Whether to Kill. Stephanie Dornschneider

However, on a more general level, it is not necessary that subjects plan their actions. For instance, my shaking of somebody’s hand may not be planned or include self-knowledge (but only self-awareness). Other actions, such as my turning right on my way to work may neither be planned nor include self-knowledge (and not even self-awareness). In fact, subjects may not even have self-knowledge or self-awareness related to their own beliefs, as is suggested by the impossibility of calling upon all the beliefs that one holds when asked to do so.

      Given these considerations, there seem to be numerous actions that are not planned. Since I define intention by reference to planning, such actions do not involve intentions, which means that such actions do not involve decisions, either. Consequently, there can be actions without decisions. Table 7 provides a summary.

      Desires

      Planning also suggests that somebody wants to do something, which is often understood as an indication of desire. Basically, this addresses the question what is logically prior to the intention, whether desire → intention → action.²⁵ Based on this, it can be questioned whether intentions are mental states.²⁶

      Wanting may but need not indicate a desire; someone may want to perform an action but not have a desire to do so. An example is the following sentence, which contradicts my dislike of cleaning up and suggests that intentions can be considered mental states, rather than desires: “I want to clean up my room.” Since people can believe they have feelings, which include desires (see beliefs of Type 5), it is nevertheless possible that intentions are ultimately based on desires. Here, it is helpful to consider another example, which corresponds to what I like after traveling for a long period of time: “I believe that I want to go home.” In this example, wanting may indeed be understood to indicate a desire—however, by saying “I want,” it is possible for me to describe a desire in the propositional content of a belief. This shows that people who feel desires can describe these desires and believe they feel these desires—which suggests it is helpful to not treat intentions as desires. It also supports the view that intentions are plans in which people have some kind of mental control over something, such as desires. In the last example, for instance, it would have been possible for me to plan to perform another action that does not correspond to my desire—or to do nothing.

      Goals

      The previous section related political violence to three observable things: (1) means (physical force), (2) perpetrators (civil), and (3) target (state). What has not been addressed, however, is the mental component of political violence, its goals. As described in the Introduction, there is consensus that people do not engage in political violence for the mere sake of using physical force. Rather, political violence is a type of behavior thought to involve goals.

      Goals are particular types of beliefs that may motivate certain decisions, such as decisions to take up arms. Like decisions, goals establish a connection between the actor (who believes in certain goals) and behavior (the behavior the actor engages in related to his goals). For example, one can have a goal of following God’s will (Belief Type 4, “I believe that my goal is to follow God’s will”) underlying one’s praying. One can also have a goal of stopping the government from attacking its citizens (Belief Type 1, “I believe that my goal is to stop the government from attacking its citizens”) underlying one’s leaving a demonstration. Or one can have a goal of fulfilling a certain desire, such as the goal to be happy (Belief Type 5, “I believe that my goal is to be happy”) underlying one’s going on vacation.

      Goals are beliefs about what the subject considers the desired consequence of his action, so that action → goal achieved. This is opposed to performing the action for the sake of performing the action, so that action → action achieved. This structure underlines that people do not take up arms for the mere purpose of engaging in violence. Rather, their actions involve certain goals. It is important to note that whether one’s goals are achieved can be evaluated only after the action has been performed. As a result, goals imply a forward-looking dimension that transcends both decisions and actions.

      Conclusion and Outlook

      This section and the previous ones introduced decisions to engage in certain behavior, such as political violence, and the beliefs connected to such decisions. The following discussion applies these ideas by modeling political violence as decisions to take up arms based on chains of interconnected beliefs. In the next chapters, I identify these chains of beliefs by coding the actors’ direct speech for decisions to take up arms, as well as for other beliefs related to these decisions. Based on this, I construct cognitive maps that make visible the complex belief systems underlying political violence. I then analyze the maps and identify different types of belief chains that motivate decisions, which sheds light on the complex microlevel mechanisms underlying political violence.

       Part II. Formalization and Counterfactuals

      Formalizing Cognitive Maps into Directed Acyclical Graphs

      Cognitive maps typically contain large numbers of beliefs and inferences. Therefore, it is impossible to systematically analyze them by hand. To cope with this problem, it is helpful to formalize cognitive maps. As shown by Axelrod (1984),²⁷ formal models make traceable processes that would otherwise not be analyzable, or only be analyzable on a much smaller scale. They allow the researcher to systematically explore the reasoning processes represented by cognitive maps.

      Based on the literature in graph theory²⁸ and computer science, cognitive maps can be formalized into directed acyclical graphs (DAGs). This offers new possibilities for studying human behavior via the cognitive mapping approach. DAGs are often used in computer science to study structures of variables that are directed and limited (Koller and Friedman 2009; Pearl 2000). The reasoning processes represented by cognitive maps are also directed by involving antecedent and consequent beliefs. They are also limited by involving traceable chains of beliefs that end in decisions. As a result of this similarity, formalizing cognitive maps into DAGs offers a convenient basis for an automated analysis.

      In the following, I explain how cognitive maps can be formalized into DAGs. Specifically, I do so by drawing on Judea Pearl’s theory of causality. This formalization also offers new possibilities for the study of counterfactuals, and allows me to explore alternative worlds in which individuals would not have decided to take up arms (see Chapter 6).

      Directed Acyclical Graphs

      According to Pearl (2000), DAGs are graphs with a particular structure. Graphs are structures with two components:

      V = set of variables of vertices

      E = set of edges connecting the vertices

      DAGs differ from other graphs by being directed and not containing cycles or self-loops (see Figure 9). Directedness means that each edge in the graph is an arrow pointing from one vertex to another. Not containing directed cycles or self-loops means that there are no relationships such as A → B, B → A (cycle), or A → A (self-loop). In this structure, it is possible to trace paths between vertices that are separated by more than one arrow by following the direction of the edges between these vertices (see Figure 9).

      According to Pearl (2000: 12), the following labels, taken from graph theory, describe the major components of DAGs:

      • All vertices are called parents or children. Parents are the starting points of arrows. Children are the ending points of arrows.

      • Vertices that do not have parents are called roots.

      • Vertices that do not have children are called sinks.

      • Indirect connections between vertices are called paths.

      This structure corresponds to the structure of cognitive maps. The similarity between DAGs and cognitive maps