A Treatise of Human Nature - The Original Classic Edition. Hume David

      A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume

       Title: A Treatise of Human Nature

       Author: David Hume

       Release Date: February 13, 2010 [EBook #4705]

       [This file last updated: March 15, 2011]

       Language: English

       Character set encoding: ASCII

       *** A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE ***

       Produced by Col Choat, and David Widger

       A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

       By David Hume

       Contents ADVERTISEMENT. INTRODUCTION.

       BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING

       PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC. SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.

       SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

       SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.

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       SECT. IV. OF THE CONNEXION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. SECT. V. OF RELATIONS.

       SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

       PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.

       SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.

       SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

       SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

       SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.

       PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE.

       SECT. II. OF PROBABILITY, AND OF THE IDEA OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. III. WHY A CAUSE IS ALWAYS NECESSARY.

       SECT. IV. OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF OUR REASONINGS CONCERNING CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. V. OF THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE SENSES AND MEMORY.

       SECT. VI. OF THE INFERENCE FROM THE IMPRESSION TO THE IDEA. SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.

       SECT. VIII. OF THE CAUSES OF BELIEF.

       SECT. IX. OF THE EFFECTS OF OTHER RELATIONS AND OTHER HABITS. SECT. X. OF THE INFLUENCE OF BELIEF.

       SECT. XI. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES. SECT. XII. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSES. SECT. XIII. OF UNPHILOSOPHICAL PROBABILITY.

       SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.

       SECT. XV. RULES BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS. SECT. XVI OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS

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       PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON.

       SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES. SECT. III. OF THE ANTIENT PHILOSOPHY.

       SECT. IV. OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

       SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL. SECT. VI. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

       SECT. VII. CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK.

       BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS

       PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT

       SECT. II OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAUSES SECT. III WHENCE THESE OBJECTS AND CAUSES ARE DERIVED SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS

       SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND HUMILITY SECT. VI LIMITATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM

       SECT. VII OF VICE AND VIRTUE

       SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY

       SECT. IX OF EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES SECT. X OF PROPERTY AND RICHES

       SECT. XI OF THE LOVE OF FAME

       SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS

       PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED

       SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM

       SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED

       SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS

       SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL

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       SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER SECT. VII OF COMPASSION

       SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY

       SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION AND MALICE SECT. X OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT

       SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS

       PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

       SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUed

       SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL SECT. IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF CUSTOM

       SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE PASSIONS SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME

       SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUed

       SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT PASSIONS

       SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH

       BOOK III OF MORALS

       PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL

       SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVed FROM REASON SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVed FROM A MORAL SENSE

       PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

       SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? SECT. II OF THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY

       SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY

       SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT

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       SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES

       SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT

       SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS

       SECT. XII OF CHASTITY AND MODESTY

       PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES

       SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND

       SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES

       SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK

       APPENDIX

       ADVERTISEMENT.

       My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction.

       INTRODUCTION.

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       Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those