Группа авторов
Список книг автора Группа авторовThe U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics
“Wheel books” were once found in the uniform pockets of virtually all junior officers and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments.In that same tradition, the Naval Institute has created and aptly named the Wheel Book series, portable libraries culled from USNI’s vast array of information that has accumulated for more than a century. Articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings are combined with selections from USNI’s oral history program and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of relevant professional subjects.Just as the “wheel books” of yesterday served the fleet well, the Naval Institute Wheel Books of today provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to modern naval professionals. The late Vice Admiral A.K. Cebrowski—well known as a brilliant thinker on the subject of naval warfare—once described naval tactics as “the sum of the art and science of the actual application of combat power.” Renowned naval tactician Captain Wayne Hughes adds that the study of naval tactics “strives to bring whatever order and understanding is possible out of the chaos of battle.” With those words of wisdom serving as “commander’s intent,” this collection sheds a bright light on this sometimes dark and mysterious but unquestionably essential realm, illuminating the principles and concepts that serve the warrior at the most critical moments in his or her profession.
Battleship Ramillies
HMS Ramillies was the last battleship to join the Grand Fleet in 1917 and survived to fight in the Second World War. Although the ship did not make headlines, she was actively employed from start to finish, and even survived being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. In this respect she was typical rather than extraordinary but, like any large ship, to her crew she was unique – she was certainly the only ship in British naval history whose captain wore a grass skirt into battle (honoring a Maori belief that the ship would come to no harm while he did so; Ramillies survived the war). This book, produced with the full cooperation of the HMS Ramillies Association, is a tribute to the ship in words and photographs, deftly assembled from a combination of interviews with surviving crew members, and carefully researched diaries and written accounts by those connected with the ship, including HRH the Duke of Edinburgh for whom Ramillies was his first ship. Many personal photo albums were unearthed to provide previously unpublished illustrations, which add a further dimension to a vivid picture of naval life in an almost-forgotten era.
21st Century Ellis
For years, the Marine Corps has touted the prescience of Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis, USMC, who predicted in 1921 that the United States would fight Japan and how the Pacific Theater would be won. Now, for the first time, those predictions and other works by the “amphibious prophet” are available in print.Included is two works by Ellis on naval and amphibious operations, including Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, the study of tactics and operations in the Pacific Ocean that the United States Navy and Marine Corps would use to win the war against Imperial Japan. Ellis describes the form and functions of a modern Marine Corps designed to win its Nation’s battles. Ellis’ ideas about how the Marine Corps should fight are still in use throughout the world today.Ellis’ ideas on amphibious operations are well known, but his ideas on counterinsurgency and conventional war have been overshadowed and forgotten. Ellis wrote two articles based on his warfighting experiences in the Philippines and as part of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during World War I. These articles, last published in the early 1920’s, are both republished in this book and show Ellis as a prescient thinker who was ahead of his time. Ellis identifies concepts that the U.S. military struggles with even today, and that other thinkers would not identify for decades after Ellis’ death.Also included are six essays by the editor, introducing the ideas of Pete Ellis and putting them in a modern context. As the United States turns its focus to the Pacific, Ellis’ ideas can inform policymakers on the dynamics of strategy and warfare in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. Edited by Captain B. A. Friedman, USMC, 21st Century Ellis reveals the strategic insights of Pete Ellis for then and now.
Strategy
How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: The Study of Strategy from Archidamus to Airpower, argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment, and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking.With that thought in mind, the authors of Strategy offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Each contributing chapter author is a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies in Montgomery, AL, widely considered the DoD’s premier school of strategy. Each earned a PhD in either history or political science. All contributors are prolific and widely respected in their fields. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than anyone else, must think strategically about the application of power on land, at sea, and in the air, space and cyberspace. In addition to the exploration of various sub-disciplines regarding strategy’s role in the employment of power, and perhaps more importantly, Strategy illuminates different approaches to thinking about strategy, which have implications beyond the profession of arms. Therefore, the authors examine the learning and teaching of strategic concepts. The book does not provide a blueprint for how to teach or learn strategy (in fact, the authors contend that such a blueprint would be short-sighted and perhaps even dangerous). On the contrary, the work explores how one should think about the study of strategy through an appreciation of both context and uncertainty.Thus, the book not only contributes to a greater understanding of the strategic aspects of the employment of power, but also widens the aperture in recognizing different ways to explore new concepts. The authors contend that only through a willingness to explore different approaches do budding strategists make the most of their journey.
The U.S. Navy Reserve
The U.S. Naval Institute Chronicles series focuses on the relevance of history by exploring topics like significant battles, personalities, and service components. Tapping into the U.S. Naval Institute's robust archives, these carefully selected volumes help readers understand nuanced subjects by providing unique perspectives and some of the best contributions that have helped shape naval thinking over the many decades since the Institute’s founding in 1873.Since its founding 100 years ago, Navy Reserve Sailors have served in every conflict from World War I to the present. The exploits of the U.S. Navy Reserve have many times been chronicled in the pages of Proceedings and Naval History. This edition of Chronicles culls articles and excerpts from that vast library.
On Seas Contested
An international team of naval historians and scholars has pooled their expertise for this definitive reference on how the great navies of World War II were organized and how they trained, operated, and fought. They provide a point-by-point evaluation on the inner workings of the navies of the United States, the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and the Soviet Union. Each navy has its own chapter, which covers such key features as weaponry, training, logistics, and doctrine. In bringing together data buried in specialized works in various languages, the authors deliver a fresh, multinational view of the naval war.
