The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

      But such a state of things, or such power, supposes general laws to take place with regard to us; or fixed connexions of things. For how otherwise could evils be avoided or goods be procured?

      It is fit to enquire a little more particularly into our sphere of activity, and the laws relating to it.

      First general law. Intelligent power, depends upon knowledge and encreases with it—in the natural—and in the moral world.

      It is because the acquisition of knowledge depends on us, that we have power, or can acquire and augment it.

      Wherefore if knowledge be progressive, intelligent power must likewise be progressive.

      But knowledge cannot but be progressive—whether knowledge by induction from experience—or scientifick, abstract knowledge.

      Knowledge must likewise depend upon our situations for taking in ideas or views.

      But men must be placed in various situations, and therefore they must have various views with respect to the sensible world.

      And with respect to the moral world.

      Knowledge must depend on application to acquire it.

      It must likewise depend upon differences with respect to natural abilities.

      But different abilities are necessary for many reasons.

      Progress in knowledge must depend on social assistances. This likewise is necessary for various reasons.

      These are the most remarkable circumstances or general laws relating to progress in knowledge, and consequently to intelligent power. And all these laws are very fitly established.

      Yet there are several instances of the care and concern of nature about mankind with regard to knowledge, very consistent with these laws of progress.

      Several instances are mentioned.

      But as considerable as these circumstances are, they amount but to a very small share of what nature hath done for us, in order to qualify us for progress in knowledge.

      We have an appetite after knowledge, and progress in it is rewarded by itself, every step our application advances.

      New and uncommon objects wonderfully attract our attention.

      The excellent final cause of this.

      Yet this itch of novelty is for good reasons checked or ballanced by the power of habit or usage over us.

      The mind is exceedingly delighted with comparing ideas, and tracing agreements and differences.

      It is particularly pleased with beautiful objects, or such objects as are regular and have unity of design.

      Thus we are naturally led to enquire after analogies, harmonies and general laws. Nature is beautiful, because nature works always consonant to itself, and by a few simple general laws.

      We have likewise implanted in us by nature a sense of moral beauty; and thus we are naturally led to enquire after the utility, or the good final cause of laws and their operations.

      We are likewise considerably assisted and directed in our researches after knowledge, by the natural delight of our mind in great objects.

      But let us consider a little our faculties, by which we acquire, or lay up and retain knowledge, and have social correspondence.

      The imagination is a most useful power—by it we have memory—it renders us capable of many delightful imitative arts—which is more, it renders us capable of social commerce by discourse—we could not have mutual commerce by discourse about moral objects, were not the moral world analogous to the sensible; so that moral ideas may be pictured to us under sensible images—The right method of teaching any language, would at the same time teach us this beautiful and exceeding useful analogy.

      Moreover, it is by our fancy that our passionate part is touched: truths cannot find their way to the heart but thro’ the imagination.

      We are so constituted for very good and wise reasons.

      Imagination is not an ingovernable faculty, as is commonly imagined— but it is much neglected in education.

      The other faculty of our minds that remains to be considered is invention.

      A history of this faculty, and of the phenomena belonging to it is much wanted—Mean time, it is obvious, that invention is the faculty of finding out truths quickly, by ranging or disposing ideas in proper juxta-positions for discovering their relations—Every new juxta-position of ideas discovers some unknown truth—New truths cannot be any other way discovered—It is therefore by exercise that invention is improved.

      In the last place, it becomes easier to make progress in knowledge, in proportion as we make advances in it: and by the help of that science, whose object is science and evidence, properly called the art of reasoning, much neglected since Plato’s time, tho’ clearly delineated and strongly recommended by the great Verulam.

      General conclusion concerning our furniture for knowledge; it is very large and noble.

CHAPTER II.

      A second class of laws, those relative to our embodied state, and our connexion with a material world by means of our bodies.

      Communication with the material world necessarily supposes dependence on its laws—And natural philosophers have proved these laws to be good.

      A material world without being perceived could be of no use.

      Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full nor coherent.

      And by our commerce with the material world, we receive a great many pleasures of the sensitive kind, which well deserve their place.

      Our senses are admirably adjusted to one another, and to our whole frame.

      But this is not all; our senses are instruments or means, by which we are capable of many noble sciences and arts,—of natural philosophy.

      And of many ingenious imitative arts.

      Nor is this all; they are the means, or afford the subjects and occasions of many virtuous exercises,—of many social virtues—And which is principal, they afford our reason and moral conscience subjects to govern and keep in due order—And thus we have a noble dominion to acquire.

      But this supposes a moral sense in our mind, which shall be considered in another chapter.

      Sensible pains, whence they arise—The law with regard to them is shewn to be good.

      Pains are proper and useful monitors.

      The only proper ones for us—Nay, we can have no other consistently with the laws relative to knowledge.

      But from the necessity there is that bodily appetites should be attended with uneasy sensations arises the necessity of all the other uneasy sensations accompanying our desires, which are called passions.

      The law of matter makes an infant state of body necessary—And the law of progressive knowledge and power or perfection, makes infant minds necessary—And such bodies and minds are proper mates.

      There is a great variety among mankind in respect of mental powers—And this very considerably depends on physical causes,—as is generally owned— It is well worth while to enquire more fully into this phenomenon than hath been yet done.

      Mean time, it is evident, that such a dependence is involved in the very idea of union between mind and body.

      And it hath very good effects.

      True morality, therefore, must consider man as a compound creature, neither merely sensitive nor purely moral,—but, as he really is, Nexus utriusque mundi.

      All the observations made by naturalists upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, and of other animals, might be inserted here—But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making