Liberty in Mexico. Группа авторов

of things. As the intellectual faculty of man does not have a precise and exact measure of the vitality with which it carries out its operations, neither does it have a measure of the amount of knowledge it needs for exercising them. To expect, then, that the majority be convinced by the judgment of some other person, even when this other person might be an authority, is to insist, says the famous Spedalieri, that they see and hear through another’s eyes and ears. It is to oblige them to let themselves be carried blindly and with no more rationale than the force they cannot resist. It is, to put it succinctly, to dry up all the sources of public enlightenment and to destroy beforehand and radically the best sources they might have been able to develop over the course of time.

      In effect, what would become of us and of the entire human race if the wishes of those who have wanted to place restraints on the understanding and limits on freedom of thought had been fulfilled? What would have been the progress of the arts and sciences, the improvements of governments, and the condition of men in the state of society? What, in particular, would be the fate of our nation? Thanks to the efforts of the extraordinary creative spirits that at all times have known how to throw off the chains that despots have sought to impose on thought, societies, although not having arrived at the highest level of perfection, have made considerable progress. Governments, excluding only a few that are called free, have always been alert to anything that could diminish their power and make clear their excesses. Therefore, they use every means to put thought in chains, making crimes of opinions that do not conform and calling those who profess them criminals. But have

      [print edition page 27]

      they had the right to do so? Have they proceeded legally when they have made use of these means? Or, rather, have they trod upon the sacred rights of man, assuming powers that no one could give them or that they could receive? This is the point we are going to examine.

      Governments have been established precisely to preserve public order, ensuring to each individual the exercise of his rights and the possession of his goods in the way and form that have been prescribed by the laws, and not in any other manner. Their powers are necessarily determined in the pacts or agreements we call constitutional charters and are the result of the national will. Those who draw them up, and their constituents, cannot make provisions in them that, by the nature of things, are beyond their powers, such as the condemnation of an innocent person; making crimes of such truly praiseworthy acts as paternal love; much less subjecting to laws functions that by nature are incapable of morality, such as the circulation of the blood, the movement of the lungs, etc. From this, it follows that for a legislative, executive, or judicial measure to be just, legal, and equitable, it is not enough that it be pronounced by the competent authority, but it is also necessary that it be intrinsically possible and indispensable for preserving public order. Let us see, then, whether those measures that have been decreed or attempted against freedom of thought are of this type.

      To this point we have shown that opinions are not free and consequently are not capable of morality; it remains only to show that they can never overthrow the public order, and especially not in the representative system. In effect, public order maintains itself by the prompt and faithful observance of the laws, which is entirely compatible with total and absolute freedom of opinions. Nothing is more common than seeing men who dislike laws and whose ideas are contrary to them, but who at the same time not only observe them religiously but are personally convinced of their necessity. To say this law is bad, it has this or that problem, is not to say that it will not be obeyed or carried out. The first is an opinion, the second is an action; the former is independent of all human power, the latter must be subject to the competent authority. Men have the right to mandate that something be done in this or that way, but not in order to make doctrines into dogmas, or to obligate others to their belief. This absurd right would suppose the necessity of a symbol or body of doctrine comprehensive of all truths, or the existence of an infallible authority by whose decisions one would have

      [print edition page 28]

      to abide. Nevertheless, nothing is more lacking in foundation than such suppositions.

      But how could the first have been formed, or who would be so presumptuous and audacious that he would dare to appropriate the second to himself? “A body of doctrine,” says the famous Daunou,¹ “supposes that human understanding has made all possible progress, opposes itself to all advancements that remain, draws a circle around all acquired understandings, inevitably includes many errors, opposes the development of the sciences, the arts, and all type of industry.” And who would be capable of having formed it? Even if, for such an unattainable project, the most celebrated men of the universe had been gathered together, nothing would have been achieved. Should their writings be recorded anyway, they will be found full of errors in the midst of some truths they have contributed to public enlightenment. The daily and continuing improvement perceived in all human actions is demonstrable proof that the perfectibility of human mental powers has no limit and of how much would have been lost in holding back their advancement, had this been possible.

      We are persuaded that none of the present governments will boast of their inability to err. They and the people entrusted to their leadership are too enlightened to be able to claim and grant such privileges, but if the governments are composed of men who are as fallible as others, through what principle of justice, or by what legal right, will they proceed to determine or prohibit doctrines? How would they dare determine for us those opinions we are to follow and those we are prohibited from professing? Is this not an act of aggression with an unattainable end, which nothing can justify? Without doubt. It, nonetheless, is common and almost always serves as a pretext for classifying citizens and immediately persecuting them. It makes men responsible for the opinions they hold or assume, and these are converted into a reason for hatred and loathing. In this way factions are perpetuated, given that the triumphant dogma will one day be toppled, and it then comes to be a crime to profess it. This is how nations become demoralized, and a forced traffic

      [print edition page 29]

      in lies is established that compels the weak to conceal their ideas and makes those with strong spirits the targets of persecution.

      Come, now, will it be lawful to express all opinions? Does not the authority have the right to prohibit the enunciation of some? Will many of them, inevitably mistaken, not be detrimental? Yes, but we assert resolutely that opinions about doctrines must be entirely free. No one doubts that the surest means, or, better said, the only means, to arrive at knowledge of the truth is examination that produces free discussion. Then not only one’s own reflections are present but also those of others, and it has happened a thousand times that, upon criticism and perhaps error or someone’s irrelevant observation, the fate of a nation has depended. No understanding, no matter how vast and universal one supposes it to be, can embrace everything or exhaust any subject matter. From this it follows that everyone, in all subject matters, especially those that treat of government, needs the help of everyone else, which they will certainly not obtain if freedom of speech and written expression is not assured, sheltering the opinions and their authors from all aggression that could be attempted against them by those who do not accept these opinions. The government, then, cannot proscribe or grant protection for any doctrine. This is beyond its jurisdiction; it is created only to observe and see that citizens observe the laws.

      It is true that, among opinions, there are and must be many erroneous ones; it is equally true that all error, of whatever kind and under whatever aspect it is considered, is highly harmful. But it is not less true that prohibitions are not means of remedying error. The free circulation of ideas and the differences that result from counterviews constitute the only way to correct opinions. If the power to regulate opinions were conceded to some authority, this latter would very quickly abuse such power, and who would be charged with restraining us from error? He who is exempt from it? But governments do not find themselves in this category; very much the opposite. When one searches for causes that have most spread error and contributed to perpetuating error, they are always found in the prohibiting institutions. On the other hand, if governments were authorized to prohibit all errors and punish the foolish, the world would very soon be missing a large portion of humanity, the rest being reduced to eternal silence. We will be told that not all opinions have to be subject to the control of authority, but if one opinion is

      [print