Social Psychology. Daniel W. Barrett

on what you haven’t achieved (Dunn, Ruedy, & Schweitzer, 2012). Both upward and downward social comparisons are most useful when you compare yourself to people who are similar to you on relevant characteristics (Tiggemann & Polivy, 2010). For instance, you may be better off contrasting your cycling prowess with your brother’s rather than Lance Armstrong’s.

      A related tactic people can use to improve their self-esteem is to engage in counterfactual thinking or imagining what could have happened (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011). Victoria Medvec and her colleagues studied silver and bronze medalists’ reactions to their event placements in the 1992 Summer Olympic games and the 1994 Empire State Games. Who do you think would feel better after completing an important competition, the bronze medal winners who placed third or silver medal winners who placed second? Using videotapes of the award ceremonies and interviews with winners, they found that bronze medalists were more satisfied with their medals than were silver medalists, despite the fact that silver medalists had obviously performed better than their counterparts. Why? Well, bronze medalists primarily focused on the counterfactual that they almost received no medal at all (almost came in fourth), and that increased their satisfaction with their achievement. In contrast, silver medalists thought more about a different alternative outcome—that they almost won the gold medal—and as result were more disappointed (Medvec et al., 1995).

      Self-Protection: Efforts intended to maintain or defend one’s positive self-image

      Self-Promotion: Efforts designed to enhance one’s self-image

      Downward Social Comparison: Contrasting one’s own performance, ability, or situation with individuals who did less well, have weaker abilities, or are in worse situations

      Upward Social Comparison: Contrasting one’s performance, ability, or situation with individuals who performed better, have stronger abilities, or are in better situations

      Counterfactual Thinking: Imagining what could have happened (but did not)

      False Consensus and False Uniqueness

      Would you prefer to be like most other people or different from them? It probably depends on what aspects of yourself you are thinking about. In some domains—such as opinions and behaviors—people would rather that others see the world in the same way that they do, but in others—such as personal abilities—we prefer to stand out. Oftentimes people believe that their opinions or behaviors are more common than they actually are, and thus exhibit the false consensus effect (Mullen, 1985; H. S. Park, 2012; L. Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). In one study, students were asked to wear a sandwich board sign displaying either “Repent” or “Eat at Joe’s” for 30 minutes. Whether they said yes or no, each estimated how many other students were likely to agree to the same request. Most of the participants overestimated the number of students who would make the same decision that they did. This was especially true for those who agreed to wear the “Eat at Joe’s” sign: Only 30% of the students actually agreed to carry it, but they predicted that 57% of other students would (L. Ross et al., 1977).

      People demonstrate the false consensus effect in many arenas of life, including adolescents’ predictions of peer substance use and adults’ estimates of how others will respond to particular behavioral experiences or how many showers others will take during a shower ban (Henry, Kobus, & Schoeny, 2011; Kammrath, 2011; Monin & Norton, 2003), and are especially likely to do so when in an opinion minority (Marks & Miller, 1987). For instance, Whitley (1998) found that sexually active college women overestimated the level of sexual activity of other college women, as compared to the estimates of nonsexually active women. Believing that other people hold the same opinions or engage in the same behaviors can maintain our self-esteem (Marks & Miller, 1987), and avoiding discussion of topics on which there is potential disagreement may help us maintain this belief (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010).

      Although we often find comfort when we think others are similar to us, there are times when we’d prefer to stand out from the crowd. This primarily occurs with respect to one’s abilities or competencies, because we’d like to think that we are uncommonly talented. As in the case with false consensus, we are often mistaken about how we compare to others, except that here we inaccurately believe that we are different from them. For instance, people who engage in socially desirable behaviors, like giving blood, may underestimate how many others would do the same (Goethals, 1986). When we hold incorrect beliefs about how different we are, we demonstrate the false uniqueness effect, and as with the false consensus effect, this tendency serves to enhance our self-esteem (Goethals, 1986; Monin & Norton, 2003; H. S. Park, 2012). Both the false consensus and false uniqueness effects stem in part from our lack of knowledge of the true attitudes or attributes of others.

      Are you more or less socially skilled than the average person? More ethical? A better driver? Well, most people believe that they are more ethical and are better-than-average drivers, even if they have a history of auto accidents (Guerin, 1994; Lovett, 1997). In fact, you probably think that you are better-than-average on most desirable characteristics, which is called the better-than-average effect (see Research box 4.1) (Gilovich, 1991; Guenther & Alicke, 2010). This effect is also known in the United States as the Lake Wobegon effect, because in Lake Wobegon, the fictional community invented by Garrison Keilor, “the women are strong and the men are good-looking and all the children are above average.” When do people prefer to see themselves as distinct versus similar to others? It depends on the desirability of the behavior in question. If the behavior is seen as positive, then people overestimate their uniqueness; however, for our negative behaviors, we’d rather believe that many others do them as well (Marks, 1984).

      False Consensus Effect: Believing that one’s opinions or behaviors are more common than they actually are

      False Uniqueness Effect: Holding incorrect beliefs about how different one is from others

      Better-Than-Average Effect: Judging that one is above average on most desirable characteristics

      Self-Serving Judgments

      When you do well on a psychology exam, what is the reason? Did you work hard? Or are you simply smart? What if you fail? Were the professor’s questions incomprehensible? Or were you deathly sick the night before? People often answer questions like these with judgments that enhance their self-esteem (Gilovich, 1991; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). If, like many of us, you take credit for your successes but blame outside factors for your failures, you are demonstrating one type of self-serving belief known as the self-serving attributional bias or, more simply, the self-serving bias (Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008). Attributions are explanations that people give for their own or others’ behavior; when you attribute your high grade to hard work, you are claiming that your grade was a result of your personal effort. The self-serving bias helps us maintain our self-esteem by bolstering us when things go well and buffering us against negative events by blaming outside factors. Basically, you feel good when you succeed, and you feel good when you fail (because it wasn’t your fault).

      Research Box 4.1

      The Better-Than-Average Effect

      Hypothesis: Participants will rate themselves as better or higher than their college peers across a range of personality traits.

      Research Method: As part of a larger testing situation, participants rated themselves or their average college peer on twenty-three traits, including cooperativeness, intelligence, truthfulness, kindness, attractiveness, and athleticism. Participants in a control condition did not complete these ratings. Eight weeks later, participants who initially rated themselves now rated the average peer, and those who initially rated their average peer now rated themselves. Control participants rated both themselves and their average peer.

      Results: The results confirmed the hypothesis. Regardless of