A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

      Having considered the nature of human free actions, and the rule according to which they ought to be regulated; the next thing to be considered, is the application of this rule to free actions. The application of a law to a fact is called imputation, and therefore we shall in this chapter treat of it.

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      Imputation is made by comparing a law with a fact; and therefore by reasoning.

      Imputation being the application of a law to a fact (§95), which cannot be done otherwise than by comparing a law and a fact, i.e. by two propositions compared together, and with a third by a syllogism; the consequence is, that imputation is a syllogism or reasoning, the major proposition of which signifies a law; the minor a certain action: and the conclusion is the sentence, with regard to the agreement or disagreement of the action with the law.^*<66>

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      Wherein it differs from conscience.

      Having said much the same thing above concerning conscience (§94), which however is not the same with imputation, let us observe wherein the difference between them consists; and it lies in this: Whereas conscience is a reasoning about the justice and injustice of one’s own actions: imputation is a reasoning about the agreement or disagreement with law of another’s actions. In the first case, every one is his own judge: in the other, another person judges of our actions, and compares them with the law.^* <67>

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      An action is imputed either by God or by human judges.

      Every application of law to fact is called imputation (§9), whether an action be compared with the divine law or with a human law; and in like manner, whether God himself, or men, whose office it is, apply law to a fact. The former, however, moralists are accustomed to call imputation in foro divino; the latter in foro humano. But there is this very considerable difference between the two, that in the latter none suffers punishment for thoughts, l. 18. D. de poenis; but God being omniscient, and requiring internal obedience (§91), he justly imputes to us even thoughts which are disagreeable to his law.^* <68>

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      And then man is declared to have merited either punishment or reward.

      Further, whereas the law which is applied to human actions is enforced by a sanction (§64), hence it follows, that to impute is the same as to declare, that the effect which a certain law assigns to an action, agrees to such a particular action. This effect is called in general merit; punishment, if the effect of an action exhibited by the law be evil; and reward, if the effect be good.^*

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      The definition of imputation and axioms relative to it.

      Imputation therefore is a reasoning by which an action of another person, being, in all its circumstances, compared with a law, whether divine or human, is declared to merit, or not merit a certain effect proposed by a law. From which definition it is manifest, that we cannot certainly pronounce whether an action be imputable or not, unless we have a distinct comprehension both of the law and of the action in all its circumstances: and that one circumstance often alters the whole state of the case.

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      It supposes the knowledge and interpretation of the law.

      Since the law must be known to him who would form a right judgment of the imputability of actions, the consequence is, that he ought to be sure there is a certain law, and ought rightly to under-<69>stand the whole of that law, and therefore to interpret it rightly, if it be conceived in concise or obscure terms; i.e. he ought distinctly to comprehend the mind of the law-giver declared by words, or by whatever other signs.^†

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      Its foundation.

      Seeing an interpreter represents distinctly the law-giver’s meaning, declared by words or other signs; it follows, that in interpreting laws, great attention must be given both to the proper and the metaphorical signification of words; to their connection with what precedes and what follows, and to the nature and character of the subject itself; and yet more especially to the scope and intention of the law-giver, which induced him to enact the law; wherefore they judge well, and we agree with them who assert the reason of the law to be its spirit or soul. See our preface ad Elem. Pandect.^*1<70>

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      Its various sorts.

      Further, since the reason of a law is as it were its soul, hence it must follow, that the law ceases when the sole reason of it wholly and absolutely ceases: that if it do not agree to a certain case, that case cannot fall under the law on account of the very reason of the law; and this is the foundation of what is called restrictive interpretation; to which may be rightly referred equity, i.e. a power of correcting the law in respect of universality: Grot. de Aequit. indulg. & facilit. c. 1. n. 3.² 2 that if the words of a law do not quadrate with a certain case, and yet the reason of the law be applicable to it, then there is place for what is called extensive interpretation: Finally, that when the words and reason of the law keep as it were pace together, then there is only room for declarative interpretation.^*<71>

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      The difference between authentic, customary, and doctrinal interpretation.

      Besides, because the law is interpreted either by the legislator or judge, or some other, to whose office it belongs to apply the law to facts, or by a lawyer, interpretation on these accounts is therefore called authentic, customary, or doctrinal; the foundation of the first is the will of the legislator; of the second, practice in courts of justice; and of the last, the application of the rules of interpretation abovementioned.^†

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      An action is imputed to its author or cause.

      Because he who would interpret a law aright, ought to know all the circumstances of the fact, (§108), and the principal circumstance is the person acting; hence we conclude, that an action is to be imputed to him who is the author or cause of it; and, on the contrary, imputation ceases if any thing be done, of which the doer is neither the cause nor the author, tho’ we sometimes impute the merits of one to others; which imputation is commonly called imputation by favour, in contradistinction to that which is of debt or merit, strictly so called. Puffend. de jur. nat. & gent. 1. 9. 2.^*<72>

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      What actions are not imputable.

      If therefore an action be imputed to none, unless he be the cause or author of it (§105); but a person cannot be called the author of any action which is not human; i.e. which is not done by the will, under the direction of the understanding (§30); hence it is obvious, that neither passions, nor natural actions, nor events wholly providential, nor things done in a fit of madness, nor natural imperfections either of body or mind, nor things done in sleep or drunkenness can be imputed to any person, but so far as it depended upon the agent to prevent them (§26, 29, 49).^†<73>

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      Whether actions done thro’ ignorance or error be imputable.

      As for what relates to ignorance and error, since both these imperfections of the understanding are either culpable or inculpable (§48, 49), vincible or invincible, voluntary or unvoluntary (§50), it follows from the same principles, that inculpable, invincible, involuntary ignorance cannot justly be imputed to a person; but that an action done thro’ culpable, vincible, and voluntary ignorance is justly imputable: and the same holds with regard to error: much less can ignorance or error be any excuse to one, if the action itself be unlawful, or be done in an unlawful place, time, or manner; because, in such cases, it not only was in the agent’s power not to be ignorant or not to err, but he was absolutely obliged to omit the action.^*<74>

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