Introducing Philosophy Through Pop Culture. Группа авторов

his memories (“Torn”). Colonel Tigh, Sam Anders, Chief Tyrol, and Tory Foster are also deceived by their memories and are unaware of their actual Cylon nature (“Crossroads, Part 2”). The revelation, in particular, of Tigh and Anders's Cylon identity is truly shocking, as they're among the most adamantly anti‐Cylon members of the fleet.

On the other hand, some unusual belief‐forming processes are reliable in Battlestar Galactica, such as Baltar's visions of Number Six. While Six's advice is often cloaked in manipulative games and sarcasm, it frequently turns out to be a reliable way to form beliefs and accomplish desirable goals. Six draws Baltar's attention to a strange device on the Dradis console, and this leads him to “identify” Aaron Doral as a Cylon. But Baltar hasn't yet created his “mystic Cylon detector” and just makes up some techno‐babble to convince Tigh that Doral is a Cylon so he can have an excuse to bring up the “odd device.” It's disturbing when Tigh abandons Doral on Ragnar Station until it's revealed that Baltar was right all along (“Miniseries”). Six also encourages Baltar to test Boomer to see if she's a Cylon (“Flesh and Bone”); tells him to choose a target for the assault on a Cylon tylium refinery by faith, which turns out to be accurate (“The Hand of God”); helps him attain both the vice‐presidency and the presidency (“Colonial Day”; “Lay Down Your Burdens”); and reveals Hera's identity to him (“Exodus, Part 2”).

      Visions resulting from chamalla extract are also a reliable process for belief formation. Roslin's visions foresee her encounter with Leoben (“Flesh and Bone”) and her leadership role in bringing the Colonials to Earth (“The Hand of God”). A chamalla‐tripping oracle tells D'Anna/Three that she'll hold the Cylon‐human hybrid Hera and experience love for the first time (“Exodus”); another oracle knows about Starbuck's upbringing and that Leoben – or at least a vision of him – will be coming for her (“Maelstrom”).

      Returning to epistemology, does reliabilism suggest that Adama's testimony is an appropriate justification for believing in Earth? Enlightenment era philosophers, such as David Hume (1711–1776), are critical of justifications based on testimony for this kind of issue. Hume claims testimony is only as reliable as experience suggests, and there are true claims that would be difficult to justify based on testimony:

The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connection, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavor to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.⁵

      Hume believes that the ultimate basis for belief in anything is our own sensory experiences. We should trust other people's testimony only because experience suggests that testimony is typically accurate. Yet, even in everyday situations, testimony falls considerably short of absolute accuracy. It's sometimes unreliable because people are dishonest, as when Felix Gaeta claims he saw Baltar voluntarily sign the execution order for over 200 innocent colonists (“Crossroads, Part 2”); or because people are simply incorrect in their testimony, as when Tyrol sincerely tells Tigh that he's not a Cylon (“Resistance”).

When someone testifies to something completely outside of our own experiences, we should be skeptical. Hume claims that someone who has never seen water freeze because he's spent his entire life in a tropical climate should be slow to accept testimony that water freezes at a cold temperature. Adama's claim to know Earth's location is similar, since the Colonials have no personal experience of Earth. This claim has no continuity with their personal experiences, though it doesn't actually conflict with these experiences. Hume contends we should be even more skeptical when testimony is used to justify beliefs that contradict our everyday experiences.

      The contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga claims that testimony plays a more foundational role in our beliefs than Hume, and his predecessor John Locke (1632–1704), acknowledge:

The Enlightenment looked askance at testimony and tradition; Locke saw them as a preeminent source of error. The Enlightenment idea is that perhaps we start by learning from others – our parents, for example. Properly mature and independent adults, however, will have passed beyond all that and believe what they do on the basis of the evidence. But this is a mistake; you can't know so much as your name or what city you live in without relying on testimony. (Will you produce your birth certificate for the first, or consult a handy map for the second? In each case you are of course relying on testimony.)⁶

      Plantinga identifies a number of important beliefs that can be justified based only upon testimony. No one knows their name, age, or location without using testimony to justify such beliefs. The Enlightenment ideal of the radically independent thinker who weighs all claims against evidence from their own individual experiences is unrealistic and artificial. While testimony is far from infallible, it plays a more important epistemic role than Locke and Hume allow.

      In either case, testimony‐based justifications for believing in Earth need to be closely scrutinized. How trustworthy is the individual providing the testimony? How unlikely is their claim about Earth? Is the individual an appropriate authority concerning Earth? As the highest‐ranking military officer surviving the destruction of the Colonies and the author of their escape, Adama and his testimony seem naturally trustworthy. Starbuck certainly trusts Adama when she's confronted with the truth by Roslin:

      STARBUCK:

      The old man is our last chance to find Earth. He knows where it is. He said so. You were there. The location is a secret. But he is going to take us there.

      ROSLIN:

      Commander Adama has no idea where Earth is. He never did. He made it up in order to give people hope.

      STARBUCK:

      You're lying.

      ROSLIN:

      Go ask him.

      (“Kobol's Last Gleaming, Part 1”)

      When Starbuck does ask him, Adama tries to avoid her questions, but she's forced to conclude that Adama's patriotism and proficiency in fulfilling military duties don't make him an expert concerning Earth. As commander of a soon to be retired battlestar, Adama simply doesn't have access to Earth's location. The Gettier problem demonstrates that the Colonials' beliefs about Earth fall short of knowledge, and reliabilism suggests there's reason to doubt whether beliefs based on Adama's testimony are even justified.

“You Have to Have Something to Live for. Let it be Earth”

How should beliefs be chosen in an uncertain world? W.K. Clifford (1845–1879) says it's unethical to believe anything without sufficient evidence. This view, known as evidentialism, claims that if there isn't enough evidence to support a belief, one mustn't consent to its truth. One premise supporting evidentialism is that incorrect beliefs can have a damaging effect on society:

And no one man's belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone. Our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes. Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork.⁷