Gbenyé and, above all, Kanza. I did not personally meet these last two, except for a quick handshake with Kanza when we happened to meet at an airport.

      We talked at length with Kabila about what our government considered a strategic mistake on the part of some African friends: namely, that in the face of open aggression by the imperialist powers, they promoted the slogan: “The Congo problem is an African problem,” and acted accordingly. Our view was that the Congo problem was a worldwide problem, and Kabila agreed.⁴ On behalf of our government, I offered him some 30 instructors and whatever weapons we might have, and he was happy to accept these. He recommended that both should be delivered urgently, as did Soumialot in another conversation—the latter saying it would be a good idea if the instructors were black [ie, Afro-Cuban].

      I decided to hear what the other Freedom Fighters had to say by having a friendly chat with them in separate meetings. But due to a mistake by embassy staff, there was a “tumultuous” meeting attended by 50 or more people, representing movements from 10 or more countries, each divided into two or more tendencies. I gave them a rousing speech and considered the requests nearly all of them made for financial assistance and training of personnel. I explained the cost of training someone in Cuba, the investment of money and time required, and the uncertainty that it would produce combatants who would be useful for the movement.

      I described our experience in the Sierra Maestra, where we obtained roughly one soldier for every five recruits we trained, and only one good one for every five soldiers. I argued as forcefully as I could to the exasperated Freedom Fighters that most of the money invested in training would not be well spent and that a soldier, especially a revolutionary soldier, cannot be trained in an academy.⁵ Only in war does he become a soldier. He might receive a diploma from some college or other, but his real graduation—as is the case with any professional—takes place in the practice of his profession, in the way he reacts under enemy fire, to suffering, to defeat, to relentless pursuit, to adversity. You can never predict from what someone says, or from their previous history, how an individual will react when faced with the experience in fighting in