Introducing Philosophy Through Pop Culture. Группа авторов

Silverman

      Summary

      What is the nature of knowledge? This chapter examines the science fiction narrative of Battlestar Galactica to address puzzles and problems in epistemology. For example, knowledge has traditionally been defined as a true justified belief. However, this definition actually accepts accidentally true justified beliefs as knowledge. In Battlestar Galactica we see an excellent example of such a belief. Captain Adama claims he is searching for Earth, but he does not even believe it exists. Anyone who believes in Earth's existence based on Adama's testimony would have an accidentally true justified belief. Can such a belief be knowledge?

      Battlestar Galactica begins with the ravaging of the known world. The survivors are demoralized, vastly outnumbered by the enemy, and homeless. Against this backdrop Commander Adama offers the promise of a new home where they'll be safe from the Cylons: Earth. But he lies. Yet, in a surprising twist of fate – though not to us who live here – it's later revealed that Adama told a “true lie.” Earth does exist and the Colonials' search for it isn't in vain. Undertaking the journey to this “mythical” home of the Thirteenth Tribe is momentous and filled with religious significance for the Colonial survivors. Faith in Earth's existence gives meaning to an otherwise hopeless situation and shapes the choices they make along the way.

“You're Right. There's no Earth. It’s all a Legend”

There's a sharp distinction between “true belief” and knowledge. President Roslin illustrates this when she asks, “How many people know the Cylons look human?” Colonel Tigh responds, “The rumor mill's been working overtime. Half the ship's talking about it.” But Roslin retorts, “There'll always be rumors. For most people, that's all they'll ever be. I'm asking how many people actually know?” (“Water”). A belief based on an unverifiable rumor isn't knowledge, even if it happens to be true. Knowledge involves a belief in which one has reason for confidence.

      A common view claims that knowledge is true belief accompanied by a convincing account justifying the belief. As Plato explains in the Theaetetus:

Now when a man gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.¹

      According to Plato, it's possible to attain truth without knowledge. Knowledge is more certain than mere true belief since the knower possesses a compelling justification for the belief's truthfulness. Someone holding a true belief based on a rumor or a lucky guess doesn't have knowledge because s/he doesn't have a reason for confidence in the belief.

The contemporary philosopher Edmund Gettier demonstrated the inadequacy of this view of knowledge by providing counterexamples in which a person's justification for a true belief turns out to be false.² Say that Helo is walking down Galactica's corridors and sees his wife, Athena. Helo calls out to her, “Sharon!” because he has a compelling justification for believing that's her name. So he believes:

      1 The woman in front of me is my wife, Athena.If Helo's justified in believing (a), knows his wife's name, and understands basic rules of reasoning, then he's also justified in believing:

      2 The woman in front of me is named “Sharon.”

      The truthfulness of (a) logically entails the truthfulness of (b).But let's suppose Helo's mistaken, for it's actually an identical robotic copy of Athena, Boomer who's in front of him – having infiltrated Galactica for some nefarious purpose. But Boomer is also named “Sharon.” Helo's belief (b) turns out to be true, but his justification for believing (b), belief (a), is false. Gettier claims that a counterexample like this shows a justified true belief that isn't knowledge since its justification is false. And this has become known as “the Gettier problem.”

      Beliefs based on Adama's true lie about Earth are similar to Helo's true belief based on a false justification. Starbuck believes:

      1 Adama knows the location of Earth.

      This belief obviously implies:

      1 Earth exists.

      It's arguable that Adama's public testimony that he knows the location of Earth, as well as his private assurances to Starbuck in “Kobol's Last Gleaming, Part 1,” would be a proper justification for belief (c). It's reasonable to believe, as Adama claims, that he has access to privileged classified information as a “senior commander” in the Colonial fleet. Hence, Starbuck is justified in believing that Earth exists based on his testimony despite the fact that she doesn't realize that he is lying to her.

Even though Adama lies about knowing Earth's location and doesn't believe in its existence, it later becomes evident that Earth does exist. Starbuck discovers this for herself in the Tomb of Athena and after apparently journeying to Earth (“Home, Part 2”; “Crossroads, Part 2”). But Gettier would be quick to point out that, before these events, Starbuck holds a true belief (d) based on a false justification (c). Therefore, her true justified belief in Earth isn't really knowledge, until Adama's lie is no longer the primary justification for her belief.

“I'm Not a Cylon! … Maybe, but We Just Can’t Take That Chance”

The Gettier problem is one of many puzzles in epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge. It's difficult to tell not only when one has knowledge but also when one's beliefs are justified. The contemporary philosopher Alvin Goldman offers a theory of justification known as reliabilism, which proposes that a belief is justified when it's produced by a reliable process.³ Sense experiences, memories, deduction, and induction are typical examples of generally reliable belief‐forming processes. Each of these processes, however, has a different level of reliability. Induction, for example, is less reliable than deduction. And the reliability of a belief‐forming process can vary based on one's situation. Sight is a reliable belief‐forming process, yet beliefs based on sight are more reliable for close objects observed in well‐lit conditions than for distant objects observed in poorly lit conditions.

      One interesting aspect of reliabilism is that it doesn't require a person to know s/he's using a reliable process to be justified in their beliefs. If a young non‐philosopher forms their beliefs based on the five senses, s/he's justified in those beliefs even if s/he never reflects upon the reliability of the senses. This has the desirable consequence of classifying many beliefs held by children, animals, and epistemically unreflective persons as justified.

In Battlestar Galactica, some typical belief‐forming processes aren't as reliable as they are for us. Sight sometimes leads people to believe they're seeing a human being when they're actually seeing a Cylon robotic replica of a human. While people are usually correct when they believe they see a human, most would believe they see a human regardless of whether it's actually a Cylon. So sight isn't a reliable process for judging between humans and Cylons, even though it's a reliable process for forming other types of beliefs.⁴

      Memory is another less dependable belief‐forming process. Boomer can't remember that she sabotaged Galactica's water tanks (“Water”) and, until her Cylon nature is revealed to her, her memories thoroughly convince her that she's human, her parents are Katherine and Abraham Valerii, and her family died on Troy. Yet these beliefs couldn't be further from the truth. She doesn't give up these beliefs until confronted by numerous copies of herself aboard a Cylon baseship, and even then her initial reaction is disbelief (“Kobol's Last Gleaming,