Название | Civl society |
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Автор произведения | Группа авторов |
Жанр | Зарубежная публицистика |
Серия | |
Издательство | Зарубежная публицистика |
Год выпуска | 0 |
isbn | 9783950493931 |
Following in the footsteps of Henry Sumner Maine, the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies made observations on – and divided apart – these two levels in a broader sociological form from the perspective of the period in his publication Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), which was published in 1887. He distinguishes the community will (if people are in favour of life within the community of the village, in a sports club, or in religion) from the social will (if people approve of taking part in public life, in forms of political involvement, or participation in a stock corporation). According to Ferdinand Tönnies, the difference between community and society lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the community is self-sufficient and can be chosen freely, while on the other hand, society is viewed as an individually applicable instrument that people can make use of or not.
To summarise: No matter to which politico-sociological extent and regardless of all kinds of side effects (even if they are positive), individuality as well as independence have contributed to man, in the course of his individual and varied striving for life, liberty, and happiness, being able to participate in social forms of coexistence, and actively help to shape the political society – or not, if he so chooses. In keeping with one’s own subjective judgement on the one hand and to the extent allowed by the laws of the land on the other, today people are – in principle – free to participate politically or lead a completely apolitical life, in the narrower sense, in our modern understanding and reject political participation in light of their own lifestyle. A fact that in ancient times – once again with the focus on the theory and practice of the classical Greek period – was neither accepted anthropologically nor in the politics of the community.23
4. On the topicality of also thinking of the “civil society” as a “community of citizens”
On no account should the comparison between the ancient community of citizens and modern civil society be overused, especially since there are socio-political and scientific developments between these two perspectives that can hardly be portrayed in a single overview – if at all. But still – first and foremost – the currently acute global COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that, on the one hand, the modern civil societies are possibly more like civic communities than the historical, sociological, and philosophical developments would lead us to expect and, on the other, the individual, independent citizens living in a society – and therefore left to their own judgement as to the extent of their political participation – would like to believe. This is compounded in this time of crisis by the fact that rationalisation, globalisation, and cosmopolitanism have, in no way, made the life of the people and their subjective lifestyles any easier.
Through the rationalisation processes in all areas of life and relationships, globalisation was, and continues to be, an additional thoroughly rational result and that with all its positive and negative consequences. Today, the economy, politics, and science take place in an increasingly global context. And, according to the sociologist Ulrich Beck, this leads to the necessity to alter the perspective from which society (or societies) is observed. Ulrich Beck believes that global problems – such as the pandemic that has had a worldwide impact – can only be solved in a global context.24 Ecological, economic, healthcare, and political crises have long not only had an impact on the country, region, or continent hit by them.
On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic shows just how fragile modern societies are in many parts of the world. Ulrich Beck also serves as an interesting point of reference in this case as, faced with the global developments, he spoke about risk societies as early as 1986. Characteristic for these risk societies is that they can easily tip from one extreme to the other due to modernisation and mechanisation – in short, research and development. On the other hand, it can be observed that modern societies are still dependent on a basic level of participation on the part of the citizens – in this current, acute crisis, by paying attention to the health-related development in one’s own country and possibly even beyond its borders, supporting any measures necessary to contain the pandemic, or reducing some personal habits one has become fond of – and which have usually developed out of a certain level of independence – for a certain period of time. All of this makes it apparent that – despite the many developments that have taken place – the civil society, at its core, also means a society of citizens. It would only take the actions of a few people to not only upset the hoped-for effects in the health, economic, and political areas, but – going even further – counteract them.
It can be concluded that, although the developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society were clearly accomplished through individualisation and independence, and by following the path towards the open societies of modern democracies, the community of citizens is still in existence – or must be. This can be recognised more clearly in times of crisis than in other periods. Evidence of this was provided in the speech given to the Austrian people at the beginning of November by the Federal President Alexander van der Bellen in connection with the regulations on the second corona lockdown in Austria. In his six-minute address, he appealed to “the community” six times and did not speak to or about “the society” even once.25
5. Community policy empathy as a civil right and obligation
And now it is necessary – in a final step – to use five points to compare ancient times with the present; however, all of the aforementioned limitations of the comparison must be taken into consideration.
(i) Ancient political theory, as well as large areas of political practice in the classical period, were already aware of the crucial necessity of the political participation of the citizen in the community, in the sense – and for the benefit – of the whole political body (also for the all sections of the polis), and demanded that this be fulfilled. However, this participation was not only considered a political, but also a moral obligation. Nevertheless, the wellbeing of the political community of the citizens of the polis was mostly given priority over that of the individual. Individuality, as well as independence in the modern sense of the word, was not in demand to this extent.
(ii) The developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society is connected with many significant and constitutive achievements, especially in Europe. They will not be questioned or criticised here – but they include, as mentioned previously, most notably the individuality and independence of the specific person in his life in society. In a subsequent step, this contributed to separating the community and society more clearly from each other than before. In this separation, political participation was transferred to the social area and removed even further from the immediate individual and independent way of life (of course, this did not happen everywhere).
(iii) However, the two aspects mentioned above should not lead to the assumption that the modern civil society does not still preserve a kind of community of citizens at its core. As just shown, how much the human being is a “community creature”, and not merely a social, individualised person in an environment that is completely free of politics, becomes crystal clear, especially in times of crisis. As Aristotle determined: The human being is dependent on his fellow man for his mere survival, on the one hand, and for a good and successful life, on the other. This forms the cornerstone for understanding the human (political) community. And, this perspective is still valid.
(iv) Seen from this politico-philosophical perspective of the human being as an individual, independent “community creature”, it can be further deduced that one cannot be completely indifferent to the life of the other – especially in one’s own state. The foundation of this non-indifference can be expressed with the necessity for a minimum of community political empathy. In the modern understanding of the political, ethics and politics are not as far away from each other as they might seem at first glance when observing