Autonomy. Beate Roessler

perhaps with respect to the discovery of existentially important false beliefs. At least, the disappearance of false beliefs is necessary in the sense that consistency of beliefs is necessary for our rationality. (I cannot simultaneously believe both p and not-p, but I can, pace Williams, rail against the fact that not-p is true.)

      31 31 Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 177‒8.

      32 32 Cf. Wollheim, The Thread of Life, 184. On the concept of the rationality of desires, cf. Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 206.

      33 33 Cf. Lear, Freud, 49f. On “high-minded purism,” see Rorty, “A Plea for Ambivalence,” 427, including her suggestions for possible necessary modifications and additions.

      34 34 Richard Ford, The Lay of the Land (New York: Vintage, 2006), 3‒5.

      35 35 Ibid., 3.

      36 36 Cf. Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” 59.

      37 37 Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” 14.

      38 38 Rorty, “A Plea for Ambivalence,” 427.

      39 39 Cf. Benson, “Taking Ownership.”

      40 40 María Lugones, “Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sara Hoagland’s Lesbian Ethics,” Hypatia 5(3) (1990): 138‒46. Cf. Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” 239.

      41 41 Siri Hustvedt, The Blazing World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 1.

      42 42 Ibid., 208, my emphasis.

      43 43 Cf. ibid., 34 and 2. The three “maskings” are named The History of Western Art (behind the mask of Tish), The Suffocation Rooms (behind the mask of Eldridge), and Beneath (behind the mask of Rune).

      44 44 Ibid., 196. See also: “The point was to ‘bend the categories’” (ibid., 118).

      45 45 Skepticism generally can relate to the persuasiveness of reasons, including in situations in which there are no conflicts or ambivalences to speak of. However, it requires a different ethical and epistemological analysis than the question of how to deal with ambivalences.