The Story of the Philippines. Murat Halstead

to do all that he would like in the way of keeping the peace. There were, he said, inquiries to the effect: What had the insurgents got for what they had done in the capture of Manila? Were they not treated by the Americans with indifference?

      Major Bell interposed to say that the Americans were in the Philippines not as politicians, but as soldiers, and had the duty of preserving order by military occupation, and it was not possible there could be maintained a double military authority—two generals of equal powers in one city under martial law. There must be one master and no discussion. The United States could take no secondary attitude or position—would treat the insurgents with great consideration, but they of necessity were exclusively responsible for the carrying out of the provisions of the capitulation.

      This was exactly to the point, and the interpreter cut his rendering of it, using but few words, and they did not cheer up the General and those about him. Evidently they want to know when and where they realize. It had been noticeable that the greater importance Aguinaldo attaches to what he is saying the lower his voice and the more certainly he speaks in a half whisper with parted lips, show-in teeth and tongue; and he has a surprising faculty of talking with the tip of his tongue, extended a very little beyond his lips. There was something so reserved as to be furtive about his mouth, but his eyes were keen, straight and steady, showing decision, but guarding what he regarded the niceties of statement. However, his meaning that there were insurgents who were finding fault with him was not so much indicative of a rugged issue as a confession of impending inabilities.

      He had nothing to say in response to Major Bell's explicit remark about the one-man and one-country military power, but the action of the insurgents in removing their headquarters—or their capital, as they call it—to a point forty miles from Manila, proves that they have come to an understanding that the soldiers of the United States are not in the Philippines for their health entirely, or purely in the interest of universal benevolence. The Filipinos must know, too, that they could never themselves have captured Manila. It is not inapt to say that the real center of the rebellion against Spain is, as it has been for years, at Hongkong.

      I reserved what seemed the most interesting question of the interview with the Philippine leader to the last. It was whether a condition of pacification was the expulsion of the Catholic priests as a class. This was presented with reference to the threats that had been made in my hearing that the priests must go or die, for they were the breeders of all trouble. Must all of them be removed in some way or another? If not, where would the line be drawn? The lips of the General were parted and his voice quite low and gentle, the tongue to a remarkable degree doing the talking, as he replied, plainly picking words cautiously and measuring them. The able and acute interpreter dealt them out rapidly, and his rendering gave token that the Filipinos have already had lessons in diplomacy—even in the Spanish style of polite prevarication—or, if that may be a shade too strong, let us say elusive reservation—the use of language that is more shady than silence, the framing of phrases that may be interpreted so as not to close but to continue discussion and leave wide fields for controversy. The General did not refer to his counselors, or the congress that is in the background and advertised as if it were a new force.

      The words of the interpreter for him were:

      "The General says the priests to whom objection is made, and with whom we have a mortal quarrel, are not our own priests, but the Spaniards' and those of the orders. We respect the Catholic church. We respect our own priests, and, if they are friends of our country, will protect them. Our war is not upon the Catholic church, but upon the friars, who have been the most cruel enemies. We cannot have them here. They must go away. Let them go to Spain. We are willing that they may go to their own country. We do not want them. There is no peace until they go."

      I said my information was that the objectionable Orders expressly proscribed by the insurgents were the Dominicans, Augustines, Franciscans and Recollects, but that the Jesuits were not included. This was fully recited to the General, and with his eyes closing and his mouth whispering close to the interpreter's cheek he gave his answer, and it was quickly rendered:

      "The Jesuits, too, must go. They also are our enemies. We do not want them. They betray. They can go to Spain. They may be wanted there, not here; but not here, not here."

      The question whether the friars must make choice between departure and death was not met directly, but with repetitions—that they might be at home in Spain, but could not be a part of the independent Philippines; and, significantly, they should be willing to go when wanted, and would be. Two Catholic priests—Americans, not Spaniards—were at this moment waiting in the ante room, to ask permission for the priests Aguinaldo has in prison to go back to Spain, and the General could not give an answer until he had consulted his council. Probably he would not dare to part with the priests, and an order from him would be disregarded. They have many chances of martyrdom, and some of them have already suffered mutilation.

      Something had been said about my cabling the President as to the Filipinos' determination to send a representative to Paris, and I had tendered my good offices in bearing instructions to a commissioner from Hongkong to meet the China at Nagasaki, the Japanese railway station, where the American transports coal for their long voyage across the Pacific. But that matter had been left in the air. General Aguinaldo had said he would be obliged if I would telegraph the President, and I thought if the decision was that there was to be a Philippine representative hurried to Paris, it was something the President would be glad to know. I was aware there might be a difficulty in getting permission for a special messenger to go on the China to Japan to meet the commissioners going from Hongkong, and I would be willing to make the connection, as I had offered the suggestion. But it was necessary to be absolutely certain of General Aguinaldo's decision before I could cable the President; therefore, as I was, of course, in an official sense wholly irresponsible, I could communicate with him without an abrasion of military or other etiquette. It was the more needful, as it would be a personal proceeding, that I should be sure of the facts. Therefore I asked the General, whose time I had occupied more than an hour, whether he authorized me to telegraph the President that a commission was going to Paris, and desired me to render any aid in conveying information.

      The General was troubled about the word "authorized," and instead of saying so concluded that I must have a deep and possibly dark design and so he could not give me the trouble to cable. The assurance that it would not be troublesome did not remove the disquiet. I could not be troubled, either, as a bearer of dispatches. The General could not authorize a telegram without consulting. In truth, the General had not made up his mind to be represented in Paris, holding that it would be sufficient to have an envoy extraordinary in Washington.

      Others, without full consideration, in my opinion, concur in this view. I can imagine several situations at Paris in which a representative Filipino would be of service to the United States, simply by standing for the existence of a state of facts in the disputed islands. I dropped the matter of being a mediator, having planted the Paris idea in the mind of the Philippine leader, who is of the persuasion that he is the dictator of his countrymen, for the sake of his country, until he wishes to be evasive, and then he must consult others who share the burdens of authority, and told him when taking my leave I would like to possess a photograph with his autograph and the Philippine flag. In a few minutes the articles were in my hands, and passing out, there were the American priests in the ante-room, the next callers to enter the General's apartment. Their business was to urge him to permit the Catholic priests held as prisoners by the insurgents—more than 100, perhaps nearly 200 in number—to go home.

      When the news came that General Merritt had been ordered to Paris, and would pass through the Red sea en route, taking the China to Hongkong to catch a peninsular and oriental steamer, I telegraphed the fact to General Aguinaldo over our military wires and his special wire, and his commissioner, duly advised, became, with General Merritt's aid, at Hongkong a passenger on the China.

      He is well known to the world as Senor Filipe Agoncillo, who visited

       Washington City, saw the President and proceeded to Paris.

CHAPTER V

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