The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen

during Chávez’s tenure. In May 2013, two months after Chávez died, Venezuela and Russia formed a joint venture to produce 120,000 barrels of oil a day by 2016 in two fields of the Orinoco Belt of heavy oil, regarded as the one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. That agreement came with another Russian loan, this one for $1.5 billion, to finance the development of the field. Some critics are skeptical that the relationship can survive post-Chávez, but Russia has much to lose in Venezuela by allowing the alliance to languish and everything to gain by remaining committed. The projects that Moscow signed with Chávez are worth at least $30 billion. Venezuela has reason to stay close to Moscow, too: It is Russia’s largest importer of arms, and Moscow promises to maintain its arms deals with Caracas.¹⁰⁶

      “As for our future relations with Venezuela,” Putin said, “they will depend primarily on the Venezuelan people, the future president, and the country’s leadership.”¹⁰⁷ Time will tell, but don’t bet on this relationship breaking up.

      Meanwhile, China has pledged to continue its “strategic alliance” with Venezuela, post-Chávez, which includes increased oil exports to China and massive Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil-producing infrastructure. Without question, oil is the key driver of this relationship, though it is not the only one.

      As late as 2005, Venezuela was sending only a few thousand barrels of oil per day to China. But China’s thirst for oil and Chávez’s hunger for loans drew the two nations closer. After getting a $36 billion loan from Beijing, Chávez stepped up shipments drastically. Venezuela now provides 500,000 barrels a day to China, a total projected to reach 1 million barrels per day by 2015. In addition, China National Petroleum is a key player, along with the Russians, in developing the Orinoco oil field. After a series of deals with the Chinese that would help him expand Venezuela’s oil production, Chávez said, “Never before has Venezuela had such a fruitful and positive relationship with a great power like China.” ¹⁰⁸

      At the same time, China has also stepped into the breach left by the U.S. ban of arms sales to Venezuela. Beijing has sold Caracas new military transport planes as well as Chinese-built trainer jets and ground radar. The two countries have hundreds of other bilateral agreements not involving military technology specifically, but a wide range of infrastructure projects. These include mining deals, satellite construction, irrigation systems, agricultural-processing plants, housing complexes, and railway infrastructure.

      The questions for the Chinese post-Chávez are the same the Russians are asking: Can the relationship survive the leader’s death? Early indications show a strong commitment by both countries to keeping the alliance going. In May 2013, the Chinese vice president, Li Yuancho, visited Caracas to meet with Maduro and discuss a host of ongoing and future projects, including ventures involving telecom and other technologies. “This visit has been very fruitful,” Maduro said. “We will never forget the loving support that China gave to our Comandante [Chávez]. We will be loyal to the work that has been done.”¹⁰⁹ Like the Russians, the Chinese have strong incentives to keep a good thing going.

      CONCLUSION

      While much of what we’ve discussed in this chapter has a gloomy cast, we’d like to close on a somewhat more hopeful note. The U.S. should recognize that when it takes concrete action—even if insufficient and not sustained—it has produced results. Not dramatic results, necessarily, but results: American pressure convinced the Chinese to rein in the North Koreans in the spring of 2013, at least to some degree, defusing what had been an increasingly tense situation. Dogged American diplomatic efforts persuaded the Russians to agree to a Geneva conference to mediate the Syrian conflict. More recently came the UN resolution requiring Assad to turn over his chemical-weapons supply. As we’ve made clear above, we’re skeptical that these efforts represent genuine changes in Russia’s and China’s postures toward these rogue regimes, but in all cases, they were better than nothing. Broader and more sustained action should prove even more effective. (Of course, U.S. engagement doesn’t always lead to positive outcomes, as indicated by the nuclear accord reached with Iran in November 2013. As we noted previously, by all indications, this accord is likely to prove hugely beneficial to Tehran but disastrous for the United States, Israel, and the Western democracies. We share the views of other observers who see the deal as part of a long-term strategy on Tehran’s part to “concede to interim demands in order to secure principles that will favorably define a final, comprehensive agreement.”¹¹⁰)

      Still, America’s moderate recent successes should remind us of a timeless lesson: Applying pressure is the only way to achieve positive results. Russia and China are not to be persuaded by American “resets” or other conciliatory postures, but they will listen, because they must, when they understand that we are committed to actively defending our positions. There is no substitute for what Hillary Clinton called “coercive diplomacy,” or what might be called muscular multilateralism: American efforts, sometimes in concert with others, to defend our interest and principles around the world. There is no substitute, in the end, for American engagement. “Leading from behind” just doesn’t cut it.

      Up to now, unfortunately, our leaders in Washington have not yet fully absorbed this lesson; they show intermittent signs of reengaging, but then they pull back again. Russia and China never pull back. They have always got the pedal down, full throttle, and we lose precious time and squander options with our dithering.

      Russia and China are, to put it bluntly, playing a double game: They work with the United States and the international community on broad efforts and thus preserve their political deniability and their economic and political relationships with the United States; at the same time, they thwart the will of the international community by backing the world’s most dangerous regimes. Neither Iran nor North Korea could long survive without Axis support. Russia, Iran, and Syria are close partners economically and militarily, and their alliance only grows closer as the United States backs off from confrontation and engagement. American passivity not only emboldens our adversaries; it also leaves our partners unsettled and prompts them to look elsewhere for support or blame us for their troubles. President Putin has made himself an ally of General al-Sisi, Egypt’s top military officer, who will run for president in May 2014. Putin encouraged him to do so. It would be a “very responsible decision,” he said, “to undertake such a mission for the fate of the Egyptian people.” He made his support explicit: “On my own part, and on behalf of the Russian people, I wish you success.” Putin made these comments during al-Sisi’s February 2014 visit to Moscow, which was accompanied by news of impending arms deal with Russia worth $2 billion, bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, feeling betrayed by American dithering on Syria, Turkey blamed Washington for its domestic unrest.

      At every juncture, we seem to be losing, and it is not clear what we’re actually negotiating—let alone what our goals are. We will discuss specific steps that the United States can and should take in our concluding chapter. But more important, even, than our particular policies is the mindset behind them. Until Washington’s foreign-policy apparatus once again embraces America’s central role in the world, the United States and its allies will operate at a disadvantage.

      Of course, the Russian and Chinese effort on behalf of rogue regimes is far from the only avenue in which they threaten American security. Both countries are actively pursuing an entire range of policies designed, if not wholly, then at least in substantial part, to negate or transcend U.S. influence. Unfortunately, Washington has been no better at recognizing these other threats—the most immediate and troubling of which is cyber warfare.

CHAPTER 3

       Cyber Security: The New Battlefield

       “I call it the Wild West, because you can be anywhere and do anything and be effective. . . . All you need is an Internet connection.”

      —GENERAL WILLIAM SHELTON, COMMANDER OF AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND¹

       “Cyber-networks are the new frontier of counterintelligence.