Sahih Muslim (Volume 2). Imam Abul-Husain Muslim

أَبِي سَعِيدٍ عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ، بِمِثْلِ حَدِيثِ شُعْبَةَ وَسُفْيَانَ.

      Text Explanation

      1. Qadi [Iyad said: ‘Different reports speak about the first to deliver the sermon before the Eid Prayer. It is said that the first was [Uthman, while other reports suggest that it was [Umar, because he noticed that people left the mosque when the prayer was over, and did not stay to listen to the speech that followed. It is also suggested that he did so to allow time for people who lived some distance from the mosque to arrive so that they could catch the prayer. Further suggestions mention Mu[awiyah or [Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr as the first to do it. What is confirmed is that the Prophet, Abu Bakr, [Umar, [Uthman and [Ali started with the prayer. Scholars of all areas agree that this is the right order, and some scholars consider it to be a case of unanimous agreement’. He meant that the unanimity was subsequent to the disagreement, but God knows best. Or it may be that the disagreement by Umayyad rulers was discounted, because of the unanimity of the earlier generations.

      Abu Sa[id al-Khudri, the Prophet’s companion, said in reference to the man who objected: ‘This one has discharged his duty’. He said it in the presence of a large audience, which makes clear that the recognized Sunnah at the time was the opposite to that of Marwan ibn al-Hakam, then governor of Madinah. He confirmed this by citing the evidence, stating that he heard the Prophet say: ‘Whoever of you sees a wrongful action …’. It would not be considered a wrongful action if he and those present thought it right, or it was done or practised earlier. This confirms that no caliph had done so before Marwan, and that what was mentioned about it being done by [Umar, or [Uthman or Mu[awiyah is incorrect, but God knows best.

      The hadith mentions that a man objected but Marwan told him that it was left out. Abu Sa[id endorsed the man’s objection by quoting the Prophet’s hadith. It may be wondered why Abu Sa[id was not the first to object. It may be that he was not present when Marwan started his move to deliver the speech first, so the man objected and Abu Sa[id came in later as the discussion progressed. Alternatively, Abu Sa[id might have been present at the beginning but he feared some strife might affect him or others if he voiced his objection to the governor. In such a situation, he would not have been required to object. The other man might not have felt such fear for raising his objection because he might have had support, or he might have not cared what happened to him, which would be commendable. A third possibiliy is that Abu Sa[id might have been about to raise his objection but the man beat him to it; so Abu Sa[id supported him, but God knows best.

      Another hadith related by both al-Bukhari and Muslim in the chapter on the Eid Prayer mentions that it was Abu Sa[id who pulled Marwan by the hand when he saw him going up onto the platform, i.e. minbar. Both Marwan and Abu Sa[id arrived at the same time. Marwan answered him as he answered the man in this hadith. So, it may be that these were two different cases with one speaking of Abu Sa[id’s objection and the other of the man’s objection in Abu Sa[id’s presence, but God knows best. Indeed, Abu Sa[id’s comment that the man had discharged his duty serves as a statement of censure of what Marwan did.

      The Prophet said that whoever sees a wrongful action he ‘should change it’. This is a compulsory order according to unanimous understanding. That enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong are duties is endorsed by the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the unanimous verdict of the Muslim community. Furthermore, it is an aspect of sincere counselling, which is the essence of the Islamic religion.

      The only people who dissent from this view are a minority of Shia, and their disagreement is not taken into account. Imam al-Haramayn said: ‘Their disagreement is discounted, because the Muslim community were unanimous on this before such people came into existence. That this is a duty is determined by Islam, not by reason as the Mu[tazilah claim. A Qur’anic verse says: ‘Believers, it is but for your own souls that you are accountable. Those who go astray can do you no harm if you [yourselves] are on the right path’. (5: 105) This is not contrary to what we have just said. According to most scrupulous scholars, the verse means that when you have done your duties, then the failure of others to do their duties will not cause you any harm. This is the same as the Qur’anic principle: ‘No soul will bear the burden of another’. (35: 18) As it is so, then one of the duties of every Muslim is to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. If one does so but the addressee pays no heed, no blame attaches to the one who has done it because he has discharged his duty, which is to enjoin and forbid, without ensuring acceptance. It is God who knows best.

      Besides, enjoining right and forbidding wrong is a collective duty: when some people do it, the others are exempt, but if all people ignore it, every one of them who is able to do so, with neither excuse for failure nor fear, incurs a sin. Moreover, it may become a personal duty when someone is the only person who is aware of the wrongful action, or the only one who can change it. This is the case of someone who sees his wife, or child, or servant doing some wrong or failing to do what is right. Scholars say that a person is not exempt from enjoining right and forbidding wrong because he believes that it will be useless. Even in this case the duty is binding, because reminders benefit believers. As we have already stated, his duty is to give the advice, but he is not responsible for its acceptance. It is as God says: ‘The Messenger’s duty is but to deliver the message [entrusted to him]’. (5: 99) Scholars cite the example of a person in a public bath or a swimming pool who sees someone with an area of his body that must be covered being uncovered; but God knows best.

      Scholars say that it is not a condition that the one who enjoins what is right and forbids what is wrong should himself be in a perfect state, doing what he enjoins others to do and refraining from what he forbids them. He should do so, even though he fails to do what he enjoins or does what he forbids. The point here is that he has two duties: to give such instructions to himself and to give the same instructions to others. If he fails to do one of these two duties, does such failure make it permissible to fail in the other duty?

      Scholars add that enjoining right and forbidding wrong is not incumbent only on those who are in authority. It is applicable to all Muslim individuals. Imam al-Haramayn said: ‘The evidence in support of this is the unanimity of the Muslim community. In the early period of Islam and the following generations, ordinary people used to enjoin governors and people in authority to do what is right and voice their disapproval of any wrong they may do’. The Muslim community approved their deeds and none was criticized for so doing, even though they held no position of authority, but God knows best.

      Moreover, a person must know what he is enjoining or forbidding, and this differs according to the matter in question. If it is one of the obvious duties or the well-known prohibitions, such as prayer and fasting or adultery and drinking, all Muslims are aware of these. If it is a question of subtle details or something that is subject to scholarly discretion, i.e. ijtihad, lay people cannot address such matters and they may not speak about them. It is left to scholars who should express their criticism only on what is unanimously agreed. If something is controversial, they may not speak against it. According to one view, every scholar who exercises discretion, or ijtihad, is correct. This is the view chosen by the majority of scrupulous scholars. The other view is that only one is correct, while the incorrect one is unknown to us. No sin attaches in this case. However, if it is done by way of advice so as to avoid controversy, then it is perfectly appropriate, provided it is done gently. Scholars agree that steering away from what is subject to disagreement is to be encouraged, provided that it does not lead to neglecting a Sunnah or involves another type of disagreement.

      In his book al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, Chief Justice (Qadi al-Qudat) Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi al-Basri al-Shafi[i mentions disagreement among scholars on the case of a person appointed as controller (muhtasib).ⁱ The situation is this: if the controller is a scholar who is competent to exercise ijtihad, may he enforce his own view or should he allow people to follow the views of their own schools of thought? The correct view is that he should allow people this freedom. In matters of detail, disagreement existed between the Prophet’s companions, the Tabi[in and later generations. No controller or other officer