Globalization. George Ritzer

be based in one or more nation-states (e.g. Soviet imperialism, British colonialism) and to affect one or more nation-states (e.g. states behind the Iron Curtain, Britain’s former colonies).

      Another way of saying much the same thing is that globalization is a decentered process. All of the others have clear centers from which they emanate and extend their power and influence.

      Globalization does not generally involve military and direct (e.g. occupation; imposition of administrators as in colonialism) control by some nations over others. There is power, control, even exploitation, but in the main it tends to be accomplished more subtly than imperialism, colonialism, and even development. The other processes – Westernization, Americanization, Easternization – vary greatly in degree of heavy-handedness and directness. Easternization, at least as it is practiced today, is the subtlest of these practices; Westernization and Americanization have often been quite blunt and direct and, in any case, have been closely tied to imperialism, colonialism, and development.

      Because it tends not to be as heavy-handed, globalization (and the processes discussed in this chapter) does not lead to the same intense opposition as did imperialism, colonialism, and to a lesser degree development. In the latter cases, opposition often took the form of armed rebellions and wars designed to end them, although those wars were not always successful.

That is not to say that there are not strong negative reactions against globalization (and development, Westernization, Americanization). Indeed, nationalist movements in the US and many other countries, as well as the alter-globalization movement show this to be the case. In these contexts, many large and sometimes violent protests are mounted against it. Americanization, in particular, is also prone to eliciting strong (negative and positive) reactions throughout the globe. But as one recent headline put it, “globalization is moving past the US and its vision of world order” (Goodman 2019).

      To the extent that these other processes continue to exist and to be of significance, it could be argued that globalization is the broadest and most all-encompassing process and can be said to include imperialism, Westernization, Americanization, and Easternization.

      Colonialism and dependency are of more historical interest as well as being models of what globalization ought not to do and to be like. Unfortunately, globalization often comes to resemble them much too closely.

      While this chapter has sought to draw distinctions among various processes and to distinguish them in one way or another from globalization, the fact is that there are strong overlaps among and between them. If we accept the idea that globalization is the latest and the broadest of these processes, it is possible to conclude that all of the others either continue to survive in, or are subsumed under, it. In terms of the former, there are certainly those who see elements of the earlier epochs of imperialism, colonialism, and dependency surviving, if not being alive and well, in the global age and in the process of globalization. This is especially true of those who are critical of the neoliberalism that dominates globalization today (see Chapter 4). They would see globalization as a newer, kinder-sounding label, and a subtler method, for more long-standing efforts to exert imperial control over, to colonize, and to create dependency among, many of the weaker nation-states and other areas (e.g. stateless locales) of the world. Beyond that, it is possible to see the other processes – Westernization, Americanization, and Easternization – as sub-processes within globalization that continue to exist to this day and to argue that one or more of them may even increase in importance in the future. Thus, while it makes sense, as we have throughout this chapter, to draw distinctions among and between these processes, they all can also be seen as informing, and as being part of, globalization. In the end, the key point is that in gaining a better understanding of these processes, we gain a more nuanced and sophisticated sense of the fundamental nature of globalization. This is the case whether we carefully distinguish among these processes or see them all as part of a larger process of globalization.

THE ERA OF THE “POSTS”

      We have already had occasion to mention postcolonization in the context of a discussion of colonization. However, it is also possible to argue that almost all of the processes discussed in this chapter can be described as being in the “era of the posts.” That is, they have passed into history, passed their prime, or are showing signs of moving into the past tense. Most, if not all, of them remain important, but what is also important are the signs of their passage into history. Thus, we could talk in terms (and many do) of post-imperialism, postcolonialism, post-development, post-Easternization, and post-Americanization.

One concrete example of this is post-Westernization, specifically the post-Westernization of the sport of cricket (Rumford 2007c: 97–106). Cricket was at its origin a Western, especially an English, sport. However, in recent years, former British colonies, especially in Asia, have become more equal combatants in global cricket matches and competitions (Fletcher 2011). Indeed, there is an ongoing struggle for control of cricket between the traditional and the nascent powers. This is especially true of India: “In many ways, India is the focal point for both the globalization of cricket – a new focus for generating cricket finance through massive TV audiences and administrative leadership – and for post-Westernization of the game” (Rumford 2007c: 95).

      The more general issue, of course, is whether we have moved into a post-Western era in a broader sense. The idea of Easternization, especially in terms of the rise of China, and to a lesser extent India, as global powers, can be taken as an indication of post-Westernization. If the twentieth century marked the peak of Westernization, it may be that the twenty-first century will come to be seen as a post-Western era, as the era of Easternization.

      Fareed Zakaria (2008, 2011) has argued that we are living in the post-American age. Contrary to some other authors (Preble 2018), he is quite clear from the opening sentence of his book that the key issue is not the decline of the US, but rather “the rise of everyone else” (2008: 1). Everyone else involves other nation-states (especially China – “the second-most-important country in the world” [2008: 93], but not likely to surpass the US in any domain for decades, at least), as well as various non-state actors (e.g. EU). The US has lost, or is losing, its top position in many realms, large and small, but it maintains and is likely to continue to retain, its politico-military position as the world’s dominant, if not only, superpower. However, in virtually every other important domain – “industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural” –the pendulum is swinging away from US dominance (2008: 4). In other words, “we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people” (2008: 5). The US is most threatened by these changes, and has the most to lose, but it is likely to remain on top in at least some areas for some time and its effects will be felt long into the future. One of the reasons for the resiliency of the US is the vibrancy of its demographics, at least in contrast to many other parts of the world (especially the EU) where populations are shrinking and immigrants are less welcome. It is this dynamic population that helps to give the US its edge in innovativeness. Others point to America’s military, economic, and soft power as helping it remain dominant in coming decades (Nye, Jr., 2015).

      While Zakaria focuses on the rest, he is not oblivious to problems in the US that have contributed to its relative decline. He is especially critical of what he considers a dysfunctional government that is able to accomplish little or nothing. Beyond that he recognizes that there are problems in the economy – the US dollar is weak, the savings rate is low, and the costs associated with rapidly growing entitlements (e.g. Medicare) are soaring.

      In the end, what this means for Zakaria is that the US will no longer be in a position to dictate to the rest of the world. Instead, the US will need to engage in “consultation, cooperation, and even [shockingly!] compromise” (Zakaria 2008: 233). Nevertheless, the role of the US will remain very important both in terms of setting agendas for the rest of the world and in organizing coalitions in support of its preferred courses of action.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

      This chapter examines several concepts