Essential Concepts in Sociology. Anthony Giddens

scientific knowledge, this appears to many social constructionists as rather naïve. This is especially the case as there is a long tradition within the sociology of scientific knowledge of studying the processes through which scientific consensus is arrived at. For sociologists of science, it is absolutely necessary to adopt an agnostic stance in order to maintain the relative detachment required to get under the skin of experimental procedures and other scientific methods.

      There is also an internal debate within critical realism regarding the extent to which the natural and social sciences can be studied using the same method. Bhaskar himself, for instance, has argued that there are fundamental differences between social and natural sciences. He sees social structures as different from natural structures. Social structures do not endure over long periods of time and are not independent of people’s perceptions of their actions. Hence, it may be necessary to use different methods for studying social and natural phenomena. But, if this is true, then critical realism may not offer the kind of unifying approach which makes it so attractive as an alternative to postmodernism and other ‘decorative sociologies’.

       Continuing Relevance

      In spite of criticisms, it can be argued that all sociological studies in practice adopt some form of ‘simple’ realism regardless of theoretical and methodological perspective. What would be the point of carrying out research if we did not think there was a real social world out there worth studying? For many sociologists who see strict constructionism as an abdication of professional responsibility, critical realism offers perhaps the most attractive, non-positivist alternative currently available.

      Critical realism has been applied to the study of crime and is seen as reinvigorating the policy relevance of criminology. Matthews (2009) argues that much contemporary criminology is pessimistic about reducing crime and recidivism, as nothing seems to work. But he suggests that realism requires interventions to be more than simply strategies or practices. Interventions embody theories about what might work in particular contexts, and an important aspect is not just the intervention but evaluations that identify the points at which the intervention fails. Because all interventions target active human agents, their aim is to change or shape the potential criminal’s reasoning process. For Matthews (2009: 357), even if such interventions do not have a radical transformative impact, ‘even small gains are gains’ that may lead to further reforms.

Gunnarsson et al. (2016) argue that, despite some ‘thematic alignments’, critical realism remains marginal within feminist theorizing. This may be because critical realism is still dominated by men and the central issues it deals with have been ‘masculine’ in nature. The authors also point out that critical theorists have tended to work with a clear distinction between sex and gender and the idea of a basic foundational biology, while queer theorists reject the notion that gendered identities are built on or require a biological base. Nonetheless, feminist theorists have become increasingly interested in ontology or theories of ‘being’, which brings them closer to key concerns of critical realism, while some critical realist work has explored conventionally ‘feminine’ subjects such as love (ibid.: 433–5). Clearly, there are still quite fundamental differences between critical realists and feminist theorists despite their recent constructive exchanges.

       References and Further Reading

      Bhaskar, R. A. ([1975] 2008) A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso).

      Carter, B. (2000) Realism and Racism: Concepts of Race in Sociological Research (London: Routledge).

      Dickens, P. (2004) Society and Nature: Changing our Environment, Changing Ourselves (Cambridge: Polity), esp. pp. 1–24.

      Gunnarsson, L., Martinez Dy, A., and van Ingen, M. (2016) ‘Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies’, Journal of Critical Realism, 15(5): 433–9.

      Matthews, R. (2009) ‘Beyond “So What?” Criminology’, Theoretical Criminology, 13(3): 341–62.

      Sayer, A. (1999) Realism and Social Science (London: Sage).

Reflexivity

       Working Definition

      A characterization of the relationship between knowledge and society and/or researcher and subject, focusing on the continuous reflection of social actors on themselves and their social context.

       Origins of the Concept

Reflexivity is related to ideas of reflection or self-reflection, and therefore it has a very long history. However, its usage in the social sciences can be traced back to the ideas of George Herbert Mead (1934) and Charles H. Cooley (1902) on the social self, W. I. Thomas’s social constructionist approach, and some early work on self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies. Cooley and Mead rejected the notion that the individual self is innate. Instead, Cooley argued that the self is created through social interaction with others as people come to see themselves in the way others see them. In Mead’s theory, this continuous interaction between the biological human organism and the social environment of other people produces a two-part self consisting of an ‘I’ and a ‘me’, which are in constant internal conversation within the individual person. This individual reflexivity forms the backdrop to meaningful social interaction.

      However, individual and social reflexivity became more central to social theory from the late twentieth century. In particular, the theoretical ideas of Ulrich Beck (1994) and Anthony Giddens (1984) have extended the concept of reflexivity from the individual to the social level, while a renewed emphasis on qualitative research methods has drawn attention to the fundamentally reflexive nature of social life per se. The existence of both individual and social reflexivity has been seen as fatally undermining any vestiges of positivism in sociology.

       Meaning and Interpretation

      For Cooley, Mead and the symbolic interactionist tradition more generally, the process of ‘self’ construction makes human beings ‘reflexive’ – actively engaged in social life and, at the same time, able to reflect on it. This individual reflexivity means that active human agents can confound scientists’ predictions of how they will or should behave, and it also shows that the thing called ‘society’ is a continuous social construction rather than a fixed, objective entity that is set apart from individuals. Self-fulfilling prophecies can illustrate some of the consequences of reflexivity as well. Rumours of trouble at a solidly solvent bank can lead to investors rushing to withdraw their money, which in turn fulfils the false prophecy by putting the bank into trouble (Merton [1949] 1957). Knowledge and information of all kinds have the potential to alter people’s decision-making processes and lead to unpredictable actions.

      In the work of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck and others, reflexivity is a key concept for understanding contemporary societies. Giddens and Beck argue that ‘late’ modernity is a ‘de-traditionalized’ social context in which individuals are cut adrift from the social structure and, hence, forced to be continuously reflexive in relation to their own lives and identities. Beck calls this emergent form of society ‘reflexive modernization’, a ‘second modernity’ or a ‘risk society’ beyond the industrial form. The consequences of this heightened reflexivity for research practice are said to be profound. Sociological research findings become part of society’s stock of knowledge, which individuals carry around with them and which underpins their decision-making. The kind of recursive effects evident in self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies become part and parcel of social life as such. In this way a simple positivistic approach based on the objective study of an external world ‘out there’ appears misguided, as the gap between researcher and research subject is eroded. Similarly, the methods adopted by sociologists have to reflect this, which may be why qualitative methods