The Campaign of Chancellorsville. Theodore Ayrault Dodge

down the Virginia Central to the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying every thing along the road. As the enemy would probably retreat by the latter route, he was to select strong points on the roads parallel to it, intrench, and hold his ground as obstinately as possible. If Lee retreated towards Gordonsville, he was to harass him day and night. The Confederates had but five thousand sabres to oppose him. "Let your watchword be, Fight! and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiastic Joe Hooker in this order. The primary object was to keep the Confederates from retreating to Richmond; and Stoneman was to rely on Hooker's being up with him in six days, or before his supplies were exhausted. If possible, he was to detach at the most available points parties to destroy every thing in the direction of Charlottesville, and of the Pamunkey.

      The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompanied Hooker's headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the 15th Stoneman threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a sudden rise in consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to return by swimming the horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, that "their efforts to establish themselves on the south side of the river were successfully resisted by Stuart." But the rise in the river was the actual cause. There was no crossing of swords.

      At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were sent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold these crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration on the part of the enemy.

      The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until the 27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the orders of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between the 15th and 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained in camp along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

      It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not have crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. It could not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have been able to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor was it impossible, in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even to threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected the singleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign.

      But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as a matter almost apart from the one under consideration.

      And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first effort of this ill-fated campaign.

      It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force of an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is illustrated in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker left himself but a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, to do the scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had he retained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there would no doubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent out to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange plank road to the junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would then have been fully known.

      The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps when in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an army.

VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.

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      Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy's communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy's attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the river on the right.

      As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down the river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which he returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth Michigan, went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats.

      These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman's raid, which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and to unsettle Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was preparing to deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements failed of much of their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corps was drawn down to the vicinity, and remained there some days.

      On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, and Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the First at Pollock's Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin's Crossing, by 3.30 A.m., on Wednesday; and the Third at a place enabling it to cross in support of either of the others at 4.30 A.m. The troops to remain concealed until the movement begins. Artillery to be posted by Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the army, to protect the crossing. Gen. Benham to have two bridges laid by 3.30 A.m. at each crossing. Troops, as needed, to be detailed to aid his engineer brigade.

      Gen. Sedgwick to command the three corps, and make a demonstration in full force on Wednesday morning to secure the telegraph road. Should any considerable force be detached to meet the movement of the right wing, Sedgwick is to carry the works at all hazards. Should the enemy retreat towards Richmond, he is to pursue on the Bowling-Green road, fighting wherever he reaches them, while Hooker will pursue on parallel roads more to the west.

      This order was punctually obeyed. Gen. Hunt placed forty-two guns at Franklin's, forty at Pollock's Mill, and sixteen at Traveller's Rest, a mile below, a number more being held in reserve. Those in position were so disposed as to "enfilade the rifle-pits, crush the fire of the enemy's works on the hill, cover the throwing of the bridges, and protect the crossing of the troops." (Hunt.)

      These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons were carried to the river by hand to insure secrecy.

      At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell's brigade crossed in boats at Franklin's with little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks's division passed over with a battery, and established itself strongly on the south side.

      At the lower crossing, Reynolds's attempts to throw the bridges early in the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. But about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted; and under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, and the crossing made by Wadsworth.

      During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readiness to force a passage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooks and Wadsworth respectively.

VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.

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      Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgment displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of the army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on hand at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, be confined to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began.

      On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley's Ford, on the Rappahannock—some fifteen miles above its junction with the Rapidan—Howard leading.

      As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to be allowed to go down to the river. Eight days' rations to be carried in the haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to a division, the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons for forage only. The rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity of Banks's Ford out of sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from the troops whose term was about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, and do provost duty.