The World According to China. Elizabeth C. Economy

of the genome as early as December 27, a full two weeks before it was released to the public.) In addition, the WHO’s chief of emergencies, who had praised China publicly, claimed in an internal meeting that China was not cooperating the way other countries – such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo – did during the Ebola outbreak.⁶⁷

The Siren Call of Sovereignty

China’s unwillingness to put its sovereignty conflict with Taiwan aside in 2020 was indicative of a much larger strategic push by Beijing to reinforce its sovereignty claims while other countries were preoccupied with the pandemic. Most notably, it implemented a politically repressive National Security Law in Hong Kong; continued its detention of more than one million Uyghur Muslims in labor and reeducation camps in the country’s westernmost region, Xinjiang; and deployed its naval and other military forces across the South and East China Seas, threatening Taiwan, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. As we will see in chapter 3, it also sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat and named more than 80 features in the South China Sea, 55 of which were underwater. China and India also engaged in their first deadly border conflict in more than four decades.

Criticism of China’s coercive political and aggressive military behavior mounted, particularly in Europe, North America, and parts of Asia. India banned a wide array of popular Chinese apps; Europe, the UK, the US, and Canada levied sanctions against Chinese officials and entities for their actions in Xinjiang; and many countries revised their decision to allow Huawei components or software in their 5G networks. Global public opinion polls indicated that distrust in Xi Jinping’s motivations and ambitions was rising precipitously (see Figure 1.2).⁶⁸ Yet Chinese officials did not relent. In fact, in the face of the Xinjiang sanctions, they retaliated against a number of European entities, jeopardizing an investment deal with Europe that had been seven years in the making. It was an important signal both of the relative weight of sovereignty as opposed to trade and investment among China’s strategic priorities, and of Beijing’s willingness to tolerate significant disequilibrium in the international system in pursuit of a new steady state: a reunified and politically insulated China.

The Recovery

During fall 2020, China mounted a renewed effort to assume a leadership position in responding to the pandemic. It joined COVAX, the international initiative to ensure a degree of equity in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, after initially rejecting participation. Several senior Chinese foreign policy analysts had argued publicly that joining would be in China’s best interest. They noted that it would send an important signal to the international community that China was not simply “sweeping its own snow in front of the door” but instead was interested in helping others. They also offered an array of less altruistic motivations, including improving Beijing’s image, assisting in the global economic recovery (which they suggested would serve the country’s economic interests), and establishing China’s vaccine as an internationally recognized brand.⁶⁹

      Figure 1.2 Comparison of global levels of faith in Xi Jinping from 2019 to 2020

      Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/

      By the time it joined COVAX, China had already vaccinated one million people domestically and in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Peru, and Argentina. But there was growing concern in the international scientific community over Beijing’s lack of transparency in its vaccine trials. China had not provided information concerning the vaccine trial results, leaving the international community questioning the efficacy and safety of the vaccines.⁷⁰ It was not until April 2021 that the head of China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Gao Fu, acknowledged that the efficacy of the country’s vaccines was relatively low and measures should be taken to improve their protection rates. (He later asserted that his comments had been misinterpreted.)⁷¹

      China’s international credibility had suffered a blow the previous month as well when WHO experts finally gained access to China for their long-promised investigation. Several delegation members raised concerns over the Chinese government’s failure to provide access to critical data. Even Tedros called on China to be more forthcoming and stated that the trip report did not provide an “extensive enough” assessment of the possibility that the virus originated in a lab.⁷²

Mapping China’s Ambition, Influence, and Impact

The conduct of Chinese foreign policy over the course of the first year of the pandemic and beyond offers some initial insights into how Xi has adapted his domestic governance model to the pursuit of his strategic ambitions. For example, he mobilized and deployed domestic resources across multiple domains – within China, through the BRI, and in the WHO – to promote the adoption of TCM internationally. He also used the penetration of the CCP in other countries’ societies to collect and distribute PPE via state-directed overseas Chinese organizations and to enable Chinese officials to spread disinformation on Western social media platforms such as Twitter. Moreover, he leveraged the Chinese market to try to coerce countries into thanking China publicly for PPE and into dropping their calls for an investigation into the origins of the virus.

      The chapters outlined below explore in detail how Xi has utilized this model and the consequences – both intended and unintended – for his ability to realize his broader strategic objectives. Chapter 2 outlines how China utilizes soft, sharp, and hard power to shape the perceptions and policy preferences of other actors and evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of these tools. It argues that context matters. Countries that are geographically distant from China, for example, are typically less concerned about the country’s deployment of hard power than those in its backyard. And while multinationals often succumb to Chinese coercive economic leverage, countries generally do not. Perhaps most surprisingly, the level of Chinese trade and investment does not correlate closely with countries’ support for Beijing on other issues, such as its policies in Xinjiang or its actions in the South China Sea. Other factors matter more.

      Chapter 3 delves into the heart of Xi’s rejuvenation ambition: the creation of a unified China. It investigates how China realized its sovereignty claims in Hong Kong, and the steps it is taking to make progress in the South China Sea and Taiwan. It reveals that China’s willingness to use soft power, as opposed to more coercive or even military actions, diminishes rather than expands as opposition among other actors to its sovereignty efforts grows. China is also willing to ignore international law, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and to endure significant disequilibrium in the international system in pursuit of its sovereignty objectives. One consequence of China’s use of economic coercion and military power has been to bolster the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Japan, India, the United States, and Australia) and to invite deeper military engagement from actors outside the region, such as Germany, France, and the UK. This expanding coalition challenges Xi’s ability to make further progress on his sovereignty ambitions for the South China Sea and Taiwan.

The heart of chapter 4 is an exploration of whether and in what ways China is selling its model and imprinting its political, economic, and security preferences on other countries through its flagship foreign policy initiative, Belt and Road. The BRI captures the essence of Xi’s strategic ambition. It places China at the center of a vast network of global physical and technological infrastructure, as well as political and security influence. The chapter delineates the