Australasian Democracy. Henry de Rosenbach Walker

of political influence, the absence of expert control, and the construction of new lines without sufficient regard to the prospects of an early remunerative traffic, which had caused the capital expenditure to have been nearly doubled while the net earnings had not increased. Under the former Act, accordingly, the Government railways and tramways, which are now about 2,600 miles in extent and have been constructed at a cost of thirty-eight millions, were vested absolutely in a Board of three Railway Commissioners to be appointed by the Governor in Council. In order that their independence might be secured, they were made irremovable except for misbehaviour or incompetency, and then only upon a vote of both Houses, and their salaries were charged on the consolidated Revenue Fund, which was permanently appropriated to the required extent. They were entrusted with the general management of the railways and with the appointment, subject to the regulations governing entrance into the public service, and dismissal, of all clerks, officers and employés, whose salaries and wages, however, are subject to the vote of Parliament. The Government were fortunate in securing the services of a very competent senior commissioner, who, with his colleagues, has been able, without lowering the rate of wages, to reduce the percentage of working expenses to gross revenue from 66.69 to 54.46 per cent., and has increased the net return on capital from 2.85 to 3.60 per cent. The result is the more satisfactory that the railways are not worked solely with a view to profit, but in such a manner as to benefit the population as a whole and to encourage the remote farmer and pastoralist. The experience of the other Australasian Provinces which established similar Boards proves it to be essential that the commissioners should not only possess great commercial ability, but be strong men who are able to withstand the pressure to which they will be subjected and are regardless of the attacks which are likely to follow upon their refusal of favours.

      The Public Works Act provides for the appointment of a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, which is to consider and report upon all proposals for the construction of public works, except such as are connected with the military or naval defences of the Province, where the estimated cost exceeds £20,000, and upon any similar proposals involving a smaller expenditure, which may be submitted to it by the Governor in Council. It consists of thirteen persons, eight members of the Assembly and five of the Council, who are appointed for the duration of a Parliament and receive remuneration at the rate of three guineas for each sitting and thirty shillings a day for travelling expenses where the sittings are held at a distance from Sydney. The Secretary for Public Works nominates an equal number from both sides of the House after consultation with the leader of the Opposition; in the majority of cases these nominations are challenged and the appointments are made by ballot of the whole House, which, according to trustworthy information, leads to disreputable negotiations between those who desire the additional salary and those who are able to confer it. It has been suggested recently by a Royal Commission, which reported that "the expenditure on public buildings is in excess of what is necessary, owing to the system of political interference, which is responsible for the erection of special post offices in country townships where shops could be used, and of costly courts of justice and other structures which are not required," that all proposals for public expenditure involving a probable outlay of more than £5,000, should be considered and reported on by a committee consisting of the permanent heads of the Public Works Department, the Treasury, and the Department on whose behalf the proposed expenditure would occur. But the adoption of this suggestion would not go to the root of the evil, which lies in the manner in which small public works of a purely local character are carried out in rural districts. In the early days of the Province the Government, in order to widen the area of settlement, constructed all roads, bridges, and other local works out of national funds. As population increased, municipalities were established, which rated themselves for local purposes and received subsidies from the Government proportionately to the amounts thus raised; but the Act of 1867, which contemplated the extension of the system, provided that new municipalities, either boroughs or municipal districts, could only be created upon the receipt of a petition signed by a stated proportion of the prospective ratepayers. The Councils of such municipalities have the right to levy rates not exceeding two shillings in the pound in one year upon all rateable land within their borders, and receive from the Government during the first five years a sum equal to the whole amount actually raised in this manner or from any other specified source of revenue. This is gradually diminished until, at the end of fifteen years, no further subsidies are received, except such as have specially been voted by Parliament. At the present time, owing to the absence from the Act of any compulsory provision, the incorporated districts of the Province comprise somewhat more than half of the population, but less than one hundredth of the total area. Successive Governments have recognised the evil, but have failed to pass a satisfactory Amending Act which would establish some form of local government in the unincorporated areas and compel them to pay a fixed portion of their local expenditure. The estimates for such expenditure are framed by the Public Works Department, and are based upon the reports of its resident engineers and of the agents of the Government Architect. The opportunity of the pushing rural member occurs upon the expenditure of the unappropriated sum of money which is left in the hands of the Minister, to meet requirements that cannot be foreseen; in this connection, members may threaten a withdrawal of their support and ministers may seek to win over new adherents. The reports of such actions are probably much exaggerated, as there are many who delight in vilifying the Assembly, but the popularity of a rural representative depends undeniably on the number of public works which the Government carry out in his district.

      The next important step was the appointment, early in 1895, of a Royal Commission to inquire into the Civil Service, which reported that the Act of 1884, under which a Civil Service Board of five persons had been constituted, had failed in its purpose, because the Board consisted usually of men who had other duties to perform and had not the power to fix the salaries or control the service, and because the right was reserved to ministers in special cases to make appointments without either examination or probation. The Commissioners found that, owing to the absence of any well-ordered system of classification, the grossest inequalities and anomalies existed in the salaries of offices attached to different departments or even to the same department, as, to take an extreme case, that, in the department of the Government Architect the official who designed the Crown Lands office and supervised its erection was receiving less remuneration than the principal messenger; and that, while the service contained many high-minded and able officials, there were cases where incompetency, neglect of duty, and even drunkenness had formed no bar to continued employment. In accordance with their recommendations, founded on the belief that Parliament could not directly cope with the matter, an Act was passed in 1895 which constituted a Public Service Board of three persons, to be appointed for a period of seven years in the same way, and with the same securities for independence, as the Railway Commissioners. The Board was charged with the duty of making a thorough investigation, which was periodically to be repeated, into the working of each department, and of fixing the number, grade, and salary of the officials. Future appointments and promotions were to be made by the Governor in Council, upon a certificate of the Board, subject to the regulations in regard to competitive examinations and an obligatory period of probation upon entrance into the service. As the Commission had reported that it should be possible to effect an annual saving of a quarter of a million, special importance attached to the provisions which enabled the Board to dispense with the services of those who could not usefully and profitably be employed, such persons to receive gratuities on a fixed scale upon their retirement. The Board were sitting during my stay in Sydney and had to suffer from the open hostility of those who had been affected by their decisions and from abusive correspondence in the press. Their impartiality was impugned, and they were charged with allowing themselves to be influenced by the wishes of Ministers; but when the unpleasant task of retrenchment has been completed, they will doubtless carry on a work of practical utility unhampered by criticisms and accusations.

      No serious attempt has yet been made to deal with the problem of the unemployed, which is the more urgent from the fact that the receipt of relief does not disfranchise the recipient. Its origin must be sought in the extensive Public Works policy of the past, which absorbed immigrants who would otherwise have settled on the land. In 1887 the majority of the great undertakings had been completed, and many thousand men, thus thrown out of employment, drifted into Sydney and led the Ministry to establish a casual labour Board, which was discontinued after a year, but spent £252,000 in the relief of destitution. In the following years