Posterior Analytics. Aristotle

or by that of its opposite

       Chapter VII: Whether the Essence can in any way be proved

       Chapter VIII: How the Essence can be proved

       Chapter IX: What Essences can and what cannot be proved

       Chapter X: The nature and forms of Definition

       Chapter XI: The kinds of Causes used in Demonstration

       Chapter XII: On the Causes of events which exist, are in process, have happened, or will happen

       Chapter XIII: On the search for a Definition

       Chapter XIV: On the discovery of Questions for Demonstration

       Chapter XV: How far the same Middle Term is employed for demonstrating different Questions

       Chapter XVI: On inferring the Cause from the Effect

       Chapter XVII: Whether there can be several causes of the same thing

       Chapter XVIII: Which is the prior cause, that which is nearer the particular, or the more universal?

       Chapter XIX: On the attainment of Primary Principles

       Appendix

Book I.

       Table of Contents

       Chap. I.: Whether a Demonstrative Science exists

       Chap. II.: What Knowing is, what Demonstration is, and of what it consists

       Chap. III.: A refutation of the error into which some have fallen concerning Science and Demonstration

       Chap. IV.: The meaning of ‘Distributive,’ ‘Essential,’ ‘Universal’

       Chap. V.: From what causes mistakes arise with regard to the discovery of the Universal. How they may be avoided

       Chap. VI.: Demonstration is founded on Necessary and Essential Principles

       Chap. VII.: The Premises and the Conclusion of a Demonstration must belong to the same genus

       Chap. VIII.: Demonstration is concerned only with what is eternal

       Chap. IX.: Demonstration is founded not on general, but on special and indemonstrable principles; nor is it easy to know whether one really possesses knowledge drawn from these principles

       Chap. X.: The Definition and Division of Principles

       Chap. XI.: On certain Principles which are common to all Sciences

       Chap. XII.: On Questions, and, in passing, on the way in which Sciences are extended

       Chap. XIII.: The difference between the Demonstration and Science of a thing’s Nature and those of its Cause

       Chap. XIV.: The figure proper to Demonstrate Syllogism

       Chap. XV.: On immediate negative propositions

       Chap. XVI.: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in mediate propositions

       Chap. XVII.: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in immediate propositions

       Chap. XVIII.: On ignorance as resulting from defective sense perception

       Chap. XIX.: Whether the Principles of Demonstration are finite or infinite

       Chap. XX.: Middle terms are not infinite

       Chap. XXI.: In Negations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease

       Chap. XXII.: In Affirmations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease

       Chap. XXIII.: Certain Corollaries

       Chap. XXIV.: Whether Universal or Particular Demonstration is superior

       Chap. XXV.: That Affirmative is superior to Negative Demonstration

       Chap. XXVI.: Direct Demonstration is superior to Reduction per impossible

       Chap. XXVII.: What science is more certain and prior, and what less certain and inferior

       Chap. XXVIII.: What constitutes one or many Sciences

       Chap. XXIX.: Concerning many Demonstrations of the same thing

       Chap. XXX.: On fortuitous occurrences

       Chap. XXXI.: Sense perception cannot give Demonstrative Science