Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

well as to the character and interest of the American people.

      That the letter signed Francis James Jackson, headed "Circular," dated the 13th of November, 1809, and published and circulated through the country, is a still more direct and aggravated insult and affront to the American people and their Government, as it is evidently an insidious attempt to excite their resentments and distrusts against their own Government, by appealing to them, through false or fallacious disguises, against some of its acts; and to excite resentments and divisions amongst the people themselves, which can only be dishonorable to their own characters and ruinous to their own interests; and the Congress of the United States do hereby solemnly pledge themselves to the American people and to the world to stand by and support the Executive Government in its refusal to receive any further communications from the said Francis James Jackson, and to call into action the whole force of the nation if it should become necessary in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in this respect to repel such insults and to assert and maintain the rights, the honor, and the interests of the United States.

Privileges of Foreign Ministers

      Mr. Giles, from the same committee, also reported the following bill, which was read and passed to a second reading:

      A bill to prevent the abuse of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by Foreign Ministers within the United States.

      Be it enacted, &c., That if any foreign Ambassador, Minister, or other person, entitled to enjoy within the United States the privileges and immunities of a foreign Minister, shall have committed, or may hereafter commit, any such act as by the laws and usages of nations would justify the President of the United States in ordering such offending Ambassador, Minister, or other person as aforesaid, out of the District of Columbia, or out of the Territories of the United States; or in sending him home to his Sovereign, or to some place or territory within his Sovereign's jurisdiction; in every such case where the President of the United States shall deem it proper and expedient to exercise his constitutional authority, in either of these respects he shall be, and is hereby authorized and empowered to cause a warrant to be issued and signed by the Secretary of State, directed to any civil officer of the United States, authorized to serve process, or any military officer under the authority of the United States, commanding him to provide for and enforce the departure of such Ambassador, Minister, or other person offending as aforesaid, taking due precautions to avoid improper or unnecessary violence in executing such warrant. And all officers, civil and military, under the authority of the United States, are hereby required and enjoined to be obedient to such warrant. And in case any officer, civil or military, to whom such warrant shall be directed, shall fail, or unreasonably delay to execute the same, every officer so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be punished by fine and imprisonment before any court of the United States having cognizance of the offence. Provided, That the fine shall not exceed – dollars, nor the imprisonment be for a longer time than – years.

      Mr. Giles gave notice that he should call for the consideration of this subject on Thursday next.

      Friday, December 8

The British Minister

      The resolution reported by Mr. Giles, approving the conduct of the Executive in refusing to hold any further communication with Mr. Jackson, was taken up in the Senate as in Committee of the Whole. The resolution having been read,

      Mr. Giles rose, and spoke as follows:

      Mr. President: Before I proceed to perform the duties enjoined upon me as chairman of the committee who reported the resolution before you, permit me to express my regret that the consideration of a subject which justly excites so much sensibility should have been delayed, even only one day, on my account; and be assured, sir, that nothing less than an indisposition, sufficient to justify it, would have caused me to have been absent from my place yesterday. Perhaps, sir, I owe an apology to the Senate at this time for entering into this debate under a state of hoarseness, which must necessarily disqualify me, in some degree, from discharging my duty on the present occasion. But, sir, it is a subject of great consolation to me, to reflect that I am fortunately favored with associates on the committee, either of whom could perform the task I am now engaged in better than myself, and some of whom will certainly do me the favor of correcting any errors I may unintentionally commit, or supplying any omissions I may inadvertently make.

      Although it appears to me that the propriety and urgency of the resolution now under consideration must be strongly addressed, both to the judgment and sensibility of every gentleman who has carefully attended to the distribution of powers under our constitution, and who has also carefully attended to the correspondence which gave rise to the resolution, yet, in a case of so much delicacy, it would naturally be expected, and is a respect due to the Senate, from the chairman of the committee, to present to it at least some of the general motives which induced the committee to report the resolution at this time.

      It is to be observed, Mr. President, that our constitution is peculiar in the organization and distribution of its powers; and in no respect is it more peculiar than in the distribution of the particular powers embraced by the resolution. In all other Governments known to us, the same department which possesses the power to receive and negotiate with foreign Ambassadors and other public Ministers, also possesses the power to make war. It has been thought wise in our constitution to separate these powers. With a simplicity of language, and a solidity of wisdom almost peculiar to our constitution, the President is invested with the power to receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; thus using the broadest terms in granting this power, without even an attempt at limitation or specification; evidently with a view that all the incidental or consequential powers might flow from this general expression to the department thus invested with this general power. It was easy to foresee (and no doubt the framers of our constitution did foresee) that the multiplicity and diversity of cases which would arise in the course of various diplomatic manœuvres and negotiations, would set at defiance all attempts to limit or specify the powers of the department, in this respect, to which these powers were confided, and to be exercised on the part of the United States; and, therefore, every attempt of that kind was wisely avoided, leaving to the President to exercise his authority upon his own responsibility, to be regulated by the only established standard amongst nations, to wit: the laws and usages of nations. For, it never can be presumed, sir, that the wise sages who framed our excellent constitution could for a moment have tolerated the idea that the Ministers of foreign nations residing near the Government of the United States, should possess greater privileges and immunities than the Ministers of our Government residing near foreign Courts. Of course, the same laws – to wit, the laws and usages of nations – were left reciprocally to govern in every reciprocal case.

      But, sir, notwithstanding the President is invested with the power "to receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," and, as I think, all other incidental or consequential powers applicable to the various agencies with such Ambassadors and other public Ministers, yet Congress is invested with the power, without limitation or qualification, "to declare war." Now, sir, it must be obvious to every understanding, that these several powers are so intimately connected, and may be so dependent upon each other, that the exercise of the power conceded to the President may consequentially involve the necessity of the exercise of the power conceded to Congress, as in the case now under consideration. The refusal of the Executive to receive any further communications from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, (Mr. Jackson,) may consequentially involve us in war with Great Britain; or, in other words, may serve as a pretext for Great Britain to make war upon us, if she should conceive it her interest to do so, which I think not very improbable. Hence arises, in my judgment, the propriety and urgency of expression of the Congressional opinion upon this Executive act, and a declaration of the Congressional will as to the course of conduct Congress will pursue under any consequences which may flow from, or possibly be attributed to, this Executive act.

      I conceive, sir, that the expression of this opinion, and the pledge of a solemn declaration, by Congress, are due to the people, because the people have the greatest interest in the character of their Government; and in no part of its attributes have a deeper interest than in its efficacy to resist and impel injuries and insults from foreign Governments. The people, also, are the mediate or immediate electors of Congress, and as such have a right to expect and demand that Congress will execute all their