The World as Will and Idea: Complete One Volume Edition. Arthur Schopenhauer

XXXII. ON MADNESS.

       CHAPTER XXXIII. ISOLATED REMARKS ON NATURAL BEAUTY.

       CHAPTER XXXIV. ON THE INNER NATURE OF ART.

       CHAPTER XXXV. ON THE ÆSTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE.

       CHAPTER XXXVI. ISOLATED REMARKS ON THE ÆSTHETICS OF THE PLASTIC AND PICTORIAL ARTS.

       CHAPTER XXXVII. ON THE ÆSTHETICS OF POETRY.

       CHAPTER XXXVIII. ON HISTORY.

       CHAPTER XXXIX. ON THE METAPHYSICS OF MUSIC.

       SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FOURTH BOOK.

       CHAPTER XL. PREFACE.

       CHAPTER XLI. ON DEATH AND ITS RELATION TO THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE NATURE.

       CHAPTER XLII. THE LIFE OF THE SPECIES.

       CHAPTER XLIII. ON HEREDITY.

       CHAPTER XLIV. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE LOVE OF THE SEXES.

       CHAPTER XLV. ON THE ASSERTION OF THE WILL TO LIVE.

       CHAPTER XLVI. ON THE VANITY AND SUFFERING OF LIFE.

       CHAPTER XLVII. ON ETHICS.

       CHAPTER XLVIII. ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE DENIAL OF THE WILL TO LIVE.

       CHAPTER XLIX. THE WAY OF SALVATION.

       CHAPTER L. EPIPHILOSOPHY.

       APPENDIX.

      TRANSLATORS’ PREFACE.

      The style of “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung” is sometimes loose and involved, as is so often the case in German philosophical treatises. The translation of the book has consequently been a matter of no little difficulty. It was found that extensive alteration of the long and occasionally involved sentences, however likely to prove conducive to a satisfactory English style, tended not only to obliterate the form of the original but even to imperil the meaning. Where a choice has had to be made, the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauer’s ipsissima verba has accordingly been preferred to that of inaccuracy. The result is a piece of work which leaves much to be desired, but which has yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as the letter of the original.

      As regards the rendering of the technical terms about which there has been so much controversy, the equivalents used have only been adopted after careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For example, “Vorstellung” has been rendered by “idea,” in preference to “representation,” which is neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant. “Idee,” is translated by the same word, but spelled with a capital,—“Idea.” Again, “Anschauung” has been rendered according to the context, either by “perception” simply, or by “intuition or perception.”

      Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text, the book is probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from the treatise “On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” It has, however, been considered desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an appendix to the third volume of this translation.

      R. B. H.

      J. K.

      PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

      I propose to point out here how this book must be read in order to be thoroughly understood. By means of it I only intend to impart a single thought. Yet, notwithstanding all my endeavours, I could find no shorter way of imparting it than this whole book. I hold this thought to be that which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy, and the discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are familiar with history as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher’s stone, although it was already said by Pliny: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur? (Hist. nat. 7, 1.)

      According as we consider the different aspects of this one thought which I am about to impart, it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics, that which we call ethics, and that which we call æsthetics; and certainly it must be all this if it is what I have already acknowledged I take it to be.

      A system of thought must always have an architectonic connection or coherence, that is, a connection in which one part always supports the other, though the latter does not support the former, in which ultimately the foundation supports all the rest without being supported by it, and the apex is supported without supporting. On the other hand, a single thought, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity. If it admits of being broken up into parts to facilitate its communication, the connection of these parts must yet be organic, i.e., it must be a connection in which every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by it, a connection in which there is no first and no last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness through every part, and even the smallest part cannot be completely understood unless the whole has already been grasped. A book, however, must always have a first and a last line, and in this respect will always remain very unlike an organism, however like one its content may be: thus form and matter are here in contradiction.

      It is self-evident that under these circumstances no other advice can be given as to how one may enter into the thought explained in this work than to read the book twice, and the first time with great patience, a patience which is only to be derived from the belief, voluntarily accorded, that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and that all the earlier parts presuppose the later almost as much as the later presuppose the earlier. I say “almost;” for this is by no means absolutely the case, and I have honestly and conscientiously done all that was possible to give priority to that which stands least in need of explanation from what follows, as indeed generally to everything that can help to make the thought as easy to comprehend and as distinct as possible. This might indeed to a certain extent be achieved if it were not that the reader, as is very natural, thinks, as he reads, not merely of what is actually said, but also of its possible consequences, and thus besides the many contradictions actually given of the opinions of the time, and presumably of the reader, there may be added as many more which are anticipated and imaginary. That, then, which is really only misunderstanding, must take the form of active disapproval, and it is all the more difficult to recognise that it is misunderstanding, because although the laboriously-attained clearness of the explanation and distinctness of the expression never leaves the immediate sense of what is said doubtful, it cannot at the same time express