At the Crossroads Between Peace and War
A great power arms race in naval weaponry and platforms, rising challengers seeking to overturn the existing international order in Asia, an economic slump that put immense pressure on politicians in democracies to trim defense budgets, and diplomatic efforts by statesmen to find ways to promote mutual security and avoid rivalries that could lead to war—all these features mark the current-day strategic environment. These features also marked in the era between the two world wars. To prevent the naval rivalries that augured international conflict, statesmen and naval leaders sought to negotiate arms control agreement. Their efforts to avert a great power naval arms race were crowned with achievement at the London Conference of 1930.What was accomplished at London, of course, did not prove lasting; nor did it lead to additional meaningful arms control and prevent future wars. Instead, London proved a dead end in the evolution of interwar international relations. The London Treaty marked the high point of interwar arms control. When measured against the magnitude of the international catastrophe that would unfold over the next decade, this achievement in arms control now appears practically meaningless at best and dangerous at worst. Critics of interwar arms control argue that, by weakening of American and British naval power, as well as stirring up extremist nationalism in Japanese internal politics, the London agreement represents a case study in political folly that contributed to the awful events leading to the war. The London Conference of 1930 thus represents a watershed, a turning point in the history of the interwar period.In this volume, leading naval historians tackle the question of how to assess the role played by naval arms control in the history of the interwar period. In addressing this important question, the authors uncover new evidence about the role of intelligence and behind-the-scenes political deal making that adds much to our knowledge of the international and naval history of this important era. This volume’s authors provide the first complete account of the strategic calculations and negotiations that shaped the outcome at the London Conference. No one interested in twentieth-century naval history, international relations and the rivalries of rising and declining great powers, and the origins of the Second World War can afford to miss this important new history.
Imperial Crossroads
For centuries the world’s Great Powers, along with their fleets, armies, and intelligence services, have been drawn to the Persian Gulf region. Lying at the junction of three great continents – Asia, Europe, and Africa – and sitting athwart the oceanic trade routes that link the cities of the world, the Gulf, like a magnet, has pulled superpowers into the shallow waters and adjacent lands of the 600 mile long appendage of the Indian Ocean. An observer at Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf would alternately have watched pass in the 15th century the treasure ships of Chinese Admiral Zheng He, in the 16th century the caravels of Portuguese Admiral Afonso de Albuquerqe, in the 17th century the merchant ships of the Dutch East India Company, in the 18th to the 20th centuries the frigates and steamships of the British, and finally in the late 20th century to today, the cruisers and aircraft carriers of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Perhaps in the future, Americans may be supplanted by the Indians, or perhaps the Chinese.In the Great Powers’ comings and goings since the 1400s, several consistent broad interests emerged. For the majority of this time, for example, the superpowers entered the Gulf region not to colonize, as the Europeans did in other places, but rather to further trade, which in the 20th century increasingly included oil. They also sought a military presence in the Gulf to protect seaborne flanks to colonial possessions further east on the Indian sub-continent and beyond (India, in fact, has long cast a shadow over the Gulf, given its historic trade and cultural ties to the Gulf region, strong ties that continue today). In their geo-political jockeying, furthermore, the Great Powers sought to deprive their rivals access to the states bordering the Gulf region. In tending to these enduring interests inside the Strait of Hormuz, the Great Powers through history concentrated their trade, political, and military presence along the littorals. Not surprisingly, their navies have played a substantive role.Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf is a collection of connected chapters, each of which investigates a different perspective in the broader subject of the Great Powers and their involvement with the states of the Persian Gulf. This volume concentrates on four western nations – Portugal, Holland, Britain, and the United States – and concludes with a look at the possible future involvement of two rising Asian powers – China and India.
The Military Advantage, 2012 Edition
THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE, 2012 EDITION is the most up-to-date annual guide to military benefits for active duty service members, veterans, military retirees, and family members. These valuable benefits include billions of dollars in scholarships, educational benefits, home loan guarantees, and military discounts. This year THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE provides detailed information about the following key benefit changes:*GI Bill Housing Stipend Payments for Online Students*Education Benefits for Active-Duty and Dependents*GI Bill Tuition and Fee Coverage*GI Bill Benefits to Cover Vocational Training*Cost-of-Living Adjustment for Retirees and Vets*TRICARE Premiums and Co-Pays*Pay Raises for 2012*And much, much more…THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE is published in partnership with Military.com, the nation s largest military membership organization.
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Command
“Wheel books” were once found in the uniform pockets of virtually all junior officers and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments.In that same tradition, the Naval Institute has created and aptly named the Wheel Book series, portable libraries culled from USNI’s vast array of information that has accumulated for more than a century. Articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings are combined with selections from USNI’s oral history program and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of relevant professional subjects.Just as the “wheel books” of yesterday served the fleet well, the Naval Institute Wheel Books of today provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to modern naval professionals. The pinnacle of leadership in a military organization is command. Article 0801 of Navy Regulations defines both the authority and the responsibility of command as “absolute.” This Naval Institute Wheel Book provides practical guidance and food for thought that actual and would-be commanders can use to carry out that absolute authority while being absolutely responsible. Included in this specially-selected collection is the sage advice of those who have commanded as well as the expectations of those who are commanded. Aspirants as well as practitioners will do well to exploit this selected survey of what Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz described as the “one purpose” for entering the Navy.