Congo Diary. Ernesto Che Guevara

for “experiences to be extracted that might be useful to other revolutionary movements.”

      In his preface, titled “An Initial Warning,” Che begins by saying: “This is the story of a failure.” While I don’t agree with this assessment, I can understand his state of mind and how it might be considered a failure. But personally I think it was truly heroic. Anyone who has spent any time in the continent of Africa will certainly understand what I am saying. The degradation it has undergone over the centuries at the hands of so-called European colonizers still leaves its mark on the peoples of Africa: the imposition of a different culture, of other religions, the blocking of the normal development of a civilization, and the exploitation of its natural wealth including the use of its people as slaves, torn from their habitat to be abused and humiliated—all this has deeply marked these human beings. If we consider that it was caused by others who still feel entitled to do such things today, and that in one way or another we allow this to continue, then we can begin to appreciate how people might respond to certain events.

      Nevertheless, many people might wonder why Che Guevara participated in this revolutionary process, what motivated him to try and help this movement. It is Che who can best answer this question: “When it comes to Yankee imperialism, it is not enough to be resolute in defense. It has to be attacked in its bases of support in the colonies and neocolonies that are the foundation of its system of world domination.”

      Che had always expressed his desire to continue the struggle in other lands. As a doctor by profession and a guerrilla fighter by action, he knew the limitations that life imposes on a human being and the sacrifices demanded by something as hard as guerrilla warfare, so we can understand his desire to transform his dream into reality while he was in the best possible physical condition. We know his deeply rooted sense of responsibility, his political maturity and the commitment he had made to many compañeros who relied on him to continue the struggle.

      He had made an earlier trip to Africa where he had the opportunity to meet some of the leaders of the revolutionary movements active at that time, and to familiarize himself with their problems and concerns. He always stayed in touch with Fidel Castro, who, in an unpublished letter dated December 1964, described the measures that were being taken in Cuba at the time.

       Che:

       I have just met with Sergio [del Valle] who reported in detail on how everything is going. There doesn’t seem to be any difficulty in carrying out the project. Diocles [Torralba] will give you a detailed verbal report.

       We will make the final decision on the plan when you return. To be able to choose from the possible alternatives, it is necessary to know the opinion of our friend [Ahmed Ben Bella]. Try to keep us informed by secure means.

      It should never be forgotten that the group of Cubans who participated in this mission along with Che shared his conviction: “Our country, the sole socialist bastion on the doorstep of Yankee imperialism, sends its soldiers to fight and die in a foreign land, on a distant continent, and publicly assumes full responsibility for its actions. In this challenge, in this clear position on the great modern-day issue of waging a relentless struggle against Yankee imperialism, lies the heroic significance of our participation in the struggle of the Congo.”

      Che and the group he led aimed to strengthen the liberation movement in the Congo, to achieve a united front, to select the best leaders and those prepared to continue the struggle for the final liberation of Africa. He took with him the experience gained in Cuba and placed it at the service of the new revolution.

      The harsh realities of the Congo affected Che: its backwardness, the lack of political-ideological development among the people, against which it was necessary to struggle with firmness and determination. There were moments of discouragement and incomprehension, but rising above these adversities, with a prophetic vision, was the enormous confidence and love that he felt for those who decided to create conditions for development and greater dignity for their people.

      In Africa, history has been transforming that vision into reality for more than 30 years, as developing education in military matters has become part of revolutionary consciousness. This resulted in such major victories as Cuito Cuanavale [in Angola against the Apartheid forces of South Africa], Ethiopia, Namibia and elsewhere, which have all contributed to the sovereignty and independence of the continent.

      The Cuban revolution maintained absolute discretion for as long as possible about Che’s internationalist activity in the Congo, for many months stoically enduring a deluge of slanders. But when the first Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party was announced [in October 1965], by which time Che was already fully engaged in combat in the Congo, it was decided to make public his farewell letter as it was no longer possible to avoid explaining to the people of Cuba and the world the absence of a man who had been one of the most solid and legendary heroes of the revolution.

      In his diary, Che concludes that knowledge of this letter created a rift between himself and the Cuban combatants: “There were some things that we no longer had in common, certain sentiments that I had tacitly or explicitly renounced but which each individual holds most sacred: his family, his surroundings and his homeland.” If this is how he felt, one can imagine how difficult it was for Fidel Castro to get him to return to Cuba. He wrote several times in an attempt to convince Che, and eventually succeeded by means of solid arguments. In June 1966, in an unpublished letter, he wrote to Che:

       Dear Ramón:

       Events have overtaken my plans for a letter. I read in full the draft of the book on your experiences in the C. [Congo], and I also reread the manual on guerrilla warfare in order to make the best possible analysis of these questions, especially considering the practical importance with regard to plans in the land of Carlitos [Carlos Gardel, ie Argentina]. Although there is no point right now in discussing this with you, I will just say that I found the work on the C. extremely interesting and I think it was really worth the effort you made to leave a written record of everything. […]

       About your situation:

       I have just read your letter to Bracero [Osmany Cienfuegos] and have spoken extensively with the Doctor [Aleida March, Che’s wife].

       In the days when an act of aggression seemed imminent here, I suggested to several compañeros the idea of asking you to return, an idea that turned out to be on everyone’s mind. El Gallego [Manuel Piñeiro²] was given the job of sounding you out. From the letter to Bracero I see that you were thinking exactly the same thing. But right now we can no longer make plans based on that supposition because, as I explained, our impression now is that for the time being nothing is going to happen.

       It seems to me, however, that given the delicate and worrying situation in which you find yourself there, that you should consider the usefulness of jumping back here.

       I am well aware that you are especially reluctant to consider any option that involves a return to Cuba for the moment, unless it is in the quite exceptional circumstances mentioned above. But analyzed in a sober and objective way, this actually hinders your objectives; worse, it puts them at risk. I find it very hard to accept the idea that this is right, or even that it can be justified from a revolutionary point of view. Your time at the so-called halfway point increases the risks; it makes extraordinarily more difficult the practical tasks that need to be carried out; and far from accelerating the plans, it delays their fulfillment; moreover, it subjects you to a period of unnecessarily anxious, uncertain and impatient waiting.

       What is the reason for all this? There can be no question of principle, honor or revolutionary morality involved here that would prevent you from making effective and thorough use of facilities that you can certainly depend on to achieve your goal. No fraud, no deception, no tricking of the people of Cuba or the world is involved in making use of the objective advantages of being able to enter and leave here, to plan and coordinate, to select and train cadres, and to do everything from here that you can achieve only with great difficulty from where you are or somewhere similar. Neither today nor tomorrow, nor at any time in the future, could anyone consider it wrong—nor should you in all conscience. What would really be a grave, unforgivable error is to do things badly when they could be done well; to have a failure when all the possibilities are there for success.