Redemption Redeemed. John Goodwin

and worshipped him, upon any terms or conditions whatsoever. Would this have excused him from vanity, in promising him all the kingdoms of the world upon such a condition, when, as all the world knew, that not one of these kingdoms were at his disposal?

      Again, neither can God, nor any minister of the gospel, say with truth to every particular man, if thou believest thou shalt be saved, unless it be supposed that there is salvation purchased or in being for them all. Because the truth of such an assertion cannot be salved by this, that all men or every particular man will not believe. The truth of a connex, or hypothetical proposition, of which kind this is, if thou Peter, or thou John believest, thou shalt be saved, doth not depend upon anything that is contingent, no, nor yet upon anything that is extra-essential to the terms of the proposition itself, (such as is, as well the non-believing as the believing of particular men) but upon the essential and necessary connexion between the two parts of the proposition, the antecedent and consequent. If this connexion be contingent, loose, or false, the proposition itself is false, though in every other respect it should be accommodated to the best. As, for example, in this proposition: If Isaac were Abraham’s son, then was he truly godly; both the parts considered apart, are true; for true it is, 1. That Isaac was Abraham’s son: and 2. That he was truly godly; yet the proposition is absolutely false; because there is no necessary or essential connexion between being Abraham’s son and true godliness: therefore the one cannot be truly inferred or concluded from the other. In like manner, when I shall say thus unto a man, If thou believest thou shalt be saved, it is neither his non-believing, nor the certainty of my knowledge that he will not believe, that either maketh or evinceth such a proposition to be true. Because neither of these relates to the connexion of the parts thereof, nor contains the least reason or ground why the latter should follow upon the former. The man’s not believing is no reason at all why, upon his believing, he should certainly be saved: no more is my knowledge, how certain soever it be, that he will not believe. But to verify such a proposition or saying, there must be a certain and indissolvable connexion between such a man’s salvation and believing, in case he should believe.

      Such a connexion as this there cannot be, unless there were salvation for him, which he might have and enjoy in case he should believe. Now certain it is, that if Christ died not for him, there is no more salvation for him in case he should believe, than there would be in case he should not believe: there being no salvation for any man, upon any terms or condition whatsoever, unless Christ hath purchased it for him by his death. Nor doth Christ’s purchasing salvation for any man, depend upon such a man’s believing; no more doth his non-purchasing salvation for him upon his not believing. So that, unless it be supposed that Christ hath purchased salvation for a man, whilst he remains yet an unbeliever, and though he should always remain an unbeliever, it cannot be supposed that Christ purchased salvation for him, though he should believe. And consequently, there can be no truth in this proposition or assertion, spoken to a man who should not believe: If thou believest thou shalt be saved; it being certain, upon the aforesaid supposition of Christ’s non-dying for him, that he should not, could not be saved, no not though he should believe.

      If it be replied, Yea, but the truth of this saying to any man whatsoever, “If thou believest thou shalt be saved,” is sufficiently salved upon this account, that Christ died sufficiently for all men, though not intentionally so that in case any man whatsoever shall or should believe, there is salvation ready for him in Christ.

      I answer, that the vanity, or mere nullity rather in respect of the coincidence of the members of this distinction, wherein Christ is affirmed to have died sufficiently for all men, but denied to have died intentionally for all men, hath been demonstratively and at large evinced formerly. I here only add, that if there be salvation ready in Christ for all and every man in case they should believe, then must this salvation be found in him, either naturally and in respect of his mere person, or by way of purchase and procurement, i. e. by means of his death. No man, I presume will affirm the former, as, viz. that there is salvation in Christ for any man, in respect of his mere nature or person; or howsoever, himself plainly denies it: “Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.” John xii. 24. If there be no salvation in him for men but by purchase, and this with his blood, then hath he no more salvation in him than what he thus purchased; no man hath anything more by purchase than what he hath bought or purchased. Therefore, if Christ hath salvation in him for all men without exception, he must have purchased or bought it for them with his blood. If so, he must either purchase more than he intended, or else intended to purchase salvation for all and every man. And what is this, without any parable, but to die intentionally for all men? Therefore the distinction of Christ dying sufficiently for all men, but not intentionally, is ridiculous, and unworthy from first to last of any intelligent or considering man.

Nor is that distinction, because it relates to the subject-matter of our present chapter, so emphatically insisted upon by Mr. Rutherford, of much better import. “That eternal life,” saith he, “should be offered unto all and every individual man, upon condition of faith; and that life should be offered unto all and every individual man, out of an intent on God’s part to give life unto them in case they believe, are two sayings widely different.”2 For, doubtless, the latter hath every whit as much truth in it, yea, every whit as much clear and pregnant truth in it as the former, yea, hath in effect one and the same truth. For when God offers eternal life unto all and every individual man, upon condition of faith, is it not his intention that they should have eternal life upon their faith, or in case they should believe? If not, then in such an offer he should offer and promise that which he intends not to give or perform, no not according to the tenor of his promise. If it be said, in favour of the distinction: Though God intends to give eternal life to all and every individual man, upon condition they believe, this being the express tenor of his offer or promise, yet it follows not that such an intention in him should be his reason or ground of tendering such an offer or promise unto them.

      Unto this I answer, that if this were the intent of the author, I mean to differentiate the latter proposition from the former in point of error or falsehood, upon this account, because the latter supposeth such an intention, as that mentioned, in God, to be the adequate reason or motive why he tenders such an offer or promise unto them, I should not much gainsay, because, I suppose, that God hath indeed other reasons, and these of greater weight, why he makes a tender of salvation unto all men upon condition of faith, than his intention of giving salvation unto them in case they shall believe. Yea, I do not conceive that either God or men do anything which they intend, simply out of their intentions thereof, or because they intend it, but out of a desire to effect, or to procure the effecting of it, or because they desire it.

      But that the author’s meaning in pleading the said latter proposition of error was far differing from this, appears sufficiently by the account which himself gives hereof in the sequel of his discourse. From this account it clearly appears, that in framing the said latter proposition, he useth those words, “ex Dei intentione,” for “cum Dei intentione,” and placeth the error of the proposition in this, viz. that it supposeth an intention to be in God of giving life unto all men upon their faith, when he makes the offer mentioned unto them. To prove this to be an error, he argues to this effect, from John xvii. 2: “God the Father gave power unto the Son to give eternal life to those only who were given unto him by the Father. But reprobates,” saith he, “are not given unto the Son by the Father; therefore the Father gave no power unto the Son to give eternal life unto reprobates. Consequently the Son cannot, either according to his own, or to his Father’s intention, offer remission of sins or eternal life unto reprobates.” To this I answer, that the whole proceed of the argument ariseth from a mistaken ground, or a plain misunderstanding of the Scripture upon which it is built. For by a “power given unto the Son to give eternal life,” &c. is not meant a power of dying for men, one or other, but a power of an actual and real investing men with eternal life, or a power to confer eternal life actually upon men, as appears from the former clause of the verse: “As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life,” &c. From whence it is evident, that the power here spoken of as given unto the Son to give eternal life, &c., is a consequent branch or effect of that power or sovereignty which the Father hath given