Phenomenology. Anthony Chemero

directly responding to them in his “The reflex arc concept in psychology” (1896). Dewey describes the structuralist view of simple reactions as a “reflex arc.” (It is an arc because it begins in the body, ascends to the mind, and returns to the body.) He argues that the structuralist understanding of the reflex arc commits “the empiricist fallacy,” the assumption that the parts of something are prior to the whole. The empiricist fallacy, in other words, is nothing other than the Wundtian and structuralist claim that whole mental acts, like the reflex arc, are molecules composed of more elementary atomic sensations and feelings. In rejecting this, Dewey argues that all actions, from simple reactions to the most complex intelligent behavior, are organic circuits that cannot be understood by breaking them into parts. Out of context, a part of an action is devoid of meaning of any kind, a “series of jerks.” Furthermore, the division of a simple reflex into parts can only be done after the fact. Something can only be identified as a stimulus after one identifies the response. In other words, in an organic circuit, what the response is determines the nature of the stimulus. That is, a visual stimulus never results in mere seeing; rather it leads to seeing-in-order-to-grasp or seeing-in-order-to-identify or seeing-in-order-to-touch. So, the Wundtian and structuralist idea that different simple reactions are composed of the same parts, mixed and matched, is fallacious. This view is an important precursor of James Gibson’s ecological psychology (Chapter 10)

      The back-and-forth between structuralists and functionalists did not end with a decisive victory, but simply fizzled out. Most American psychologists of the first ten years of the twentieth century considered themselves functionalists. In Europe, and especially Germany, functionalism found essentially no footing. The debate was effectively ended by the rise of behaviorism, a version of psychology that led the discipline into closer alliance with the natural sciences, and away from the humanities permanently.

Key terms

      feelings – in Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology, the irreducible, affective elements of experience. Feelings are atoms from which experiences are built.

      functionalism – an early twentieth-century psychological movement, inspired by the work of William James. Functionalists studied the mind, emotions, habits, and so on as temporary adaptations to the environment.

      inner experiences – in Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology, complex thoughts, emotions, and attitudes. Inner experience is inaccessible by scientific psychology.

      outer experiences – in Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology, simple sensations and feelings. Outer experience can be studied scientifically using the methods of psychophysics.

      sensations – in Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology, the irreducible, qualitative elements of experience. Sensations are atoms from which experiences are built.

      structuralism – an early twentieth-century psychological movement, inspired by the work of Wilhelm Wundt. Structuralists study the mind by identifying the elements of conscious experience.

Further reading

      Many of the works discussed in this chapter are available online at the Psych Classics website, ed. C. Green. http://psychclassics.yorku.ca

      James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Boston: Henry Holt. – (1904). “Does consciousness exist?” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1: 477–91.

Wundt, W. M. (1874/1902/1904). Principles of Physiological Psychology, trans. E. B. Titchener from the 5th German edn., published 1902. (Original German edn. published 1874.)