Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

and adversely affect both the habits of the people and the revenue of the State. Many of the articles which are now imported from Great Britain are indispensable for our comfort, and some of them for our existence. The people cannot do without them: the consequence must be, that, instead of being regularly imported, the articles will be smuggled into this country, and thereby the price not only becomes greatly enhanced to the consumer, but the duties are wholly lost to the Government.

      Hitherto, the revenue of the United States, arising from impost, has been collected with a degree of integrity and punctuality highly honorable and unexampled in the history of commercial nations. This successful collection of duties has not however been effected by the employment of swarms of revenue officers, spies, and informers, as in other countries; it has been infinitely more effectually secured, by an honorable pride of character, and that sentiment of affection which was naturally excited in the hearts of freemen towards the Government of their choice, and a Government under which, in the main, they have experienced much prosperity. But barriers of this description, like other high-toned sentiments of the mind, being once broken down, can with difficulty be restored, and the chance of materially impairing this, in reality, "cheap defence of nations," should, in my opinion, of itself, afford a sufficient reason for the rejection of all measures of doubtful policy.

      In a country nearly surrounded by, and everywhere intersected with navigable waters, encompassed by a frontier beyond the ability of ten Bonapartean armies to guard, and inhabited by a race of men unrivalled for hardihood and enterprise, and at present in a state of poverty, the temptation of great prices will be irresistible – for there is no truism in morals or philosophy better established than the commercial axiom, that demand will ultimately furnish a supply.

      There are, undoubtedly, periods in the history of a nation, in which a contest would be both honorable and indispensable, but it should ever be the result of great deliberation, and in an extended republic, perhaps, of necessity. That government is most wise and most patriotic, which so conducts the affairs of the nation over which it presides, as to produce the greatest ultimate good; and when a nation is attacked at the same time by two assailants, it is no reflection on its honor or its bravery, to select its opponent; and on principles of reciprocity, independently of those of interest, the first aggressor would undoubtedly be entitled to the first notice.

      Who then has been the first aggressor? I answer, France. The Berlin Decree is in a great measure the cause of our present difficulties. In justification of France in doing this, I know gentlemen resort to the convention between Russia and Great Britain in 1793, to prohibit a supply of grain to France; but this is by no means sufficient justification to France, even without referring to a decree to the same effect issued in May of the same year by France, while she was ignorant of the secret stipulation between Russia and Great Britain.

      For a long period, and among most of the maritime nations of Europe, the right of inhibiting a supply of provisions to an enemy, was tacitly acquiesced in, or expressly admitted. This practice existed even so long ago as the Mithridatic war, and has probably been followed up, without an interval at any one time of fifty years, from the commencement of the Christian era to the present day. This attempt, therefore, of Great Britain to injure France, formed no excuse for France to attempt to injure Great Britain by violating the commerce of the United States.

      On the 31st of December, 1806, the British Government formally notified the American Government, that Great Britain would consider an acquiescence in the Berlin Decree on the part of neutral nations, as giving to her (Great Britain) the right to retaliate in the same way against France.

      Had the American Government, at this period, manfully and explicitly made known its determination to support our rights at all hazards, I have no belief that our present difficulties would ever have existed.

      In May succeeding, advices were received of French privateers, under this decree, depredating upon American vessels in the West Indies; and during the same month the ship Horizon, in distress, was thrown by the act of God on the French coast, and was seized under the same authority.

      In November, 1807, the British, in conformity with their notice, issued their retaliating order. A prior Order in Council of January, 1807, had been issued, but this only affected vessels trading between different ports of France, or between ports of France and her allies; a trade always obnoxious to suspicion, and one which during war must ever be expected in a great degree to be restricted, and which is also interdicted by a standing law of the French Government, passed in 1778, and confirmed by the present Emperor.

      Then followed in succession, on the part of France, the Milan and Bayonne decrees. The last of which dooms an American vessel to condemnation from the exercise of a right universally acknowledged to belong to belligerents, and one which the neutral has no possibility of preventing, that of being spoken with by an enemy cruiser, which from her superior sailing there was no possibility of avoiding. In point of principle, this is the most outrageous violation of neutral rights ever known, and this, too, took place under the existence of a treaty made within a few years by the same person who issued these very decrees. While with Great Britain we have no treaty, and whose orders are expressly bottomed upon and limited in duration by the French decrees, and issued after having given twelve months' notice of her intention to oppose them in this way, and the Orders in Council are even as yet not co-extensive in principle with the French decrees.

      I have, in taking this brief view, confined myself exclusively to the decrees and orders of the two Governments, without adverting to other causes of complaint on either side. I consider myself as warranted in doing this, from the American Government having explicitly taken this ground, and made known that, on the removal of the decrees and orders, it would, on our part, remove the embargo, and restore the accustomed intercourse between the two countries.

      From this consideration of the subject, it irresistibly follows, that France was the first aggressor on us, in issuing her decrees – that in point of principle, they are much more outrageous violations of right than the British Orders in Council – that the latter originate from, and co-exist only with the former, and that France should of consequence be the first object of our vengeance.

      The effects of a war with one or the other nation, would be as distinctly perceptible. With France it would make no difference to us. For as long as she continues her decrees, commerce with her could not be prosecuted – no man would be mad enough while her coast is lined, and the ocean covered with British cruisers, to send his vessel to France, where she would meet with certain condemnation for being even seen and spoken with by a British frigate. With France, therefore, the actual difference arising from passing this bill, and declaring a non-intercourse, would be next to nothing.

      With Great Britain the effects would be reversed. No one now doubts her ability or disposition to carry her orders into effect, nor her preparation to extend the theatre of war. If we commenced war upon France, as she would be the common enemy of both nations, there is no doubt in my mind that our differences with Great Britain would be favorably settled, that the commerce of the world, excepting as it respects France and her allies, would be again open to us, and that a trade, which has hitherto employed nearly seventy millions of our capital, might be again accessible to the industry and enterprise of our citizens.

      Reverse this picture, admitting that you have a war with Great Britain, what will be its consequences? If your citizens are united, you can capture Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick; when you have effected this, what remains next to be done? You have reached the ne plus ultra of your ability. Thenceforward your ports are hermetically sealed. Privateering, from the convoy system adopted by Great Britain, could not be successfully prosecuted; no food for enterprise remains, and thus you would remain, five, ten, or fifteen years, as the case might be, until the wisdom and good sense of the nation predominated over its passion, when an accommodation would be made with Great Britain, following her example with regard to her West India conquests, restoring the captured provinces, enriched by American population and industry, and giving us perhaps a treaty still less favorable than the much execrated instrument of 1794, which, bad as it was said to be, has proved a cornucopia of wealth to our country, if it produced nothing less than a thirteen years' peace, and which, to my view, is vastly preferable to its abortive successor of the year eighteen hundred and six.

      The question was now taken on the passage of the