Aristotle: The Complete Works. Aristotle

To know and not to know the same thing is generally thought to be possible, when e.g. one knows that X is white, but does not realize that he is musical: for in that way he does know and not know the same thing, though not in the same respect. But as to the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is approaching and that he is Coriscus.

      A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that of those who solve the proof that every number is a small number: for if, when the conclusion is not proved, they pass this over and say that a conclusion has been proved and is true, on the ground that every number is both great and small, they make a mistake.

      Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the aforesaid reasonings, e.g. the proof that ‘X is your father’, or ‘son’, or ‘slave’. Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proof depends upon a plurality of meanings, the term, or the expression in question, ought to bear a number of literal senses, whereas no one speaks of A as being ‘B’s child’ in the literal sense, if B is the child’s master, but the combination depends upon Accident. ‘Is A yours?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And is A a child?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then the child A is yours,’ because he happens to be both yours and a child; but he is not ‘your child’.

      There is also the proof that ‘something “of evils” is good’; for wisdom is a ‘knowledge “of evils”’. But the expression that this is ‘of so and-so’ (=’so-and-so’s’) has not a number of meanings: it means that it is ‘so-and-so’s property’. We may suppose of course, on the other hand, that it has a number of meanings-for we also say that man is ‘of the animals’, though not their property; and also that any term related to ‘evils’ in a way expressed by a genitive case is on that account a so-and-so ‘of evils’, though it is not one of the evils-but in that case the apparently different meanings seem to depend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely. ‘Yet it is conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase “Something of evils is good”.’ Perhaps, but not with regard to the phrase in question. It would occur more nearly, suppose that ‘A servant is good of the wicked’; though perhaps it is not quite found even there: for a thing may be ‘good’ and be ‘X’s’ without being at the same time ‘X’s good’. Nor is the saying that ‘Man is of the animals’ a phrase with a number of meanings: for a phrase does not become possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose we express it elliptically: for we express ‘Give me the Iliad’ by quoting half a line of it, e.g. ‘Give me “Sing, goddess, of the wrath… ”’

      <

      div id="section25" class="section" title="25">

25

      Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a particular thing, or in a particular respect, or place, or manner, or relation, and not valid absolutely, should be solved by considering the conclusion in relation to its contradictory, to see if any of these things can possibly have happened to it. For it is impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to belong to the same thing absolutely; there is, however, nothing to prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation or manner, or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular respect and the other absolutely. So that if this one belongs absolutely and that one in a particular respect, there is as yet no refutation. This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion by examining it in comparison with its contradictory.

      All arguments of the following kind have this feature: ‘Is it possible for what is-not to be? “No.” But, you see, it is something, despite its not being.’ Likewise also, Being will not be; for it will not he some particular form of being. Is it possible for the same man at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath?’ ‘Can the same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man?’ Or isn’t it the case that being something in particular and Being are not the same? On the other hand, Not-being, even if it be something, need not also have absolute ‘being’ as well. Nor if a man keeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particular respect, is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely, but he who swears that he will break his oath, and then breaks it, keeps this particular oath only; he is not a keeper of his oath: nor is the disobedient man ‘obedient’, though he obeys one particular command. The argument is similar, also, as regards the problem whether the same man can at the same time say what is both false and true: but it appears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to see in which of the two connexions the word ‘absolutely’ is to be rendered-with ‘true’ or with ‘false’. There is, however, nothing to prevent it from being false absolutely, though true in some particular respect or relation, i.e. being true in some things, though not ‘true’ absolutely. Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and place and time. For all arguments of the following kind depend upon this.’ Is health, or wealth, a good thing?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But to the fool who does not use it aright it is not a good thing: therefore it is both good and not good.’ ‘Is health, or political power, a good thing?’ ‘Yes. “But sometimes it is not particularly good: therefore the same thing is both good and not good to the same man.’ Or rather there is nothing to prevent a thing, though good absolutely, being not good to a particular man, or being good to a particular man, and yet not good or here. ‘Is that which the prudent man would not wish, an evil?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But to get rid of, he would not wish the good: therefore the good is an evil.’ But that is a mistake; for it is not the same thing to say ‘The good is an evil’ and ‘to get rid of the good is an evil’. Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken. For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing, acquiring things is also evil: what he wishes, therefore, is not what is evil but what is good; for to acquire something good is good. Also, disease is an evil thing, but not to get rid of disease. ‘Is the just preferable to the unjust, and what takes place justly to what takes place unjustly? ‘Yes.’ ‘But to to be put to death unjustly is preferable.’ ‘Is it just that each should have his own?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But whatever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his personal opinion, even if it be a false opinion, are valid in law: therefore the same result is both just and unjust.’ Also, should one decide in favour of him who says what is unjust?’ ‘The former.’ ‘But you see, it is just for the injured party to say fully the things he has suffered; and these are fallacies. For because to suffer a thing unjustly is preferable, unjust ways are not therefore preferable, though in this particular case the unjust may very well be better than the just. Also, to have one’s own is just, while to have what is another’s is not just: all the same, the decision in question may very well be a just decision, whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave the decision supports: for because it is just in this particular case or in this particular manner, it is not also just absolutely. Likewise also, though things are unjust, there is nothing to prevent the speaking of them being just: for because to speak of things is just, there is no necessity that the things should be just, any more than because to speak of things be of use, the things need be of use. Likewise also in the case of what is just. So that it is not the case that because the things spoken of are unjust, the victory goes to him who speaks unjust things: for he speaks of things that are just to speak of, though absolutely, i.e. to suffer, they are unjust.

      <

      div id="section26" class="section" title="26">

26

      Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must, according to the plan sketched above, be met by comparing together the conclusion with its contradictory, and seeing that it shall involve the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and time. If this additional question be put at the start, you should not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double, but grant that it is possible, only not in such a way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case. All the following arguments depend upon a point of that kind. ‘Does a man who knows A to be A, know the thing called A?’ and in the same way, ‘is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.’ Is a