Preserving Democracy. Elgin L Hushbeck

he put forth legislation to limit the size of a farm and to buy back land previously sold by the state at the original selling price, so that this land could be divided up into smaller lots and given to the poor. Tiberius argued eloquently for his bill appealing to the plebs,

      You fight and die to give wealth and luxury to others. You are called masters of the world, but there is not a foot of ground that you can call your own.⁴

      Tiberius’s plan faced a lot of opposition, particular from landowners whose property had appreciated in value, either though the improvement that they had done, or simply as a result of inflation. Opposition was particularly strong from those who had purchased their land from a prior owner at a greater cost than the government was now willing to pay. In response, the Senate denounced the proposed law. When the Assembly passed it, Senators convinced or persuaded the other Tribune, Octavius, to exercise his veto.

      While Tiberius’ proposed law caused a large uproar, it did not in and of itself threaten the Roman Republic. His reaction to the veto, however, was the first step in its subsequent downfall. Tiberius could have waited until Octavius’ term was up at the end of the year, but then his term would have been over as well, and he would no longer be in a position to push for the reforms.

      So he concocted a scheme to remove Octavius by having the Assembly pass a law which said that any Tribune who acted contrary to the wishes of the plebs was to be immediately removed from office. As soon as this new measure was passed Tiberius had his people forcibly remove Octavius, thereby effectively negating the Tribunal veto.

      While it achieved his purpose, his actions were seen for what they were, a subversion of hundreds of years of Roman law. His enemies could not touch him while he remained Tribune, but they made it well known that as soon as his term was up they would bring charges against him.

      Faced with almost certain conviction and having already circumvented Roman law, Tiberius decided that the only way out was to retain the immunity granted a Tribune, and so ran for an unprecedented second term. This act cost him what little support he had left in the Senate, and so he appealed to the plebs with a whole new series of promises all aimed at buying enough votes to win reelection.

      The flouting of law and tradition, combined with the uproar over all the new promises caused tensions to grow. Critics charged that Tiberius was trying to set himself up as king. Tempers flared, and on the day of the election, broke out into violence in the Forum, during which Tiberius was killed.

      Though Tiberius was gone, the plebs saw him as their hero and a martyr. To end the unrest the Senate put many of Tiberius’ laws into effect. But the plebs were still restless and anyone who was seen as betraying Tiberius’ memory could turn up dead, as did Scipio Aemilianus, a brother-in-law to Tiberius, when he intervened before the newly created land board on behalf of some land owners.

      Tiberius’ brother, Gaius, determined to complete his brother’s work. A brilliant orator, he was not as idealistic as his brother, but a much more practical and skilled politician. In 124 B.C. he became Tribune. He built a large following through a series of laws tailored to build support among specific groups. The most significant was that the state would now sell grain to the poor at what amounted to half the market price, shattering the Roman notion of self-reliance, replacing it instead with dependence on the State, a dependence later politicians were to exploit.

      Having amassed a huge power base Gaius busted wide open the crack that his brother had made; he not only ran for, but won a second term. Yet, before long he also overreached. He was still plagued by the Senate who constantly fought against his reforms. He sought to remedy the situation by doubling the Senate’s size. This would allow him to put his supporters into the newly created Senate positions and give him a majority

      Gaius’ greatest mistake however was his attempt to expand the vote in varying degree throughout all of Italy. The masses in Rome were in no mood to dilute their own political power. His opponents seized on this mistake by submitting a series of laws aimed at enticing political support away from Gaius, with their own set of giveaways. It worked and when Gaius tried for a third term, he was defeated. Once out of power, his opponents began repealing his laws. Again tension flared and Gaius was forced to flee Rome. But he was overtaken and killed.

      Tiberius and Gaius set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the collapse of the Roman Republic. To be sure they did not cause the problems that were plaguing Rome, but their overreaching to solve those problems had three key results, which when combined had lasting and detrimental effects.

      First was an increase in the political power of the plebs. Tiberius and Gaius both rose to power, and in the end Gaius was brought down with appeals to the masses of Rome. This was not in and of itself a bad thing, until combined with the second factor, which was an increased dependency on the state. Both the Gracchi brothers and their opponents appealed to the masses by what were effectively giveaways, such as Gaius’ Corn Laws. Many of these giveaways made the masses dependent in one way or another on the state.

      The third factor was that the Gracchi’s actions had raised the specter of tyranny, such that any further attempt at significant reform would be seen as an attempt to destroy the Republic. The result was a government where political power was gained by appealing to the masses which were thereby increasingly dependent on the state, but in which no real significant change could be allowed. Rome had reached its point of no return. Though it did not know it, it was doomed.

      The paralysis made it increasingly difficult to get anything done. Action required power, and power required political support, and that depended on who could sway the masses. As a result political power began to center around personalities that could attract large followings.

      Rome was still threatened on many fronts. Defeating these threats and making Rome ‘safe’ combined with the wealth such victories brought was the surest way to gain the support of the masses. A general with the military skills to win battles, and political skills to appeal to the masses could rise very quickly. Within twenty years of the death of Gaius, following a series of military victories, Marius was reelected consul not only for a second term, but for five terms, later adding a sixth, and then even a seventh.

      The giveaways continued. Food prices were reduced even further. More land was given away in an effort to please the people. In 105 B.C. the state began to sponsor gladiatorial games, adding entertainment to the growing list of dependencies. Seeing all these benefits going to Rome, Italy revolted. When it became clear that Rome could not win, it ended the war by granting full Roman citizenship to the rest of Italy, though some procedural maneuvering undercut this citizenship such that little actually changed and the paralysis continued.

      But political paralysis in the face of large problems breeds instability, and instability in turn breeds the desire to get something done. Political battles became more pronounced. The courts increasingly became little more than a tool to be use against political opponents. Increasingly political battles ended in bloodshed, both with individuals and, given the political importance of generals, in some cases with armies from the opposing factions. In 82 B.C. an army supporting the Senate and led by Sulla, who had been a general under Marius, defeated an army, supported by the Assembly and led by Marius’ son.

      Following the victory, Sulla demanded that he be made dictator, the Senate agreed in an effort to restore order and get something done. Sulla further expanded the vote to include some who had supported him, restored the power of the Senate, re-instituted the one-term limit on consuls, and greatly limited the office of Tribune of the Plebs, that had in his eyes caused so much trouble. Confident that he had restored Rome to its former glory, and that most of his enemies were dead, he stepped down as dictator after only two years. But the examples set by Sulla and Marius proved more lasting than Sulla’s reforms, needing only a new crisis to reemerge.

      The new crisis came just seven years later. It started at a gladiatorial training compound in Campania, where slaves were trained for the games. During a mass escape attempt, seventy-eight gladiators made it out. Led by Spartacus, they began raiding nearby villages for food. Rome’s best general of the time, Pompey, was already famous and very popular. But he was away fighting in Spain. Still, it was only a small group of gladiators, so Rome sent an army of 3,000 men to deal with them before the