The Great Debate That Made the U.S. Constitution. Madison James

corps.

      Mr. Wilson. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Government cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by the Nationonal Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national Government. He was not however for extinguishing these planets as was supposed by Mr. D. — neither did he on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country. He could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest would be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an election through the medium of the Legislatures than by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an election by the people in large districts which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters.

      Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr. D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice would be made? If an election by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived thro' that channel than from the people thro' some other. The great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say that the National Legislature without a proper check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.

      Mr. Sherman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.

      Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied interest would be more secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the Legislatures are against it. In Massachusetts the County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that would sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There would therefore be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three powerful objections against elections by districts, 1. it is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds would be unavoidable. 2. small States forming part of the same district with a large one, or large part of a large one, would have no chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 a new source of discord would be opened between different parts of the same district.

      Mr. Pinkney thought the 2d branch ought to be permanent & independent; & that the members of it would be rendered more so by receiving their appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode would avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective sizes, & for allowing to the 1st class three members, to the 2d two, & to the 3d one.

      On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's motion referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's for referring it to the people.

      Mass. no. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland no. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

      Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the National Government a certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the National Government. In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the National Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Governments. Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Congress does not apply. Congress had no power to carry their acts into execution, as the National Government will have.

      On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State Legislatures,

      Mass. ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

      Mr. Gerry gave notice that he would tomorrow move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the National Executive in order to substitute an appointment by the State Executives.

      The Committee rose & The House adjourned.

1 It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States & dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a proportional representation in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body too numerous, as the smallest State must elect one member at least. — Madison's Note.

      Friday June 8th in Committee of the Whole

       Table of Contents

      On a reconsideration of the clause giving the National Legislature a negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,

      Mr. Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature should have authority to negative all laws which they should judge to be improper." He urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case, it would be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations: that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Government; that under the British Government the negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, than the Colonies were then.

      Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect System. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy would lie in an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost enforce a national decree against Massachusetts abetted perhaps by several of her neighbours? It would not be possible. A small proportion of the Community, in a compact situation acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the National authority. Any Government for the U. States formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary & fallacious as the Government of Congress. The negative would render the use of force unnecessary. The States could of themselves pass no operative