The Handy Military History Answer Book. Samuel Willard Crompton

10,000 of the rank and file perished. Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio became the first of numerous Roman generals to attest to Hannibal’s military brilliance, and his eighteen-year-old son, Scipio junior, made the first of many notations about the skill of Hannibal’s army.

      What was so different about Hannibal’s strategy?

      First and foremost, Hannibal was a person of great charm, able to influence and persuade the various ethnic groups under his leadership. Second, Hannibal was one of the first of all generals—at least of those who we know—who planned an entire battle ahead of time. To be sure, he had to improvise at times, but on the whole, Hannibal had a well-designed battle plan on the morning of the event.

      Third, Hannibal was likely the first military commander to exploit the technique of double envelopment. This meant creating an intentional weakness in the center of his infantry line and luring the enemy to charge straight ahead. Given that his North African and Spanish cavalry were superior to the Roman horsemen, Hannibal then brought his cavalry around the flanks and even into the back of his foe. This technique was certainly tricky and required excellent timing, but Hannibal pulled it off time and again.

       What do we mean by “Fabian” tactics?

      After suffering two crushing defeats, the Romans put all power, temporarily, in the hands of Quintus Fabius Maximus (c. 280–203 B.C.E.), giving him the official title of Dictator. Fabius chose not to meet Hannibal in the field; rather, he kept his forces secure in Rome and other Italian cities. Hannibal had the run of the countryside, but he lacked siege weapons, and the Romans were safe behind their walls.

      When did the Romans go on the offensive?

      By the spring of 216 B.C.E., the Roman public was weary of Fabian, or delaying, tactics. Fabius Maximus stepped down, and two new consuls raised the largest army Rome had ever seen: perhaps 85,000 men in all. Many were new recruits, but they had magnificent armor, and they looked far more impressive than their Punic foes. In the hot summer of 216 B.C.E., the two consuls brought their force south to encounter Hannibal in the province of Apulia (the modern-day tourist knows how hot the summer sun is in that area).

      Hannibal planned yet another battle based on double envelopment. He had, perhaps, 55,000 men, but nearly all of them were battle-hardened, which could not be said of the Romans. On the morning of August 2, 216 B.C.E., Hannibal lured the Romans into an attack, and—as had happened so often in the past—they took the bait. Hannibal’s center seemed weak, and the Romans pressed forward, not realizing that the ground and landscape became narrower with each passing minute. When Hannibal’s cavalry sprang the trap, the Romans were jammed so tightly onto the corn field that they could not use their lances.

      How great was Hannibal’s victory at Cannae?

      It was one of the greatest victories ever achieved in the ancient world, and it was, quite likely, the single bloodiest day of that historical epoch. Roughly 48,000 Romans perished that day, compared to perhaps 10,000 of Hannibal’s force. All night long, Carthaginians searched the field, finding and hacking the gold rings off former Roman aristocrats’ hands (the rings were placed in baskets and shipped to Carthage as evidence of the remarkable victory). When morning came, Hannibal’s cavalry commander arrived to say that the victory was complete and that Hannibal would sup in the Roman Capitol five days hence (it actually would have taken two weeks to make that march).

      Hannibal demurred, saying he lacked siege weapons and an understanding of Rome’s defenses. Muharbal, astonished, declared: “Truly, the gods do not give all their gifts to one man. You, Hannibal, know how to create a great victory, but not how to use it!”

      Was Muharbal right?

      Yes. Throughout his career, Hannibal had dared the odds and prevailed. A siege of Rome may have been the greatest risk of all, but this was clearly the right moment, and Hannibal should have seized it.

      What happened to Hannibal’s invasion of Italy?

      Hannibal had come a long way and achieved great things, but with each month that passed without a march on Rome, his reputation suffered. Rome was prostrate after the Battle of Cannae, but by the next spring, the government and people were breathing defiance once more. Hannibal laid siege to two or three southern Italian cities over the next few years, but with very few exceptions, the Italian allies proved loyal to Rome. Just as important, Carthage now had a new foe.

      Publius Cornelius Scipio junior (236–184 B.C.E.) was son of the consul who fought Hannibal in 218 B.C.E. After his father’s death, Scipio became leader of the family and the new military hope of Rome. That he possessed a genius cannot be denied, but some of his methods were clearly based on Hannibal’s. Even so, many military commanders never learn this lesson: they fail to profit from watching their enemy.

      Whom did Scipio defeat in Spain?

      Over the next five years, Scipio met and defeated practically every Carthaginian commander in Spain. He captured the city of New Carthage and gained for Rome the silver and iron mines of the Iberian Peninsula.

      Only one member of the Barca family—Hannibal’s younger brother Hasdrubal—escaped from Spain. Leading about 30,000 men, Hasdrubal imitated his brother by crossing the Alps and reaching the broad plains of northern Italy. Had he effected a junction with Hannibal, they would have had about 90,000 men. Just enough, perhaps, to bring Rome to its knees. Hasdrubal sent six mounted messengers by different routes, but all were captured by the Romans, who therefore learned of his approach. Hannibal, meanwhile, knew nothing.

      Why do historians label the Battle of Metaurus as among the most decisive in history?

      Knowing that Hannibal was still in southern Italy, a Roman consul hastened north with 7,000 picked men. He effected a junction with the army of the north just days before Hasdrubal approached. On the morning of the battle (in 207 B.C.E.), Hasdrubal heard two trumpets rather than one, meaning that he faced two Roman armies instead of one.

      The battle was short and sweet (from the Romans’ point of view). The Romans had profited from the previous ten years’ experience. Though they had not yet adopted all the characteristics of what was later referred to as a “legion,” they were much closer than before. Ten thousand Carthaginians and their allies were killed, and another 10,000 taken prisoner. The first that Hannibal knew of this defeat was when a Roman horseman galloped near his camp and hurled the head of his brother over a wall. Tradition has it that Hannibal bowed his head, saying that at last he saw the destiny of Carthage.

      Where did Scipio the Younger go after the Battle of Metaurus?

      Scipio continued to win victories in Spain, and in 205 B.C.E., he received permission from the Senate to carry the war into Africa. His first campaign in North Africa was a desultory affair until he won the alliance of Massinissa, leader of a group of Numidian horsemen. These were the same African tribesmen who had been so instrumental in Hannibal’s earlier victories, and Scipio used the advantage to its maximum extent. Threatened by a possible siege, Carthage summoned Hannibal, and in 203 B.C.E., he had 40,000 of his veterans land on home soil.

      Hannibal knew the situation was dangerous, even desperate. In 202 B.C.E., he marched southeast, toward where Scipio and his soldiers waited. Upon reaching his destination on a wind-swept plain called Zama, Hannibal asked for a peace conference. Neither he nor Scipio got anywhere in the discussion: it was apparent that only a major battle would settle the issue.

      How did Scipio win the Battle of Zama?

      In what way did he not? Early that morning, Hannibal rode to reconnoiter his enemy’s positions, and what he saw filled him with despair. Scipio had learned everything that Hannibal had to teach. But there was no remedy: the battle began around 10 A.M.

      Hannibal began by launching a charge of elephants, but Scipio had trained his men to break into highly maneuverable cohorts which evaded the animals’ charge; one section of elephants even turned and crashed into a Carthaginian line. Scipio then advanced and cut his way through Hannibal’s first and second lines, only to meet the battle-hardened veterans of the Italian campaigns. This was when Hannibal should have launched a counterattack, but he was listless at Zama, not his usual