The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

does not suppose innate ideas—But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind—Nature therefore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice—But our moral sense, like all our other faculties, must depend on our care to improve it.

      Hitherto then we have found our nature to be admirably well constituted with regard to virtue and vice—But, it remains to be enquired, how interest and virtue agree according to the constitution and laws of our nature.

CHAPTER V.

      Another class of laws. Those relative to interest, or private and publick good.

      First of all, the several enquiries about morals are classed.

      Next, it is to be observed, that beauty is inseparably connected with utility throughout all nature—It is so in all the imitative arts—Because it is so in nature the standard of truth.

      It is so in our mundan system—and with regard to the bodies of all animals.

      It is so, and must be so with respect to the fabric of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters, and their effects.

      The proof of this must be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind—Lord Shaftsbury’s reasoning to prove it, is taken notice of as an example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on.

      Another train of reasoning to prove that virtue is private interest—and universally acknowledged to be so.

      Some observations on Cicero’s way of ascertaining human perfection and duty,—and then of proving that virtue is in all respects our truest interest.

      An observation upon other ancient arguments to prove that virtue is private good,—we are not made for sensual pleasures, but for those of the mind, or rational ones.

      Man is made for exercise, and to acquire dominion over his mind, and all its appetites—In this our natural greatness of mind consists, and virtue alone can content this natural desire of power, and inclination to extend our capacity. Several observations to illustrate this.

      Some other considerations taken from ancient authors to prove, that virtue is man’s supreme, nay, his only happiness,—and that virtue alone can be the reward of virtue.

      Virtue is therefore private interest or good.

      This chapter concludes with some reflexions on the debates among philosophers about the meaning of obligation.

      And then sums up all in a conclusion from the foregoing considerations concerning human nature and its maker, in Lord Shaftsbury’s words.

CHAPTER VI.

      Another class of laws. Those relative to society, or the dependence of human perfection and happiness on social union, and rightly confederated abilities and powers.

      A general view of our social make—Man is in as proper a sense made for society as any machine is for its end.

      The fundamental error of Hobbs consists in his considering the desire of power, which is natural to man, as his only natural appetite or instinct.

      But our natural desire of power, as it is conjoined in our frame with other equally natural desires, is a most noble and useful instinct.

      All our affections, not only the publick ones, but even the private, have a respect to society, and are formed with a view to it.

      Society or variety of social happiness.

      Requires variety of talents and characters.

      The exigences of our animal life require great diversity of powers and talents.

      Moral happiness requires the same diversity—A variety of different tempers and characters is requisite to various reflexions or modifications of social happiness; in like manner, as various textures of bodies are necessary to the different reflexions, refractions, and transmissions of light and heat, in which the beauty of the visible world consists.

      All social virtues suppose mutual dependencies and wants, for they may be all reduced to giving and receiving.

      Natural diversities make different materials for a variety of good, by our own improvement, or of our own acquisition by right social union.

      Benevolence or publick affection naturally works in those proper proportions, which the general good of society requires—It operates like attraction in the material world.

      The notion of a publick interest is no sooner formed than due affection arises towards it—And our mind is so fitted by nature to form that notion, that we cannot avoid forming it.

      But benevolence, like other affections, is liable to changes,—it may be diminished or strengthened.

      It is difficult to determine the original force of any affection in our hearts— But it cannot be asserted, that there is nothing social in our nature, without denying the most evident truths or facts.

      It is absurd to suppose social or any affection produced by art.

      But it is proper to take notice of something that is yet more peculiarly the result of our social make,—which is the necessary dependence of our happiness and perfection as a kind, on right social union.

      Some states are adjusted to one end, and some to another,—and every moral end, as well as every natural one, hath its natural, proper and necessary means by which alone it can be accomplished.

      Hence it is that politicks is a science,—or that the different effects of different constitutions or different internal principles of government, may be determined.

      But nature could not have dealt more kindly with us than it hath done, by making us social creatures, and by pointing and prompting us to right union in order to our greatest happiness and perfection, as a kind, by our natural disposition to society, and by our moral sense of public good and order.

      Thus it plainly appears, how well we are constituted for procuring to ourselves that perfection and happiness, which must, in the nature of things, be the result of right union, or well-formed society.

CHAPTER VII.

      Another class of laws. Those relative to religion. Man is made for religion as well as for virtue.

      He can hardly avoid forming or receiving the idea of a supreme power, upon which he absolutely depends.

      And our moral sense, naturally leads us to ascribe not only intelligence, but the love of order, and the most perfect benignity of temper, to a first or original and independent mind.

      The reasonings which lead us to these conclusions are natural to the human mind, if any sentiments or reasonings can be said to be such; or indeed any instinct or appetite be such.

      Whence then imposture and false religion—It took its rise with tyranny, or was promoted by it.

      But no argument can be brought from hence against a moral sense in our nature.

      Religion is natural to man,—and religious contemplation is a very pleasant exercise.

      And highly improving to virtue.

      But good affections may become too strong and vehement.—The love of mankind may degenerate or be misguided,—and religious admiration is apt to degenerate into certain excesses or extravagancies.

      If any other guide is set up in our mind superior to natural reason, and not to be tried by it, our whole frame is necessarily unhinged.

      But the genuine effects of true well-moderated devotion, are submission to providence, and activity in doing good.

      Thus, we see, we are made for religion as well as for virtue; and that indeed in our nature, religion and virtue are one and the same thing: it is the same disposition of the mind employed contemplatively in admiring and loving supreme virtue, and actively in imitating that model. The sum of religion and virtue, according to reason and revelation, is to love God and to love mankind: and these two dispositions must go together.

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