Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China. Thomas Heberer

an ‘innovation economy’ in sectors like information technology, biotechnology, robotics and intelligence systems, high-efficiency energy storage, new-energy vehicles, etc. For a long time, the promotion of ‘national champions’ has been criticized by both foreign and Chinese experts as they threaten to ‘crowd out’ the domestic private sector and shut out international competitors from the Chinese market. For an early study on China’s ‘national champion’ policy, arguing that this policy can be traced back to the 1970s, see Nolan (2001).

      ³¹Our fieldwork in Wenzhou in 2013 and 2017 brought to the fore the manifold problems of the private sector in this prefecture-level city. Private entrepreneurs complained strongly that the local government does too little to help them survive the rough-and-tumble of economic adjustment due to necessary structural change. In a particularly telling interview with local entrepreneurs and business associations on September 23–24, 2017, the local government was asked, among other things, to shield the local economy from external investors, reduce taxes, facilitate access to credit, provide for skilled labor from outside Wenzhou, engage in more communication between private enterprises and government cadres, and reduce the pressures put on the private sector to adjust to environmental guidelines. Whereas many Wenzhou entrepreneurs did not care for the government in the early years of ‘reform and opening up’, they now call for the state’s help and guidance. This was confirmed by an interview with a former policy advisor to the Wenzhou government, 12 April 2018.

      ³²We have defined this shift as the rise of ‘local state corporatism 2.0’. In traditional local state corporatism (‘local state corporatism 1.0’), local governments and private enterprises were conceptualized as components of a larger entity (a corporate firm) with the goal of maximizing the profits of the local corporate state. In this concept, the state figured as an entrepreneur itself, establishing and operating collective-owned enterprises (TVEs) in order to develop a locality. Under the conditions of ‘local state corporatism 2.0’, however, the local state no longer figures as a ‘corporate head’ but increasingly acts as an ‘interested facilitator’ and regulator of private sector development.

      ³³Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan wenti de jueding (Decision of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Government on Some Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms). Chinese version: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html (accessed 3 January 2019).

      ³⁴See, e.g. ‘Xi Jinping tan minying qiyejia: dajia dou you tou you lian yao weihu hao xingxiang’ (Xi Jinping on private entrepreneurs: All are respected people who should safeguard their image). http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-03-09/doc-ifxqafrm7345622.shtml (accessed 10 March 2016).

      ³⁵An extensive Chinese study on the innovation potential of China’s private entrepreneurs is provided by Liu Dan (2017).

      ³⁶‘New social classes’ refers to four groups of people: private entrepreneurs and leading managing and technical personnel of private enterprises and foreign joint ventures; leading figures of intermediate and social organizations; self-employed persons; and leading figures in the new social media (see also Luqiu and Liu, 2018). An overview of the ‘New social classes’ is provided by Zhang Linjiang (2018).

      ³⁷A specific bureau was established to consult representatives from these new social classes. See ‘Zhongyang tongzhanbu shige 11 nian zai she xinju zhuanmen fuze xinde shehui jieceng renshi tongzhan gongzuo’ (After 11 years the United Front Department of the CCP has established a new bureau targeting the new social classes). http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2016-07/05/content_316162.htm (accessed 1 October 2016).

      ³⁸See ‘Shaanxi xin shengdai qiyejia he xinde shehui jieceng renshi lingting 19da jingshen xuanchuan’ (The new generation of entrepreneurs and new social classes in Shanxi listen to the propagation of the spirit of the 19th Party Congress). http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-12-08/doc-ifypnyqi2272507.shtml (accessed 1 May 2018).

      ³⁹See Zai jie ‘xindeshehui jieceng renshi’ (Newly understanding the ‘new social classes’). http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/zcjd/201703/f2cd5f2c04b64e8a95e5ab7e6f378a81. shtml (accessed 2 May 2018).

      ⁴⁰‘Quanguo tongzhanbuzhang huiyi: Jinnian yao jiaqiang xinde shehui jieceng renshi tongzhan gongzuo’ (National conference of the heads of United Front Departments: From this year onwards the United Front work with new the social classes shall be reinforced). http://money.163.com/18/0118/15/D8EOOPUB002580S6.html (accessed 4 May 2018). On private entrepreneurs as a new social class, see also Huang Dongya (2014).

      ⁴¹See http://house.china.com.cn/apple/fullview_823253.htm (accessed 28 March 2016).

      ⁴²See, e.g. Mass entrepreneurship and innovation as new growth engine. http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/03/03/content_281475300571752.htm (accessed 24 April 2018). See also http://guoqing.china.com.cn/word-en/2016-05/10/content_38430378.htm (accessed 24 April 2018).

      ⁴³See, e.g. ‘Rang minying qiye chengwei chuangxin zhuti’ (Let private enterprises become the main force of innovation) (2017). Qinghai Ribao (Qinghai Daily), 24 November. http://news.ifeng.com/a/20171124/53544625_0.shtml (accessed 2 May 2018). A 2018 report published by the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing revealed that in 2017 the expenses of private enterprises for research and development were 13 percent higher than in 2016. The report noted that these figures are comparable to those in industrialized countries. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 June 2018.

      ⁴⁴In 2018, a forum organized by private entrepreneurs defined ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ as the determination to contribute to the nation no matter how big the difficulties are (Wang Meng, 2018: 77). For the party, ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ means to be creative and innovative so that they can pave the way for China’s turn from being a production base for traditional industries to a high-tech and knowledge-based economy (Wang Meng, 2018).

      ⁴⁵For an early academic conceptualization of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ with the help of indicators to measure entrepreneurship as well as innovation and leadership capacity, see Wu et al. (2014) and Hu (2018). Xi Jinping, for his part, added patriotism and social responsibility to the concept of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’.

      ⁴⁶In April 2018, for instance, the National Federation of Industry and Commerce organized a meeting in Beijing attended by government representatives and private entrepreneurs to discuss new policies to strengthen private enterprises such as downscaling administrative procedures and costs, as well as introducing new tax reduction incentives. See 9 bumen wei minqi zhuanchang jiedu youhua yingshang huanjing (Special meeting with 9 government bureaus to interpret the optimization of the business environment), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-04/03/c_1122628747.htm (accessed 3 April 2018).

      ⁴⁷Liu Mingping weiyuan huyu zhuoli pojie minying qiye ‘san nan’ (PCC member Liu Mingping urges to solve the ‘three difficulties’ of private entrepreneurs). Jiangzhun Shibao (Jiangzhun Times), 8 March 2018.

      ⁴⁸For his speech, see http://www.qnr.cn/waiyu/yiwen/eng/201501/1039326.html