Animal Intelligence. George John Romanes

upon instinct as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies, which is not to be explained by any known qualities inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from any laws of mechanism, but as an immediate impression from the first Mover, and the Divine energy acting in the creatures.

      This mode of 'looking upon instinct' is merely to exclude the subject from the sphere of inquiry, and so to abstain from any attempt at definition.

      Innumerable other opinions might be quoted from well-known writers, 'looking upon instinct' in widely different ways; but as this is not an historical work, I shall pass on at once to the manner in which science looks upon it, or, at least, the manner in which it will always be looked upon throughout the present work.

      Without concerning ourselves with the origin of instincts, and so without reference to the theory of evolution, we have to consider the most conspicuous and distinctive features of instinct as it now exists. The most important point to observe in the first instance is that instinct involves mental operations; for this is the only point that serves to distinguish instinctive action from reflex. Reflex action, as already explained, is non-mental neuro-muscular adaptation to appropriate stimuli; but instinctive action is this and something more; there is in it the element of mind. Such, at least, is instinctive action in the sense that I shall always allude to it. I am, of course, aware that the limitation which I thus impose is one which is ignored, or not recognised, by many writers even among psychologists; but I am persuaded that if we are to have any approach to definiteness in the terms which we employ—not to say of clearness in our ideas concerning the things of which we speak—it is most desirable to restrict the word instinct to mental as distinguished from non-mental activity. No doubt it is often difficult, or even impossible, to decide whether or not a given action implies the presence of the mind-element—i.e., conscious as distinguished from unconscious adaptation; but this is altogether a separate matter, and has nothing to do with the question of defining instinct in a manner which shall be formally exclusive, on the one hand of reflex action, and on the other of reason. As Virchow truly observes, 'it is difficult or impossible to draw the line between instinctive and reflex action;' but at least the difficulty may be narrowed down to deciding in particular cases whether or not an action falls into this or that category of definition; there is no reason why the difficulty should arise on account of any ambiguity of the definitions themselves. Therefore I endeavour to draw as sharply as possible the line which in theory should be taken to separate instinctive from reflex action; and this line, as I have already said, is constituted by the boundary of non-mental or unconscious adjustment, with adjustment in which there is concerned consciousness or mind.

      Having thus, I hope, made it clear that the difficulty of drawing a distinction between reflex and instinctive actions as a class is one thing, and that the difficulty of assigning particular actions to one or the other of our categories is another thing, we may next perceive that the former difficulty is obviated by the distinction which I have imposed, and that the latter only arises from the fact that on the objective side there is no distinction imposable. The former difficulty is obviated by the distinction which I have drawn, simply because the distinction is itself a definite one. In particular cases of adjustive action we may not always be able to affirm whether consciousness of their performance is present or absent; but, as I have already said, this does not affect the validity of our definition; all we can say of such cases is that if the performance in question is attended with consciousness it is instinctive, and if not it is reflex.

      And the difficulty of assigning particular actions to one or other of these two categories arises, as I have said, merely because on the objective side, or the side of the nervous system, there is no distinction to be drawn. Whether or not a neural process is accompanied by a mental process, it is in itself the same. The advent and development of consciousness, although progressively converting reflex action into instinctive, and instinctive into rational, does this exclusively in the sphere of subjectivity; the nervous processes engaged are throughout the same in kind, and differ only in the relative degrees of their complexity. Therefore, as the dawn of consciousness or the rise of the mind-element is gradual and undefined, both in the animal kingdom and in the growing child, it is but necessary that in the early morning, as it were, of consciousness any distinction between the mental and the non-mental should be obscure, and generally impossible to determine. Thus, for instance, a child at birth does not close its eyes upon the near approach of a threatening body, and it only learns to do so by degrees as the result of experience; at first, therefore, the action of closing the eyelids in order to protect the eyes may be said to be instinctive, in that it involves the mind-element:[3] yet it afterwards becomes a reflex which asserts itself even in opposition to the will. And, conversely, sucking in a new-born child, or a child in utero, is, in accordance with my definition, a reflex action; yet in later life, when consciousness becomes more developed and the child seeks the breast, sucking may properly be called an instinctive action. Therefore it is that, as in the ascending scale of objective complexity the mind-element arises and advances gradually, many particular cases which occupy the undefined boundary between reflex action and instinct cannot be assigned with confidence either to the one region or to the other.

      We see then the point, and the only point, wherein instinct can be consistently separated from reflex action; viz., in presenting a mental constituent. Next we must consider wherein instinct may be separated from reason. And for this purpose we may best begin by considering what we mean by reason.

      The term 'reason' is used in significations almost as various as those which are applied to 'instinct.' Sometimes it stands for all the distinctively human faculties taken collectively, and in antithesis to the mental faculties of the brute; while at other times it is taken to mean the distinctively human faculties of intellect.

      Dr. Johnson defines it as 'the power by which man deduces one proposition from another, and proceeds from premises to consequences.' This definition presupposes language, and therefore ignores all cases of inference not thrown into the formal shape of predication. Yet even in man the majority of inferences drawn by the mind never emerge as articulate propositions; so that although, as we shall have occasion fully to observe in my subsequent work, there is much profound philosophy in identifying reason with speech as they were identified in the term Logos, yet for purposes of careful definition so to identify intellect with language is clearly a mistake.

      More correctly, the word reason is used to signify the power of perceiving analogies or ratios, and is in this sense equivalent to the term 'ratiocination,' or the faculty of deducing inferences from a perceived equivalency of relations. Such is the only use of the word that is strictly legitimate, and it is thus that I shall use it throughout the present treatise. This faculty, however, of balancing relations, drawing inferences, and so of forecasting probabilities, admits of numberless degrees; and as in the designation of its lower manifestations it sounds somewhat unusual to employ the word reason, I shall in these cases frequently substitute the word intelligence. Where we find, for instance, that an oyster profits by individual experience, or is able to perceive new relations and suitably to act upon the result of its perceptions, I think it sounds less unusual to speak of the oyster as displaying intelligence than as displaying reason. On this account I shall use the former term to signify the lower degrees of the ratiocinative faculty; and thus in my usage it will be opposed to such terms as instinct, reflex action, &c., in the same manner as the term reason is so opposed. This is a point which, for the sake of clearness, I desire the reader to retain in his memory. I shall always speak of intelligence and intellect in antithesis to instinct, emotion, and the rest, as implying mental faculties the same in kind as those which in ourselves we call rational.

      Now it is notorious that no distinct line can be drawn between instinct and reason. Whether we look to the growing child or to the ascending scale of animal life, we find that instinct shades into reason by imperceptible degrees, or, as Pope expresses it, that these principles are 'for ever separate, yet for ever near.' Nor is this other than the principles of evolution would lead us to expect, as I shall afterwards have abundant occasion to show. Here, however, we are only concerned with drawing what distinction we can between instinct and reason as these faculties are actually presented to our observation. And this in a general way it is not difficult to do.

      We have seen that instinct involves 'mental operations,' and that by this feature it is distinguished