The Chancellors. Howard Davies

less than a quarter in 1997 to more than a third by 2010. There is room for doubt about whether holding a degree in media studies is a robust proxy for higher workplace skills, and vocational and further education have remained weak areas, but the additional investment in higher education has overall been positive.

      It is also likely that tax credits introduced in 2001 and 2003 helped to arrest the decline in Research and Development (R&D) expenditure, which had been a feature of the UK economy since the late 1970s, and there is a strong case for saying that the regulatory changes introduced under Labour, especially in telecommunications, had a positive impact.

There were, however, three negative features, which have become persistent and worrying. The first is that British management scores poorly in international comparisons, well below the US, Japan and Germany.⁴ There was a modest improvement in the later years but not enough to change the overall picture. Second, regional differences in GVA and productivity are greater than elsewhere. In Europe the UK is second only to Ireland in the degree of regional inequality. London is far more productive and wealthier than other cities, partly because of the City’s remarkable success in establishing and maintaining its position as the largest financial centre in Europe, even outside the Eurozone. London as a global city has grown apart from its hinterland in terms of growth, productivity and social and political attitudes. That growing inequality seems to have been a factor in the Brexit vote, and also in the 2019 election. Third, the performance of the public sector was weak. Measuring output and productivity in the public services is not straightforward, but Corry et al. conclude as follows: ‘UK output growth in the non-market sectors was greater in the Labour period than under the Conservatives, but labour productivity growth fell from 0.6% to zero … this is consistent with the story that the large increase in public services expenditures led to a fall in productivity in these sectors.’

      Nonetheless, the record of the first decade of Labour, with Brown as Chancellor, was quite strong. The economy was the fastest growing in the G7, with rising productivity, high inward investment (though investment was not high overall) and relatively low unemployment by international standards. Also, while the UK share of exports of goods continued to decline, its share of world services exports rose and remained second only to the US.

      The UK economy had grown consistently since the spring of 1992: there were 64 consecutive quarters of growth until the second quarter of 2009. That relentless expansion contributed to the psychology of optimism which lay behind the financial market excesses. The global financial crisis (GFC), which began in the summer of 2007, but hit the real economy hardest in 2009, brought this steady progress to a crashing halt.

      As we shall see in Chapter 7, Osborne mounted an argument, in opposition and then in government, to the effect that Labour was responsible for the crisis because of the change in regulatory structure introduced in 1997–8, and because of its encouragement of light-touch regulation. Given the global nature of the problems revealed, that does not seem plausible.

But there is a separate point: the crisis may have hit the UK economy harder, and led to more persistent weakness, because of the large increase in public spending after 2000. We discuss the public spending and taxation profile through the period in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. The particular argument here is that the government’s fiscal position was out of balance when the crisis hit. As Corry et al. put it: ‘In retrospect, it is clear that public debt levels were too high for the stage of the cycle in 2008 … [and] the debt position exacerbated the pain of recession.’ Nicholas Sowels argues that the pre-crisis deficits broke the government’s own fiscal rules, which ‘in turn prepared the way for a substantial deterioration in public finances when the crisis broke, a deterioration which may take years, if not decades, to set right’.⁵ By contrast, Jonathan Portes points out that the structural deficit was only around 1% of GDP.⁶ That jumped to 5% over the next two years, but the ‘poor state of the public finances was a consequence of the recession, not a cause of it’.

      Unsurprisingly, Gordon Brown and Ed Balls, then Chief Economic Adviser in the Treasury, reject the idea that they had left the UK in a vulnerable position. In his memoirs Brown asserts the contrary: ‘We entered the crisis with debt and deficits low by historical standards. There was no profligate pre-crisis spending spree.’⁷ But he acknowledges that there were different views in the official Treasury. Nick MacPherson, then Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, ‘considered everyone too soft on the deficit and debt’. From the perspective of 2021, the figures look almost insignificant, but their influence on policy was important, as we can see from the spending policies of the Coalition government.

      It is reasonable to conclude that, while all Western governments, central banks and regulators should shoulder a share of the responsibility for the imbalances and financial excesses that led to the GFC, the particular role of the spending and regulatory policies of the Labour government does not feature prominently in considered analyses of its causes.⁸ So the thirteen years of Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 were a relatively successful period for the British economy, during which its long catch-up phase, closing the GDP gap with comparators, continued at roughly the same pace as in the previous two decades.

The crisis was, however, extremely severe. The economy shrank by more than 6% between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, and took five years to recover fully. Unemployment, always a lagging indicator, rose from 5% to 8.4% by the end of 2011. The government’s deficit reached 7% of GDP in 2009 and was still 5% in 2010. Real incomes fell sharply in 2009 and did not begin to rise sustainably until 2015. With household, business and financial debt at 420% of GDP, the UK was the most highly indebted developed country in the world.

2010–16: The austerity years

      That was the difficult background against which the Coalition government was formed in May 2010. George Osborne, who had been Shadow Chancellor since David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, was the inevitable choice for 11 Downing Street. The complex negotiations over the leading positions in government led to the appointment of Liberal Democrat MP David Laws as Chief Secretary to the Treasury (CST), soon replaced by Danny Alexander, making him an unusually powerful holder of that post, as one of the ‘Quad’ of key decision-makers in the government.

      The economy had, in fact, begun to recover in the first quarter of 2010, though that was barely perceptible to the electorate while unemployment continued to rise, as it did for another year or more. Although the recovery was steady, without a second recession, triggered in other parts of Europe by the Eurozone crisis, there was no post-recession boom as had typically been seen after earlier downturns. The economy returned to growth, but on a lower trajectory than before. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) estimated that in the summer of 2018 GDP was 11% higher than it had been at the pre-crisis peak in 2007–08, so the economy was 16% smaller and GDP per head was £6,000 lower than they would have been had growth remained on its pre-crisis trend.⁹

Surprisingly, employment growth remained strong, and there were 2.7 million more people in work in 2018 than a decade before. So average household incomes were higher than in 2008, and household income inequality had fallen a little. But the worst news was that productivity per hour grew by a mere 0.3% a year compared to a long-term trend of 2% a year. Output per hour worked was 18% below the average for the G7, and the current account deficit in 2015 was at a record high of 5.2%. The IFS summary stated:

      The UK economy has broken record after record, and not generally in a good way: record low earnings growth, record public borrowing followed by record cuts in public spending. On the upside employment levels are remarkably high and, in spite of how it may feel, the gap between rich and poor has actually narrowed somewhat, but the gap between old and young has grown and grown.¹⁰

      That may seem to be a definitively negative verdict on the Coalition government’s performance. But through an international lens the position looks rather different. The immediate recession hit to the UK economy